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At the end of the Twentieth Century, as the theory of legalism in the 
common law lost its grip, it had been suggested that the idea of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty was an outdated model for British 
constitutionality, and that the practice of Judicial Activism should be 
permitted to expand. Based upon this premise, this thesis proposes that the 
Courts should adopt the legal title of Sovereign, based on evidence of their 
actively both making and overturning laws and statutes in the United 
Kingdom. 
 Based on accounts gathered from case law from both the United 
Kingdom and other jurisdictions, and interviews with Judges of the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, it shall be shown that Parliament’s 
relationship with the courts has changed radically since Parliamentary 
sovereignty was first popularised, and that in the United Kingdom 
Parliament is subject to the will of the judiciary, and not the other way 
around. 
 However, this thesis will also demonstrate that this system is not without 
its own flaws. Examples of judicial corruption, widely criticised decisions 
and a lack of democratic transparency in jurisdictions can be found across 
the world; all tarnish judicial sovereignty as a viable alternative to that of 
Parliament, and erode the public’s trust in the Courts to protect and defend 
the ideals of justice and the Rule of Law. Without these principles, the 
courts become a black-robed agency of the Government or worse, a publicly 
funded old-boys network that principally protects its own interests and its 
grip on authority.  
 Though the ideals that the courts claim to uphold are virtuous, history has 
shown the worrying consequences of Judicial complacency as Governments 
ignore the rule of law and the concept of Justice, most prominently observed 
in the dictatorships of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. If Judicial 
Sovereignty is to survive, it must learn from, and overcome, the mistakes of 
the past, and harmonise their role as appointed public figures with ideas of 
popular democratic government. To do this, it must accept Parliament’s 
rule-making capacity, but doing this in a way that preserves their Legal 
Sovereignty is the central challenge the Judiciary must face. 
  
 
Chapter One - Judicial Activism and the New Sovereignty of the Courts  
 
Introduction: Perspectives on the Sovereign 
 
“Most contemporary political philosophers have little use for 
the idea of ‘unlimited’ or ‘absolute’ power. Modern political 
theories ... start from a fundamental assumption that persons 
share equal rights and responsibilities so that those appointed to 
offices of power are bound by legal and moral duties ...There 
does not appear to be any room for absolute power in modern 
law and politics.” 
Pavlos Eleftheriadis
1
 
 
According to Theodor Geiger, the law can be described as an “inclusive community... based on a 
sanction-apparatus implemented monopolistically by particular organs.”2 It is the goal of this work 
to identify the courts as being that organ, operating monopolistically in its application of sanction, 
and who are capable of being called sovereign in the UK. Currently, although there is much 
confusion surrounding the issue, there is an understanding in the jurisprudential world that the 
Sovereign (i.e. the lawmaker) is Parliament, or the Head of State, or whoever it is who issues edicts 
and whose will is to be obeyed by the population. However, the idea that Parliament is the 
sovereign in the English legal system is only valid if one assumes that the ‘will’ of Parliament is 
obeyed, that what they legislate is obeyed to the letter, and the rules they write are enforced 
universally. As is to be expected in legal academia, there are many differing views of what the 
Sovereign constitutes and who, or what, the Sovereign is in a real legal system. It is the intention of 
this thesis to use the courts as model for the sovereign in the United Kingdom. This is because there 
is ample evidence to support this theory, though the evidence does leave some questions 
unanswered. However, much like Darwin’s theory of evolution, the evidence gathered in its support 
is robust enough to be convincing, and it will take more than one critique of sovereignty to answer 
every question to all peoples’ satisfaction. 
 
Pavlos Eleftheriadis points out above that no institution or body can be imbued with absolute 
power. Attempting to identify one person or organisation in a western democracy as having been 
given absolute authority, whether theoretical or actual, would be both politically and legally 
challenging to any sensible-minded person, but it is an unlimited institution, body or individual that 
we take to mean the legal Sovereign in any system. The courts, rather than a law- or policy-making 
body, instead might be seen as an instrument to guarantee checks on the power of institutions, and 
to maintain the rule of law which seeks to remind institutions of government that “be you never so 
                                                 
1 Law and Sovereignty (Draft Paper) Cambridge 2009 (see appendix) 
2 Geiger, T Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts, Duncker & Humblot (1987) 
  
high, the law is above you.”3 It is upon this this principle  that the challenge to Parliamentary 
Sovereignty rests, and that this thesis seeks to address. The objective of this thesis is to prove that 
the Courts have the ability to overturn statute, and thus play a significant part in the creation and 
development of law in the United Kingdom
4
; far more than the currently accepted view. It is the 
object of this work to prove that the courts not only make law, as is expected in a common law 
system, but also unmake law
5
 and that the supposed Sovereignty of Parliament expounded by Dicey 
is a dated and outmoded model in need of redevelopment itself, or of its context, with greater focus 
on the role of the judiciary. 
 
In order to carry out this objective, the first task must be to define what is meant by Sovereignty in 
the legal and political systems of the United Kingdom, and to properly apply this meaning to the 
institutions of power in Britain. As it is commonly understood, “Sovereignty is the absolute and 
perpetual power of a commonwealth, which the Latins call maiestas; the Greeks akra exousia, 
kurion arche, and kurion politeuma; and the Italians segnioria, a word they use for private persons 
as well as for those who have full control of the state, while the Hebrews call it tomech shevet; that 
is, the highest power of command”6. 
 
The theory of sovereignty can be traced as far back as Aristotle, who wrote in The Politics that in a 
state there is a supreme authority, and that such power to make law must lie with one, a few or 
many people
7
. It is necessary therefore to examine many different organs of authority to reach any 
conclusive answer to the question of sovereignty of the United Kingdom. It is also necessary to 
examine constitutional theory as well as definitions of sovereignty, and the distinction between the 
Political and Legal sovereign. This distinction is extremely important, and helps to distinguish the 
purely political role of Parliament and the government, from the influence, intentional or otherwise, 
they also have in the legal system.  
 
The legal and political systems of the United Kingdom are distinct, but intertwined. One cannot be 
explored without understanding its relationship with the other. It is also important to explain here 
too that the institutions of power are constituted by The Legislature, the Executive and the 
Judiciary. Between them, they form the basis of any state government, and in the following chapters 
I shall be exploring their roles in the law-making process, their effect on the definition of 
sovereignty, and how their operation changes and shifts the title of legal sovereignty from one 
institution to another, or to all, or to none. 
                                                 
3 Thomas Fuller 
4 It is important to distinguish here between the United Kingdom as a State, and the distinct legal systems of England and Wales, and 
that of Scotland and Northern Ireland. These states enjoy an independent legal jurisdiction and a degree of Law-making power, and 
are considered separate jurisdictions. Considering it’s importance in the British Constitution, Devolution will be explored in greater 
depth in later chapters, but since a vast proportion of the theory I have mentioned is derived from observation of the legal system of 
England, where I refer to the United Kingdom in a legal sense, I will inevitably be referring to the legal system of England and 
Wales. 
5 de facto, if not de jure. 
6 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, edited and trans. by Julian H. Franklin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 1 
7 Aristotle, The Politics, Penguin Classics (2000) 
  
 
Equally important is the distinction between ‘Politics’ and ‘the political’, as demonstrated by Carl 
Schmitt in his short but influential essay, The Concept of the Political.
8
 In this work, Schmitt points 
out the distinction between these two concepts; describing the way politics functions as being 
defined by conflict, our state or social group versus (in one sense or another) a political foe; while 
the political is described as being the force or energy that drives societies into adversarial groups. 
Schmitt uses the example of pacifism, arguing that “If pacifist hostility toward war were so strong 
as to drive pacifists into a war against nonpacifists, in a war against war, that would prove that 
pacifism truly possesses political energy because it is sufficiently strong to group men according to 
friend and enemy.”9 As Schmitt says, “The specific political distinction to which political actions 
and motives can be reduced is that distinction of friend and enemy.”10 Obviously, this essay 
concerns itself with the law, and as many professional judges will testify (as well as some 
prominent legal theorists) that the law does not concern itself with politics. However, Schmitt has 
already explained that ‘the political’ is concerned with the friend-enemy distinction. Even 
superficially, we see this concept of the Political in Law, this is the adversarial system that is 
employed in litigation. Thus, we can see the application of the political in the law, that helps to 
shape political policy by creating and altering precedent. In this regard, we can see that “contrary to 
crude separation of powers accounts of the role of the courts, the UKSC [United Kingdom Supreme 
Court] does make policy, sometimes in significant ways.
11” 
 
A significant pitfall faced whenever we might attempt to solve the problem of the definition of 
sovereignty is that various definitions can each be applied to one, two or all three of these 
institutions at once. In jurisprudence, a definition of sovereignty that applies to one organ of 
government effectively and properly, in a way that fits not only with the theoretical powers and 
responsibilities of that organ, but also with its actual, exercised powers, has so far been elusive, 
although several theories of sovereignty have been proposed.  
 
John Austin, in his work, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined
12
 proposed a list of 
prerequisites a person (or body of persons) must meet in order to be called sovereign in a legal 
system. I have chosen deliberately to focus on the Austinian model of Sovereignty, which was 
expanded and updated for the twentieth century by H.L.A. Hart, because his model was principally 
a theory based upon principles of Natural Law. This system is one in which the morality of law is 
inherent to their validity. The opposing school of thought, Legal Positivism, attaches no moral 
conditions upon the rules of a legal system. For Positivists, there is only pure law. The morality of a 
rule should attach to the rule-maker, and not the instrument of law which he creates. In particular, 
natural law theory works well with the concept of Judge-made law, because it is the judges who 
must make decisions on the application of rules in a legal system; and to do this, they must base 
                                                 
8 Scmitt, C, The Concept of the Political, University of Chicago Press 1996 pp36 
9 Scmitt, C, The Concept of the Political, pp26 
10 ibid at pp26 
11 Aitken R, Smallwood H and Stirton L, Judicial Politics: Reigning Supreme? New Law Journal 02/12/11 
12Austin, J Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (ed. W. E. Rumble) Cambridge University Press, 1995 
  
their decisions on more than the mere application of statute. As Hart says in The Concept of Law
13
 
“the judge, in punishing, takes the rule as his guide and the breach of the rule as his reason and 
justification for punishing the offender.” For Hart, clearly, the role of a judge was not to simply 
apply a rule when it is proscribed by circumstance, and that in fact Judges play a vital part in the 
interpretation, evolution and wider application of rules in a legal system by using more than just the 
statute. The Judge must use reason and morality, gauging the effect of a statute as well as the 
judgment itself to determine how he should rule. In this regard, one could see interpret the role of 
the judge as being one principally concerned with the school of Natural Law. The two most 
prominent writers on the validity of rules, whose work we have already explored, are H.L.A Hart in 
his book The Concept of Law and John Austin in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Both 
were Positivists who, to put it briefly, believe that if a rule is valid (i.e. the source of law is one that 
forms 'legitimate' rules in a legal system, or is from the 'Sovereign', and the rule itself was created 
using the proper procedure) then it is a proper law, regardless of its ethical or moral implications or 
consequences.  
 
Applying ethics to the law is a case of observing the intentions of the Sovereign, and not judging 
the consequences of the law directly. That is to say, a law might produce an inherently ‘bad’ result, 
but it is the sovereign who is at fault for producing the law, not the law itself. The rule is inert, has 
no motive and no conscience. In Natural Law, a statute can be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending upon its 
effect, and Judges such as Lord Chief Justice Coke (who shall be discussed in later chapters) take 
an active role in the control of statutes through more liberal interpretation. For more active judges 
than Coke, this can extend to even declaring an act void altogether. This has been made even easier 
in recent years through a greater abundance of directly effective European Union law, along with 
the introduction of the Human Rights Act. This interpretation means accepting that the Sovereign, 
whether Parliament or another person or body, whose morality is fallible if not his will, can be 
responsible for the consequences of the laws he enacts. Equally so, the Judiciary must accept 
responsibility for the rules that they create in the common law, and how they manipulate the 
language of Statutes in order to change their meaning. When a judicial decision alters the meaning 
of a Statute, as was done in Anisminic, for example, the Judiciary must account for the impact that 
change will have on society. 
 
To Austin, the sovereign must act as a determinate common superior, who is habitually obeyed by 
the bulk of the population but who does not need to obey any other body or person. When viewed 
alongside Hart’s perspective on the role of the courts, it becomes more clear that the Courts do and 
must take a primary role in the law-making process.  
 
A further reason for choosing to begin by examining Austin’s definition is that it is easy to 
understand, and is a useful starting point at defining the sovereign. It is unfortunate however that it 
is impossible to apply his definition to any one person or body in a legal system. This is because in 
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a democratic society any one body with law-making authority must have its power checked by 
another to ensure that no one institution can act autocratically.  
 
That is a significant flaw in Austin’s definition of the Sovereign: how a person or body of persons 
can have unlimited power, and not be constrained by any other person or body. In the United 
Kingdom, Parliament is regarded as the sovereign, bearing all the hallmarks of a body 
unconstrained by any other. However by its definition it must be constrained
14
 (in a legal and 
political sense
15
) by the population, since it is made possible by democratic process. It is through 
the electorate that Parliament can be challenged, and through the electorate that Parliament 
legitimizes its claim to sovereignty.
16
 This theory, of legitimacy,  However, if Parliament is 
dependent on the will of the people, it cannot be sovereign, since it is at the mercy of the electorate. 
This forms a part of Austin’s theory, who said in Lecture IV of Province of Jurisprudence, 
“speaking accurately the members of the Commons House are merely trustees for the body by 
which they are elected and appointed: and consequently the sovereignty always resides in the 
King’s Peers and the electoral body of the commons.17” The people too cannot be sovereign 
according to Austin’s definition, because they are bound by the will of Parliament, which enacts 
laws that are directly enforced upon the population. Is it, then, that Parliament is sovereign by the 
will of the people, who devolve authority to make and apply law to Parliament itself? Sir Francis 
Jacobs observed in his Hamlyn Lecture, that, “Legally, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify 
today a State in which a ‘sovereign’ legislature is not subject to legal limitations on the exercise of 
its powers. Moreover, sovereignty is incompatible, both internationally and internally, with another 
concept which also has a lengthy history, by which today is widely regarded as paramount: the rule 
of law.”18 
 
It has become quite clear that Austin’s theory, though it may not deserve to be disregarded, at least 
needs to be updated, or explored in a new, more modern context. The theory must be made to fit the 
politics of the age, rather than attempting to bend the definitions of politics to fit an aged, 
incompatible theory. Fortunately there is an alternate theory that could be applied when attempting 
to define the sovereign in the United Kingdom. A.C. Gray, in his work, Nature and Sources of the 
Law, said that it is judges who breathe life into “dead statute.”19 To Gray the Courts, who are 
responsible for creating and guiding common law, and interpreting statute, are actually law-makers 
in themselves, and serve as a potential candidate for the title ‘sovereign’. If this were true, then the 
relationship between Parliament and the courts would need to be closely re-examined.  
                                                 
14 A number of Statutory examples of these constraints exist, including the Representation of the People Act 1985, used recently in 
the judgement against the MP Woolas, who won his seat by making false allegations against his competitor in the election, contrary 
to the Act. On the other hand, the new system for examining MPs’ expenses is only one example of the Judiciary controlling the 
activities of Parliament. 
15 Whereas for example a Military Junta rules only with a monopoly of force, in a democratic system a government rules with a 
monopoly on public support. 
16 “The argument ... is that the government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed.” Ashcraft, R 
(ed.) John Locke: Critical Assessments London: Routledge, 1991 pp524 
17 Nowadays we would more accurately refer to this as Representative Democracy. 
18 The Sovereignty of Law: The European Way, Hamlyn Lectures 2006 (Cambridge University Press 2007), pp5 
19 Gray, A.C. Nature and Sources of the Law 
  
 
Austin’s theory, though applicable to the courts, is not usually applied to the judicial system. 
Judges, it seems, are modest, and do not wish to be accused of making law. Austin does assert that 
the Sovereign is that person or body of persons whose will is habitually obeyed by the majority of 
the population the majority of the time (it must be the majority, or else the idea of crime would be a 
fiction). If Members of Parliament (especially in a majority government) vote based on pressures 
from their whips, and the cabinet, then Parliament itself is controlled by the cabinet. This is the 
guiding principle behind the working of government in the United Kingdom. If, however, the 
Cabinet controls parliament, then could it not be argued that the Executive, in the United Kingdom 
known as the Cabinet, is Sovereign? 
 
This problem will be more thoroughly explored in chapter four, but the answer to this question is 
no. Aside from the obvious rebuttal that Parliament, sharing its capacity as legislature between the 
Members of the Commons and the King’s Peers, can vote down a bill proposed by the Cabinet, the 
Cabinet cannot be sovereign because even if Bills they propose are enacted into statute it is 
inevitable that, at one stage or another in its application, it will be challenged by judicial review. 
Judicial Review, the process whereby the courts decide on the applicability and importantly, the 
legality, of any Act of Parliament, is a right reserved exclusively by the courts, and plays a vital part 
in ensuring that the power of the legislative and executive branches is controlled and not allowed to 
become arbitrary.  
 
Since so many potential candidates exist that may fit the definition proposed by Austin, albeit 
superficially, that undertaking to discover who has the most legitimate claim to Sovereignty is 
extremely difficult, and to make an informed decision, we must understand the term before we 
attempt to apply it. Austin confusingly calls the population both the sovereign and the subject, being 
at once ruled over and also the rule-maker by virtue of elections to Parliament. Historically, this has 
always been the case: “from the end of the 13th century it was an axiom of political theory that the 
justification of all government lay in the voluntary submission of the community ruled.”20 
 
We, as the electorate, devolve the authority to make decisions on our behalf to the members of 
Parliament that we select to represent us. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, makes this point, that 
“In a free state, every man, who is supposed a free agent, ought to be, in some measure, his own 
governor; and therefore a branch at least of the legislative power should reside in the whole body of 
the people.”21  
 
The problem with this is that the system itself has been put in place non-democratically, and even in 
a way that is detrimental to the basic freedom of democracy in the United Kingdom. Parliament, the 
Grandfather of the modern democracy, was historically not a House for the representation of the 
                                                 
20Gierke O, Johannes Althusius und die Entwickling der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien (1902) 78 
21 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1 Chapter 2 
  
people. Even Magna Carta, hailed as a document guaranteeing the freedoms of the people, did this 
only accidentally. Historically, Magna Carta was authored by the Barons of England, building on 
historical rules established by the Saxons (such as Kine Ine), in response to the imprisonment of a 
nobleman at King John’s pleasure and without trial. This lead to an uprising of the Barons, and John 
was forced to sign the document under duress.
22
 
 
This story creates many problems. The first is, if the Magna Carta was authored by, and applied 
only to the Barons, how can this be a democratically supportive document? First, it is vital to note 
that as a statute and an act of positive law, the principles contained in Magna Carta were thereafter 
applicable to everyone. Moreover, as a statute that received royal assent, it became binding, and the 
words became open to interpretation by the courts. As a result, it became very simple for socially 
minded Justices to interpret the universal applicability of the act, and to make the act applicable to 
the serf population of Britain, the peasant class that had, until that point, not enjoyed the now 
historic right to habeus corpus. It was also applicable to the growing middle classes and merchants, 
who gradually came to dominate the lower house. 
 
The second and more important question of course is that, if an act is signed into law by a king 
under duress, can it be a legally binding act of the Crown?
23
 It is important to note that Magna 
Carta was reissued a number of times, suggesting that although it was an act assented to at first 
begrudgingly, it nonetheless became an accepted part of the English legal system. However, the 
nature of Magna Carta’s first inception invites a number of concerns regarding the legitimacy of 
acts signed into law by the Crown. If Magna Carta is valid, then it is possible for a sovereign to be 
pressured into assenting to acts. If this were true, then he would no longer be the sovereign.
24
  
 
This does highlight the concern that the crown, even the Crown of King John, whose authority was 
far wider than those who succeeded him, is not Austin’s ‘sovereign’, but is in fact a mere 
figurehead, a shadow-king whose presence is decorative yet unnecessary in a functional 
government
25
. Of course, the Sovereign as we understand it did not truly exist in the time of King 
John. His reliance upon his Council to legitimise his rule made the term ‘sovereignty’ somewhat 
alien to our modern understanding; perhaps in that sense there was no real sovereign at all. Despite 
Blackstone’s assertion in his Commentaries that the King “is not only incapable of doing wrong, 
but even of thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or 
weakness,”26 King John, existing as he did in a time when Parliament as we know it now was 
unthinkable, was an autocratic ruler, and so his authority was absolute. But even Kings such as John 
                                                 
22 Bingham, T, The Rule of Law, Penguin 2010 
23 Since duress normally invalidates agreements, even ones as authoritative as Magna Carta. 
24 We shall discuss this issue in greater depth in chapters five and six. 
25 See Bagehot, W, The English Constitution (Cambridge University Press: 2001). As well as casting more light on Henry III in 
particular, Walter Bagehot also provides a thorough and engaging discussion on the historical development of the English 
Constitution. 
26 Blackstone, Commentaries. I, ch.7, p. 239 
  
were constrained by the tide of public opinion. For example, Henry III’s coronation speech served 
as a sort of non-election manifesto
27
, promising lower taxes and greater freedoms for his subjects.  
 
The monarch, when viewed in this way, carries out a defunct and perfunctory role in the political 
and legal system. It is more a question of tradition. That we have had a monarchy for so long breeds 
the question, why be rid of them now? Although this is a discussion on subject of Sovereignty in 
the United Kingdom, the topic inevitably moves toward a discussion of the monarchy. The monarch 
acted as the legal and political sovereign for hundreds of years, and the influence of the Royal 
Family is still evident in the practices and procedures of Parliament and government. Ministers, for 
example, are all ‘Of the Crown;’ acts of Parliament require Royal assent, and this is not just true of 
the United Kingdom. Sixteen nations of the Commonwealth recognise the Queen as their official 
Head of State (the rest regard her merely as Head of the Commonwealth), despite the fact that it is 
their respective Parliaments that pass their laws, and any question of a foreign monarch deciding on 
the validity of domestic law is simply ignored. It would be as if all acts of our Parliament in the 
United Kingdom required the assent of the Dutch Royal Family. The assertion itself totally defies 
the idea of the sovereignty of Parliament, and places that same sovereignty into the hands of the 
Crown.  
 
However the monarch cannot be sovereign. This has been proven by countless acts and historical 
legal documents, beginning with Magna Carta in 1215. The legacy of this document lasts even to 
this day, and the freedoms of the people, as well as the restrictions on the sovereign, last even in 
modern bills, and modern rhetoric. It is from this document that the principle of Habeas Corpus is 
derived, one of the most important rights in the history of the English legal system. The Bill of 
Rights, of 1650 laid down principal rights that should be inherent in all legal systems. It constrained 
the monarch, removing the power to levy taxes without the consent of Parliament, enshrining in law 
the final subjugation of the People to the Monarch’s will. Magna Carta, as valid a legal and 
constitutional document now as it was then,  if not more so, must apply its spirit not just to the 
monarch but also to Parliament should it act ultra vires. In defence of Magna Carta, and any 
document that seeks to check absolute power, it has been argued that, “[i]f Parliament ... can change 
any law at any moment ... then the rule of law is nothing more than a bad joke.”28 Constitutional 
documents and the power wielded by the courts ensure obedience to the Rule of Law by the law-
makers, and this clearly makes the courts, the constitutional interpreters, the Sovereign in Law
29
.  
 
And yet, we are no closer to understanding who the sovereign is in the British Legal and Political 
systems. We have so far ruled out the population, because they are bound by laws enacted by 
Parliament. We have ruled out Parliament, because it is bound by the will of the people, and that 
                                                 
27 For more on this discussion, see Bingham, T, The Rule of Law, (Penguin: 2009), whose historical account of the development of 
the rule of law is covered in greater depth.  
28 G. de Q. Walker, The Rule of Law, Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press: 1988) 
p159 
29 This idea, expounded by the formidable Australian Jurist Sir Owen Dixon, as well as the famed New Zealand Appellate Judge 
Lord Cooke, in greater depth in later chapters. Further reading on this topic can be found in Dixon’s “Law and the Constution” (1935 
51 LQR 590), and Cooke’s “The Suggested Revolution Against the Crown” (in Joseph, Essays on the Constitution (1995), 28-40) 
  
individual MPs are made to follow the party line by their respective whips. We have ruled out, too, 
the executive branch, the Cabinet, because when bills are sent through Parliament MPs can vote 
them down, and so the Cabinet’s will is subject to the will of Parliament.  
 
As we have already seen, however, the will of Parliament is subject to the will of the people who 
are subject to the will of the Government which is subject to the will of Parliament which is subject 
to the will of the people... etc, etc. 
 
Clearly, this circular logic negates the present definition of the sovereign, as applied in its current, 
Austinian form. It is obvious that there is no defined, authoritative sovereign in the United 
Kingdom. However, by saying this, we omit one of the most vital branches of government, the 
Judiciary. 
 
The courts do not rely on the population and elections. Moreover, the courts operate within a 
common law system, as well as applying Acts of Parliament. This means that the courts have the 
authority to create law where no statute exists on the subject, or to expand on rules already created 
by previous judicial decisions. Judges are also able to expand on statutes where there is little or no 
supporting instruction on how the statute is to be applied, or if its application is impossible except 
through further interpretation. This role of judicial review and statutory interpretation is supported 
by the statement of Baroness Hale, a Supreme Court Justice and one of the most senior appellate 
judges in the United Kingdom, who said, “the court would require incredibly plain language to 
make the actions of government non justiciable, not subject to judicial review in some form or 
other.”30 This, therefore, enables the court to fit Austin’s definition of sovereignty neatly, by using 
Gray’s theory, that ‘“Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it 
is he who is truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or 
spoke them”; a fortiori, whoever hath absolute authority not only to interpret the Law, but to say 
what the Law is, is truly the Law-giver.’31 
 
However, this is not the recognised theory among conventional scholars of jurisprudence. Since 
Blackstone, there has been a total shift in consensus from recognising the Courts as having their 
own authority to decide on the constitutionality of the executive and legislative branches of 
government, to an attitude derived principally from the sovereignty of Parliament. Even Judges 
themselves refuse to acknowledge their own authority against Parliament, yet their decisions 
frequently influence the power and jurisdiction of the executive and legislative branches. Baroness 
Hale said “We have two guiding principles in our constitution. One is the rule of law but the other 
is the Sovereignty of Parliament ... the rule of law would tend to say that the sovereignty of 
Parliament must be respected. And all exceptions to that ... come from the European treaties ... The 
                                                 
30 Interview with Baroness Hale, 30/03/2011, Tom Graddon (see appendix) 
31 Gray, A.C, Nature and Sources of the Law 
  
theory is that Parliament could unmake those exceptions.”32 This is true, but only so long as those 
exceptions are derived from principles of the Rule of Law. 
 
This statement implies that Parliament has the right, at its will, to decide on all matters without 
question. Although this adheres to the commonly held belief in modern jurisprudence in the 
absolute sovereignty of Parliament, in practice this dated understanding of the interrelationship 
between the three organs of government is totally unworkable. Parliament has no such authority, 
because important matters of state are more often than not governed by the relevant government 
department and minister. As a result, the Cabinet (or rather, the Executive) curtails the actual power 
of “parliament” as a whole. It is possible to argue that Parliament itself has devolved its authority to 
individual ministers, and that such devolved authority could be reclaimed; but in practice 
Parliament is actually constrained by a system of rules created under principles of the Rule of Law.  
 
The next logical question, of course, is from where does the authority of the cabinet arise? Unlike 
Parliament members of the cabinet do not need to be elected, beyond becoming an MP
33
, to become 
cabinet ministers. It is possible, then, to say that although Parliament is sovereign de jure, it is not 
the de facto sovereign. 
 
The key to understanding the origin of sovereignty in the United Kingdom is to understand what we 
mean by the Rule of Law. Despite the Parliamentary Sovereignty rhetoric, the Rule of Law runs 
superior to common legal sovereignty, and only “tends” to lend sovereignty to Parliament. More 
than this, the rule of law shapes the political and legal landscape of not only our government, but all 
democratic government systems. Baroness Hale added that “The anxiety of the judges to maintain 
the rule of law i.e. everybody has got to obey the law whatever the law is, is is a common thread 
that goes through.” 
 
John Austin said that the sovereign enforces his authority with a monopoly on “state-sponsored 
violence.”34 Never has this been proven truer than in the last three decades. Since 1980, the police 
and security forces in the United Kingdom have demonstrated their willingness to apply this 
violence, in particular during the Brixton Riots of 1981, the Poll Tax Riots of 1990, the G20 
demonstrations of 2008, the Student Demonstrations of 2010, the Austerity Marches and the Riots 
of 2011. The riots, in fact, actually support the notion that the Sovereign is the judiciary, because in 
sentencing offenders in the aftermath the Judiciary showed a surprising heavy-handedness against 
those convicted.
35
 There is, however a misconception as to the relationship between the Judicary 
and the Police. According to Justice J M Priestley,  
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 Of course, a Cabinet member may also come from the House of Lords. 
34 Perhaps Austin was guilty of a tautology here, since violence against the population can only ever be sanctioned by the Sovereign. 
Any other person or body is constrained by law, whereas he is not and thus is able to commit acts of violence without risk of 
punishment. 
 
  
“In the public mind judges are seen as part of [The State’s] law 
enforcement apparatus. Several times a month television presents 
powerful images of criminal trials, where judges and courtrooms 
appear in the same stories as prison vans, police officers, Department 
of Corrections escorts, and lawyers. It is common knowledge that 
judges are lawyers. They must be selected from the pool of 
practitioners. They are regarded as lawyers. What these images and 
impressions miss is that a judge, on appointment, is no longer a 
member of the bar. A judge is instead part of an arm of government, 
independent, and performing a vital constitutional role.”36 
 
In the aftermath of the London Riots, the role of the courts became one of both judicial impartiality 
and appeasement of public and political feeling against the rioters. As a result, the Judiciary was 
forced to become politicised. Whereas the Police were only required to quell the rioting, to the point 
of requesting extraordinary riot suppressant tools (such as rubber bullets and water cannon), the 
Judiciary must consider the repercussions of their judgments, and as a result, must enter the political 
fray, if reluctantly. In MacDonald Inc v Attorney General of Canada, La Forest J said that “Courts 
are specialists in the protection of liberty and the interpretation of legislation and are, accordingly, 
well placed to subject criminal justice legislation to careful scrutiny. However, courts are not 
specialists in the realm of policy-making, nor should they be.”37 As much as Judges would like to 
avoid questions of constitutional conflict with Parliament, it is inevitable that questions of policy 
will be debated in the halls and chambers of Justice, and so the justices themselves must accept that, 
since all questions of law that come before the Supreme Court will affect domestic law, all 
questions of law must also be questions of policy in some regard. 
 
The police, however, are free from the fetters of judicial impartiality, and instead are only required 
to implement criminal law policy issued by Government
38
. Where this happens, with no review by 
the judiciary, infringement of rights and liberties can occur in the name of government policy. One 
such example could be that of the Royal Wedding on the 29th April 2011. Although on the day 
there was widespread celebration, it is natural to expect that not everyone shared in the festive 
atmosphere. However, any attempt to demonstrate on this day was highly regulated, and permitted 
only outside a designated area in central London. Even outside this zone, demonstrators were met 
with hostility by the Metropolitan Police, who announced that they would be enforcing “section 
60s.”39 Protesters were told that if they did not disperse from their gatherings the police would treat 
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the situation as being imminent of a breach of the peace
40
, and would make arrests against anyone 
demonstrating.  
 
This is a clear misuse of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which only gives officers the 
right to search members of the public, or gives officers the right to make an arrest where he believes 
a breach of the peace is imminent. However, for this to be the case, there must be an act committed, 
or threatened, which puts a person in fear of harm. According to the charity Liberty Advice Service, 
whose advice would have been publicly available to the protesters, “Something which merely 
distresses or offends someone will not normally amount to a breach of the peace.”41 As a result, 
they could not have anticipated that their actions would have amounted to a criminal breach of the 
peace. 
 
The police, it must be noted, are granted independent constabulary powers, and may have been  
acting independently of government. Nonetheless, this (mis)use of the Act in these circumstances is 
not only disproportionate, but contrary to the will of both Parliament (acknowledged politically and 
legally, and perhaps falsely, as the sovereign), and the population itself which is granted the right to 
gather and protest under the Human Rights Act 1998.  If this is the case, and the will of Parliament 
was ignored by the police, an organization whose duty is to uphold the will of the sovereign, then 
Parliament is not be habitually obeyed. Moreover, these actions contradict the will of the Courts 
who, as I shall show below, defend the right to protest, and rule harshly where the police misuse 
their powers, use them disproportionately or in a way that is not in the way that Parliament had 
intended the act to be used. This is all part of the process of Judicial Review, and can also include 
measuring an acts compatibility with the Human Rights Act, and with European conventions and 
treaties.  
 
The reported case of R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary
42
 lends itself 
well to the assertion that the Police enforce the will of the Government, but not necessarily the 
Sovereign. The facts of the case state that a coach full of protesters, on their way to a 
demonstration, were stopped on their route by the police and, fearing a potential breach of the 
peace, the constable in charge deemed it appropriate under section 60 to detain the protesters and 
have them return on the coach to London, and were not allowed to step off the bus until it returned 
(a journey time of approximately 2½ hours). The court decided in this case that although the police 
were within their right to order the passengers not to continue their journey, they were not at liberty 
to send the coach back to its point of origin, and nor was it a legitimate order to disallow any 
passenger to leave the coach for the duration of the journey. The courts decided that in this case, the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(b)that persons are carrying dangerous instruments or offensive weapons in any locality in his police area without good reason, 
he may give an authorisation that the powers [to stop and search] conferred by this section are to be exercisable at any place within 
that locality for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours 
40 Video Recording, 29/04/2011, Tom Graddon (see appendix) 
41 www.yourrights.co.uk/yourrights/the-right-of-peaceful-protest/other-police-powers-to-restrict-right-to-protest.html Accessed 
28/06/2011 
42 R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary [2006] UKHL 55 
  
police were clearly acting beyond their jurisdiction, as May LJ stated in his judgment when he said 
that “(a) there was no immediately apprehended breach of the peace by her sufficient to justify even 
transitory detention, (b) detention on the coach for two-and-a-half hours went far beyond anything 
which could conceivably constitute transitory detention such as I have described, and (c) even if 
there had been, the circumstances and length of the detention on the coach were wholly 
disproportionate to the apprehended breach of the peace.”43 
 
These examples of disproportionate application of police power require exploration in order to fully 
understand for whom these powers are operating, and to what end. The Police, like many other 
government institutions, operate on behalf of the Crown. However, as has already been seen, the 
Crown is not sovereign, because it lacks the authority to make law at its leisure. 
 
Then surely, sovereignty must belong to Parliament, since it is they who make the statutes that the 
police enforce; thus, it is the police exercising the state-sponsored violence in the name of enforcing 
the will of Parliament? Yes and no. Although the police do enforce statutes enacted by Parliament, 
they also enforce common law decisions made by the courts. Murder, for example, is a common 
law offense, defined by Lord Chief Justice Coke as being “the unlawful killing of any man in rerum 
natura, with malice aforethought.”  
 
As a result, the police are, in fact, enforcing the will of the courts, who act in their capacity as a 
law-making body. Moreover, where a suspect is charged, the right of Habeas Corpus is instantly 
put into effect, and the police must bring the suspect before a court to be tried for the crime of 
which he is accused. This writ, one of the oldest in the English legal system, is one of the most 
fundamental rights in English law, and is enshrined historically, and still in contemporary legal 
documents, that everyone “is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”44 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights, enshrined in English law by the Human Rights Act 
1998, guarantees a fair and impartial judiciary, though historically this is a right already enjoyed by 
citizens of the United Kingdom. Traditionally, the courts have been outspoken in their criticism of 
the government, particularly Lord Chief Justice Coke who, in Dr. Bonham’s Case (1615), said that 
if ever an act was “anathema” to the public good, the courts should render it not law.  
 
Baroness Hale commented that, “you might when you read the case and think about it, think that 
there was a certain commonality, not complete consistency, but a commonality in Coke's saying the 
common law of England is a stronger thing than the power of the king.”45 
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Naturally, this assertion is correct; one couldn’t say for definite that Coke meant the power of 
anyone but the King in this case. However, given that his approach was normally to challenge 
absolute power, even of the sovereign, it is logical to interpret that when he made this comment he 
was referring to anyone that claimed absolute law-making power, including Parliament. After all, 
wherever power is derived from it is power nonetheless, and must be checked to prevent it from 
becoming absolute and arbitrary. Logically, anyone who claims absolute law-making power is in a 
very dangerous position; because it is possible to apply the will of the Sovereign arbitrarily, it is 
possible that the enactment of his will could lead to an abuse of power. It could be argued that this 
is what happened in 2005 when the Freezing Order
46
 case came before the Supreme Court. This 
case was the application of the Terrorism Act passed previously, which allowed security services to 
hold terror suspects indefinitely in detention before a burden of proof had been met, thus depriving 
suspects of their right to be presumed innocent, and their right to a fair trial. In that circumstance, 
the House of Lords held that the law was incompatible with the Human Rights Act, and the 
Government reacted by allowing the statute to lapse and subsequently replaced it. The Government 
did not need to comply with the declaration, because they allowed this to happen and replaced the 
legislation appropriately.  
 
A further example of the court exercising their powers of judicial review and power to prevent the 
legislature and executive from arbitrary rule came with the case of Control Orders and Special 
Advocates. 
 
The legislation as drafted said that if the closed material was sufficient for the court to uphold the 
control order the court should do so, even if it couldn't be disclosed to the controlled person and he 
wouldn’t have a fair hearing without its disclosure. The Supreme Court could have made a 
declaration of incompatibility, saying it was incompatible with Article 5 or Article 6 depending 
upon whether it was a deprivation of liberty (because it was not supposed to be a deprivation of 
liberty). But they chose not to do that; Instead, the court interpreted the act so that it meant the 
opposite of what it actually said. That is, that the home secretary can't be forced to disclose the 
closed material if he didn't want to, but if the person couldn’t have a fair hearing without it being 
disclosed, the home secretary would not be able to rely on it for the purposes of persuading the 
court to make the order. As a result, the home secretary was forced to choose between disclosure 
and the order. This decision was effectively the reverse of what the parliamentary language said.  
 
When the case next came to the Supreme Court, because there was still a problem about how 
disclosure was necessary to ensure a fair trial. The Home Secretary could have said that the prior 
decision was an impermissible use of section 3 of the Human Rights Act, and could have demanded 
a declaration of incompatibility so that the Act could continue to operate in its original form. 
However, the Home Secretary chose not to do that.  
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In many ways, this is a curious approach by the Government, and almost reinforces the assertion 
that the Courts are sovereign over Parliament. If the Government had so wished, the Home 
Secretary could have pressed for the court to make a declaration of incompatibility, so that the Act 
could be normalised (the convention that politicians do not interfere in the decisions of the courts is 
well-established, though they sometimes criticize the decisions afterwards). However, the courts 
had reinterpreted the statute into something totally removed from the parliamentary language, and 
totally different from the will of Parliament. The courts had manipulated the language of the statute 
on the subject of control orders, and had bested Parliament at making law. If the courts were not 
sovereign, the Executive could have pressed for a redrafting in the Commons of the Act as it stood, 
so that the language was non-justiciable and clear, but instead the Government was faced with an 
act that had been almost rewritten by the Supreme Court, in a case that, coming from the most 
superior appellate court, made a ruling not just in one case, but a common law rule that would 
subsequently affect all cases whose points of law were homogenous to this one.  
 
This is where the real power of the court lies. No court could simply create a law; not because there 
is some prior stated convention that prevents the court from doing so, but simply because 
attempting to do so would create so many political arguments that it is impractical to try. As Sir 
Robert Howard said, “the king ought to be under no man, but under God and the law, because the 
law makes the king. If any prerogative is disputed, the courts must decide the question of whether 
or not it exists in the same way as they decide any other question of law.”47 
 
Already, there have been arguments between the Executive and the Judiciary on the subject of law-
making authority. In January of 2011 David Cameron, the Prime Minister, made a statement
48
 
condemning a Supreme Court ruling on the subject of the sex offenders register
49
. The court had 
found that it is disproportionate and contrary to article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights for a 
person to be placed on the sex offenders register in perpetuity, where circumstances make this so. 
The case that went before the Supreme Court surrounded two complainants, who argued that their 
continuing registration was an unfair breach of their right to a private and family life. The first 
complainant had been convicted of rape at 14, arguably at a time when he was not fully responsible 
for his own actions. As a result of his crime, he was placed on the sex offenders register for life, 
with no opportunity for appeal to be removed. The court accepted that this was disproportionate, 
and that it should be permissible for a person to appeal for his removal from the register after an 
appropriate period of time.  
 
The Executive and Legislative branches of government complained that the courts had exceeded 
their jurisdiction, and had gone about making a law in a way that was not constitutional. This was, 
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in fact, false, and even the criticism itself was unconstitutional
50
, as it could be construed as an 
attempt to pervert the independence of the court. However, despite the complaints from 
Government, the decision made by the court will be upheld, and the Executive have said that they 
will amend the statute accordingly so that the court’s decision can be put into practice. This shows 
that the Government feels compelled to follow the direction of the court, even when it disagrees 
fundamentally with the decision.  
 
I shall now briefly explain the format of my reasoning in the coming chapters, and explain how I 
shall use the materials available to me to establish a legitimate line of argument in support of my 
thesis that the Courts are Sovereign in the legal system of England and Wales. 
 
Approaching an Argument for Judicial Sovereignty 
 
It is key to the argument that the courts are sovereign that the definitions of what it is to be 
Sovereign are explored. This work relies principally on the work of modern jurisdictions outside the 
United Kingdom, including that of the United States, Australia and New Zealand. However, there 
are certain philosophical theories that must be explored as well as instances of actual judicial 
activism. Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan is a foundation stone to understanding the definition of the 
Legal and Political sovereign. His work, alongside that of A.C. Gray and Austin, shall be explored 
principally in chapter 2. Furthermore, we shall also explore the work of H.L.A. Hart, and other 
modern legal philosophers’ explorations of the Sovereign.  
 
Once it has been shown that the Courts have authority over the law-making branches of 
Government, we then need to explore just how far this power can be exercised practically in the real 
world. To do this, we shall look at some practical examples. These will be explored in depth in 
chapters five and six, but for now we shall briefly explore the principal cases surrounding the issue, 
and the questions which arise therein. 
 
I shall now explain how I intend to structure my argument. I shall first engage in a study of the 
established theory, and historical cases which have been established in the common law as 
demonstrating actual examples of how the courts have asserted their sovereign authority over 
Parliament. So, for chapter three we shall focus on direct historical examples, as the chapter’s title 
suggests. We shall then move on to modern examples of judicial activism, and explore how the 
courts exercise their authority in the modern world, as well as the tools they use to do this.  
Following this, I shall explore two jurisdictions that bear similar hallmarks to our own, but with 
radically different views on judicial activism. These jurisdictions are the United States and New 
Zealand, in both of which judges have taken on a more active role as policy-makers either through 
their defined roles in the constitution or because of their own will to activism. A more detailed 
explanation of what shall be examined can be found below. After this, I shall conduct a thought 
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experiment, drawing on examples from Pakistan and Thailand, to build an idea of what would 
happen if the Judiciary and Parliament clashed over judicial review of statutes. There shall then 
follow the concluding chapter of this work that shall reiterate the points made in the initial chapters, 
and finally establishing that the courts are sovereign in the legal system of England and Wales. 
 
The first historical case to be explored is, of course, Dr. Bonham’s Case51. This case is noteworthy 
because of the obiter statement made by Coke which was mentioned above. Coke ruled that  
 
“in many cases, the common law will controul [sic] Acts of Parliament, 
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of 
Parliament is against common right or reason, or repugnant, or impossible 
to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such an act 
to be void.”  
 
This attitude was not uncommon for its day, but was nonetheless indicative of a Judiciary that was 
prepared to clearly define its independence, and its role in the law-making process. The key issues 
raised by this case is simply who Coke was referring to in his statement. As Baroness Hale 
explained above, his language identifies the King in that particular case, but, as I mentioned, why 
should this not be extended to whomever is in charge and claims sovereignty? If one tries to apply 
the same statement in the modern day, it becomes obvious that it doesn’t apply to the Monarchy, 
since their role is to act as figureheads, and only continue to exist because the extent to which the 
constitution was reformed after the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution gave us a constitutional 
Monarchy rather than the complete abolition of the Royal family all together. Could it be, therefore, 
that Lord Chief Justice Coke’s statement would apply to Parliament? 
 
Besides which, even if Coke’s statement would not apply to Parliament it was, for its time, a 
particularly extreme statement to make, given that the Judiciary derived its authority from a 
devolution of justice from the Sovereign, originally named as the monarch, who ruled autocratically 
and was, thus, the sovereign according to the Austinian definition. The question to be asked later is, 
therefore, how is this statement to be applied, and could it be relevant in a modern legal-political 
landscape? 
 
The next case to be examined is The Case of the Sheriff of Middlesex
52
. This case, from the 
nineteenth century, concerned the separation of power between Parliament and the Judiciary. Its 
impact was greatly significant, as the case cemented the doctrine that where there is a breach of the 
law, it is the Judiciary that has sole responsibility for hearing arguments and adjudging on points of 
law, whereas prior to this the House of Commons was able to exercise authority as a court for 
Parliamentary procedure. This case could be seen as the first real and significant challenge made by 
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the courts against the sovereignty of Parliament, as it was a direct challenge to Parliamentary 
authority. As sovereign, despite devolving its judicial functions to the Courts, Parliament should be 
able to adjudicate on points of law that it creates, whereas this case laid down clear divisions in the 
power of the separate arms of government, and stated unequivocally that the role of Parliament is to 
draft and enact statute, and the role of the Judiciary is to interpret statute and apply the law in all 
circumstances. In many ways, this case could be seen as the Judiciary ring-fencing itself, and 
defining its own limitations, but nonetheless, the case raises the question, if the courts apply and 
interpret the law, but also innovate common law rules, then is the judiciary legitimately responsible 
for making law itself?  
 
We shall also, in our pursuit of the Sovereign in the United Kingdom, examine the roles of courts in 
other jurisdictions, paying particular attention to the Supreme Court in the United States, and its 
role in the law-making process. We shall in particular examine the case of Marbury v Madison, 
which famously established the US Supreme Court as one with jurisdiction to strike down statute 
that is incompatible with the US Constitution. We shall then focus on a case study, that of the 
President of the United States and his role as the potential Sovereign in their legal system. Two 
presidents in the past century have declared themselves to be above the  law, using a number of 
legal arguments, in their attempts to evade the implementation of the Rule of Law to curtail their 
authority. Nixon, in the nineteen-seventies, declared that “if the President does it, that means that it 
is not illegal”, and similarly George W Bush Jr. stated that as Commander-in-Chief, he had the 
authority to ignore the law and to act without judicial review. This is a position, as we shall explore, 
that the courts will not allow, and will decide accordingly, limiting the power of the President to 
what they consider to be appropriate and within the confines of the Constitution.  
 
The United States does in fact operate in a similar fashion to the United Kingdom: it has a common 
law system alongside its statute law; however the United States has a constitution which, one could 
argue, is the sovereign in itself. Would it be appropriate for the United Kingdom to adopt a 
constitution, in order to avoid issues of sovereignty? Already in commonwealth countries, the 
United Kingdom has had a great deal of experience in drafting constitutions, and the Privy Council 
is well versed in deciding cases of constitutionality, so it could be that enacting a formal 
constitution, and forcing government to ensure statutes are compliant with it, is an appropriate 
means of balancing the power of the court with the authority of parliament. It does, however raise 
the question, who decides on the constitutional power of the different arms of government, and 
could the constitution itself be the subject of (mis)interpretation by the Supreme Court in Britain? 
 
Following this, we shall examine the attitudes of foreign jurisdictions that bear yet closer 
similarities to our own legal system. In particular we shall be examining the concept of sovereignty 
in New Zealand and Australia. We shall also be examining the role and development of law 
surrounding the Treaty of Waitangi. This is a significant legal document in New Zealand, and 
amounts almost to a form of Constitution, the terms of which ensure protection of lands and 
  
freedoms belonging to the indigenous Suomi people, and outline procedure for land transfer from 
the Suomi to the Crown, and in reverse. This document has achieved a kind of importance 
unparalleled in the United Kingdom, especially since the terms for the treaty were expanded upon 
and defined in a judgment by the courts. This is an example of the courts directly influencing 
political policy, and is a dramatic departure from the position the courts in the United Kingdom 
would rather inhabit. Moreover, we shall be examining in detail the work of the distinguished jurist 
Robin Cooke, who wrote extensively on the influence and work of the courts in defining and 
creating laws and policy. 
 
Furthermore, we shall go on to explore the Anisminic Case, which concerned compensation from 
the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. In this case, a committee was created to divide the 
compensation fund, and the statute declared that all decisions made by the committee will be final. 
The House of Lords, however, decided that where that decision was incorrect on points of law, it 
could come under the scrutiny of the courts. This could be seen as a continuation of the Sheriff of 
Middlesex, as it effectively puts all questions on points of law to the jurisdiction of the court where 
those questions are raised in the course of proceedings in Parliamentary committees and tribunals. 
The question raised here is, to what extent could this power be applied by the court to other aspects 
of Parliamentary procedure? Could the courts, theoretically, call into question the validity of 
Commons and Lords decisions where a point of law is incorrect? And should a statute be passed by 
virtue of an error of law, could the courts subsequently overturn the act’s validity and have the 
decision reviewed? 
 
The more modern cases to be examined are all concerning the power of government to curtail rights 
viewed as fundamental in law. These include the Freezing Order Case
53
 (Also known as Ahmed v 
the Treasury, or the Treasury Order Case). This case concerned the power of the treasury to rely on 
the United Nations Act 1945 to freeze the assets of terror suspects. In one of its first decisions as the 
Supreme Court, the highest appellate court in England and Wales decided that without 
Parliamentary scrutiny, such orders were invalid, and thus overturned the orders themselves. This is 
significant because the Supreme Court is making clear that unless Acts, orders and Statutory 
instruments are given proper scrutiny by Parliament, then they cannot be allowed to operate. 
Moreover, the court is making clear that it will uphold wherever necessary the rights and freedoms 
laid out by the Human Rights Act and European Convention on Human Rights. This case, as well as 
the Belmarsh cases and Control Orders cases, which are mentioned above, raise obvious questions 
as to the power of the Courts, and the extent to which they are permitted to challenge the authority 
of Parliament. So long as the courts are able to challenge the authority of parliament, then 
Parliament cannot claim sovereignty.  
 
The final cases to be examined shall be the Woolas and Parliamentary Expenses Cases. These cases 
concern Members of Parliament who commit acts of criminal wrongdoing, and so present a legal 
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question of jurisdiction, inviting conflict between Parliament and the Court. For Woolas, the 
wrongdoing was straightforward: during the course of his election campaign, he  made a series of 
false allegations against his opponent, violating section 108 of the Representation of the People 
Act.
54
 As a result, a special Election Court was convened to decide on the legitimacy of his election, 
and how best to apply the law. In this case, the court decided to remove Woolas from his seat, and 
declared the election void. The court, effectively, overturned a democratic election, and implied its 
superiority over democracy, effectively making it greater than the political system.  
 
In the case of Parliamentary Expenses, three MPs were prosecuted for fraudulently claiming 
expenses for personal expenditure. When challenged in court in criminal proceedings, they 
attempted to claim that their expenses were covered by Parliamentary privilege and so inadmissible 
as evidence. Moreover, they tried to claim that it was Parliament’s jurisdiction to discipline MPs, 
and not the courts; a claim that was dismissed by the judiciary.  
 
These cases all present different points of law and procedure when trying to identify the sovereign 
in the United Kingdom. They can be grouped together into themes however, and in the following 
chapters I shall discuss these cases according to their themes, beginning with direct challenges to 
the sovereignty of Parliament, in Bonham, and Middlesex. Furthermore, we shall discuss the 
implications of challenging the procedural authority of Parliament, in Anisminic, Freezing Orders 
and Woolas. Finally, we shall examine the authority of the courts to adjudicate on matters 
concerning European Union legislation, and how not only its influence, but also the manner in 
which the courts interpret and apply that legislation, affects the sovereignty of Parliament. These 
cases are, of course, Concerning the Sex Offenders’ Register55, the question of prisoner voting56, 
and Control Orders
57
. 
 
We shall also be examining contemporary issues of sovereignty in the United Kingdom, with 
reference to changes in foreign and domestic policy, and how 9/11 has fundamentally changed the 
British legal/political landscape, and how the relationship between Parliament, the Cabinet and the 
Courts has been perhaps irreversibly changed as a result of the measures put in place by Parliament 
in order to prevent acts of terrorism.  According to the Telegraph, “Laws rushed onto the statute 
book were judged inimical to ancient British liberties because they allowed terrorist suspects to be 
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held without trial. Yet they had been passed by Parliament in the full knowledge that they were 
illiberal and discriminatory: MPs and peers decided that, on balance, the threat from suspected 
terrorists outweighed their human rights.”58 A legitimate concern would be that, in that current 
climate of fear, the words of Thomas Fuller, “be you never so high, the law is above you,” are being 
overlooked or even ignored by Parliament. How threatened is the Rule of Law, and as a result the 
power of the courts over the other two pillars of government, to guarantee compliance with the 
principles of the Rule of Law?  
 
This attitude toward the law by the executive and the legislature has been expounded by policy 
changes by the United States, which has adopted an exceptionalist attitude
59
 toward violations of 
human rights and the rule of law, for example in their use of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and Bagram 
Airbase
60
, which are used to detain people without adherence to the principle of Habeas Corpus, 
and in their continued use of extraordinary rendition, which strips terror suspects of the basic 
human rights guaranteed by the United States by proxy. 
 
Lastly, I shall conduct a thought experiment to try and explore the implications of a direct challenge 
to the authority of Parliament by the Judiciary. A serious concern raised by the Sheriff of 
Middlesex’s Case was that the courts could, if they wished, stop co-operating with Parliament, and 
refuse to uphold the convention of Parliamentary sovereignty. If this were to happen, the 
implications would be colossal. It would be impossible for Parliament to operate as both a 
legislative and judicial organ, and thus any breakdown in their relationship would mark a 
fundamental change in the legal-political landscape. In the course of this thought experiment, I aim 
to show that the Courts have an authority beyond mere interpretation of statute. They are the 
authority, to which the police subject criminal elements, but they are also law-makers, that protect 
and uphold our rights and liberties, and they are guardians of a fair and democratic society. In their 
capacity as justices, the courts prevent arbitrary rule, uphold basic maxims of Habeas Corpus and 
fundamental human rights, and administer fair and universal justice. Without independent common-
law courts, society would be markedly different, and not for the better.  
 
T this work is intended to prove that the courts, through their dispensation of justice according to 
the rule of law, are the legal sovereign in the United Kingdom. I shall show, through the combined 
chapters described above, that Parliament is at the mercy of the Courts who, through their 
interpretation of statute, breathe life into otherwise “dead law,”61 and can overturn statute as they 
choose, so long as their decision to do so is supported by sound legal argument, firmly based in the 
Rule of Law, good precedent and principles of Natural Law. Though Parliament lays claim to 
authority to author statute, without the court it would be unenforceable, and the very nature of the 
                                                 
58 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/philipjohnston/8001383/Do-we-want-to-be-ruled-by-judges-or-MPs.html 
accessed 29/07/2011 
59 Aradau, C and Van Munster R, Exceptionalism and the ‘War on Terror’: Criminology Meets International Relations Br J Criminol 
(2009) 49 (5): 686-701 
60 We shall be examining Bagram Airbase in particular in Chapter 5, where in particular we shall focus on Rahmatullah v Foreign 
Secretary. 
61 Gray, A.C, Nature and Sources of the Law 
  
sovereign is that his will is obeyed and enforced. Without the Court, there can be no Sovereign, and 
if the Sovereign relies on another body to carry out his functions, then he cannot be defined as such 
in a legal system.  
 
  
 
Chapter Two - Historical Challenges to Parliamentary Sovereignty 
          
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good 
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example."
62
 
      Justice Brandeis USSC      
 
In this chapter we shall explore the historical context of judicial sovereignty and the prevalence of 
judicial opinion over statute in early modern British legal-political history. This topic is far-
reaching, and so our discussion will need to be narrowly focused. Therefore, we will be examining 
a few of the most significant cases and examples in order to prove that, historically, the courts have 
enjoyed a Sovereignty which today they are unwilling to acknowledge. 
 
Taken from his dissenting judgment in Olmstead in 1928, Justice Brandeis must have known that a 
statement such as the one above would have generated much controversy in jurisprudence. 
Government, as a teacher to the people, leads by example in its adherence to the Rule of Law. Any 
government that ignores the law so too indicates to the people that to do so is acceptable. The 
Courts, arbiters of the rule of law, set the rules by which government must play. If governments fail 
to listen to their judgments, and so fail to abide by the Rule of Law, then what good are the courts?  
 
The Early Development of Judicial Sovereignty 
 
The courts, through their judgment and interpretation, mediation and arbitration, become churches 
to the Rule of Law.  There can be only one law for everyone, and everyone stands beneath it and 
must live within its confines. The Rule of Law is an abstract concept. It cannot ensure by its own 
volition that governments adhere to it, which the public keep within its bounds, and so the Courts 
use their authority to do this by proxy. Through the Seventeenth Century, in keeping with the idea 
of the courts as being almost mystics of the law, the role of common-law judges was “to act as 
ultimate court of appeal in constitutional matters, as a supreme court. The law itself was sovereign; 
and the judges alone understood its mysteries.”63 And even earlier, the prominent jurist Henry de 
Bracton made note in his work, On the Laws and Customs of England, that “Though in almost all 
lands use is made of the leges and the jus scriptum, England alone uses unwritten law and custom. 
There law derives from nothing written [but] from what usage has approved.”64 
 
Obviously, the reality of this statement has changed since the seventeenth century. Dicey, 
Blackstone and others have all made their own contributions to rebutting the Courts in defence of 
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the sovereignty of Parliament
65
. Even historically, however, the idea of the rule of law was used 
then as it is used now: not only in legal terms, but also as propaganda. For example, one need only 
turn to Oliver Cromwell who, on the establishment of his Protectorate, authored the Instrument of 
Government in 1653, which was to enshrine in law some unalterable principles. 
 
Within the Instrument, Cromwell says, “In every government there must be somewhat fundamental, 
somewhat like a Magna Carta, that should be standing and unalterable.” The nobility of this phrase 
cannot be overlooked - effectively enshrining in law certain unalienable principles such as the right 
to religious freedom - Cromwell comforts us with the assurance that “parliaments should not make 
themselves perpetual” because “of what assurance is a law to prevent so great an evil if it line in 
one and the same legislator to unlaw it again?”66 
 
The problem with this assurance is that the Instrument gave supreme power to Parliament, if not to 
the Lord Protector himself,
67
 as a result, even considering this to be the first modern European 
‘constitution’ it is still flawed, since it denies the possibility of the rule of law over the rule of the 
sovereign
68
. However, as a starting point, it still serves as a fine example of how a British 
constitution has been authored to reflect, if not to effect, a belief in the rule of law. But is it really 
necessary to have a constitution in order to give Judges the authority to make law? Jeremy Bentham 
felt it was an obvious fact that judges make law, and exercise private judgement in cases brought 
before them. He said that any judge who claims not to make the law, but instead, as Blackstone 
suggested in his Commentaries, serve as “depositories of the law; the living oracles who are bound 
by an oath to decide according to the law of the land,”69 is resorting only to a “childish fiction.”  
 
In modern English political history, it was not uncommon for politicians to leave matters of law to 
Judges themselves; “occasionally, it [Parliament] would pass a legal monument such as the Bill of 
Rights of 1689 or the Act of Settlement of 1701, but judges formulated most of the rules regarding 
torts, trespass, property, wills, contracts and obligations between employers and employees.”70 It 
can be seen, therefore, that the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty is not an antique notion. In 
fact, it was borne out of the nineteenth century, seemingly as a matter of necessity. While other 
nations were adopting constitutions, and building supreme courts to regulate policy against its 
sovereign laws, Britain lacked both. Canada granted its supreme court the power of constitutional 
judicial review of statutes in the late nineteenth century, Norway too, in the 1880s, granted this 
power to its supreme court, and the twentieth century saw Australia, Ireland, India and the 
Philippines grant this authority to their supreme courts. Variations of this judicial review can be 
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found in Switzerland, parts of Latin America, some African nations, and such formal, if not real, 
authority can be found in Pakistan and was witnessed in the former Yugoslavia. Argentina’s Corte 
Suprema modeled itself after the United States Supreme Court and paid particular attention to its 
authority to review statute.  
 
In the legal system of England and Wales, however, there is no such method of recourse. To 
illustrate this point, I would highlight the issue of Kenya’s independence. In 1968, Kenya was 
granted its independence from the British Empire. When this occurred, the government of the 
United Kingdom offered British passports to all Asians domiciled in Kenya who refused Kenyan 
citizenship. However, when Kenya began expelling Asians with non-Kenyan citizenship, the 
number of non-white immigrants to the United Kingdom increased, and as a result, a limit was 
placed on the number of non-white immigrants that were permitted to enter Britain. If this same 
situation had arisen in the United States, and Congress had passed a similar bill refusing entrance to 
non-white immigrants, the Supreme Court would almost certainly have found this to have been 
unconstitutional, as it unfairly excluded immigrants with a legal right to enter the country bearing 
British passports.  
 
The Privy Council, of course, has exercised the authority to decide on colonial constitutional issues, 
and continues to do so (though without the authority that it had during Britain’s Commonwealth 
era) this Court does not have the jurisdiction to decide cases within the legal system of England and 
Wales. The Supreme Court too, refuses to reclaim the authority it exercised in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and which was vehemently defended by Bentham.  
 
According to Baroness Hale the United Kingdom has experience enough of drafting constitutions
71
 
but without one for ourselves, we were in need of some means of justifying the origin of our laws. It 
was not uncommon thought at the time of Austin in the early nineteenth century that Judges did 
indeed make the law, and perhaps the most vocal of those who advocated the sovereignty of the 
courts was A.C. Gray, a contemporary of Austin’s, whose treatise ‘The Nature and Origins of the 
Law’ continues to be a persuasive manifesto for a Sovereign Common Law. His defence begins 
with criticism of the common law itself, asserting that,   
 
“The Common Law has often been reproached with the lack of 
precision and certainty in its definitions, but, in truth, it is a great 
advantage ... that its definitions are never the matters resolved 
by the cases; they are never anything but dicta. If at the end of 
the sixteenth, or of the seventeenth, or even of the eighteenth 
century, there had been definitions binding by statute on the 
Courts; if the meaning of “contract," and  “malice,” and 
“possession," and “perpetuities" had been fixed, what fetters 
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would have been imposed on the natural development of the 
Law.”72 
 
In this assertion he is, of course, correct. The advantage common law holds over statute is that it is 
able to change, to direct its own natural evolution and to ensure that practitioners of law, and the 
citizens of its society who must be able to understand and live within it, are not “hampered by the 
cast-iron classification and definitions of a former generation, which, in the advancement of legal 
thought and knowledge, are now felt to be imperfect and inadequate.”73 
 
This is the balance that the current system attempts to strike when creating and adjudicating on 
statutes. Parliament creates law that, if the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty is to be believed, 
should be fixed and immutable. However, the disadvantage of creating law that is unchangeable is 
that it is just that: unchangeable. Obviously, the custom that Parliament cannot bind itself plays its 
part in ensuring that laws are more flexible - if a government dislikes an act of Parliament passed by 
a previous government, it can simply draft a bill to replace it. But is this enough? Surely, it cannot 
be that Parliament must spend so much time drafting and redrafting replacement bills for statutes 
that have become dated and obsolete? 
 
This is where the courts play their vital role, and take on their task as sovereign. They create the 
law, but not directly. As Baroness Hale pointed out, “You could say that the sovereignty of 
parliament is judge made, but it's probably a sensible approach to consider where the tanks are.” 
This is a view of legitimacy shared by political philosopher Max Weber, who wrote extensively on 
the “monopoly of legitimate physical coercion”74 that the state is said to have.  The courts must be 
careful not to upset their relationship with Parliament or make a direct challenge to the supremacy 
of Parliament when making law, and so a law’s creation comes not with drafting a statute, but with 
its interpretation.  
 
There are two aspects to the interpretation and implementation of the law: the first comes in 
drafting statute, the second in its implementation. As was pointed out by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, 
“historically, legislation had failed to meet the requirements of change; given complex conditions of 
modern life it was inconceivable that legislators could write laws that would foresee and provide for 
all eventualities.”75 Whereas Blackstone claimed that judges were not “delegated to pronounce a 
new law, but to maintain and expound the old one,” it becomes apparent as one examines the 
principle of statutory interpretation that the role of judges actually shapes the meaning of statutes, 
sometimes deviating entirely from the original purpose of the bill.  The most obvious and recent 
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example must be that of the Control Orders case
76
, which was heard in what was then the House of 
Lords in 2005.  
 
In this case, terror suspects were statutorily unable to see certain evidence against them, and 
particularly the use of closed evidence and special advocates. The legislation as drafted said that if 
the closed material was sufficient for the court to uphold a control order the court should do so, 
even if it couldn't be disclosed to the controlled person and he wouldn't have a fair hearing without 
its disclosure. The House of Lords (as it was then) could have made a declaration of incompatibility 
saying it was incompatible with article 5 or article 6 depending upon whether it was a deprivation of 
liberty, because control orders were supposed to be a limitation, and not a deprivation of liberty. but 
we the Law Lords interpreted the statute so that it meant the opposite of what it actually said. That 
is to say that the Home Secretary can't be forced to disclose the closed material if he didn't want to, 
but if the person can't have a fair hearing without it being disclosed, the home secretary can't rely on 
it for the purposes of persuading the court to make the order.  So the home secretary was forced to 
an election between disclosure of the evidence and upholding the control order, which was the 
reverse of what the parliamentary language said. When the case next came for an appeal, because 
there was still a problem about how disclosure was necessary to make a fair trial, the home 
secretary could've said the decision had been wrong, that it was an impermissible use of section 3 of 
the Human Rights Act and that it was necessary to submit a declaration of incompatibility to 
continue using the act in its original form. The strange thing, however, was that the Home Secretary 
chose not to do that. Instead, the Government decided to uphold the decision of the court and, when 
the case returned for appeal, again on the question of disclosure, rather than argue over the same 
question of disclosure, instead  the government chose to argue on how much disclosure was 
necessary.  
 
This example shows quite plainly that the Executive will respect the rule of law, because in reality, 
Parliament is not the sovereign. In a statement to me on the issue, a spokesperson from the Ministry 
of Justice said, "The Government
77
 fully acknowledges the ruling of the Supreme Court in this case 
and is unwavering in its commitment to both the independence of the courts and to the rule of 
law.”78 The Government, if it so wished, could have pushed for a change in legislation, or for an 
order of incompatibility, but despite it’s theoretical powers to act against the ruling of the courts, it 
did not. It could be argued that for Parliament, the truth of the matter is that “the survival of 
sovereignty is what it appears to be, just a mistake.”79 
 
Direct Challenges to Parliament in Legal History 
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The first historical case that we will discuss is Dr Bonham’s Case,80 but first I would like to turn to 
an historical example of Courts’ supremacy outside the bounds of the United Kingdom and earlier 
than Bonham. I would like to explore the development of the Legal System in Early Colonial 
America.The development of the legal system in Colonial society is of significant interest not only 
because of the role the courts played, but because of the manner of their inception.  
 
The Plymouth Colony, established in December 1620 by the occupants of the Mayflower, was the 
first continuously and permanently occupied settlement in North America, and followed on from 
the failed colonies of Roanoke and Fort Raleigh further south along the coast in Virginia. 
Unusually, Plymouth was not granted a Royal Charter and so had no absolute source of English law 
to establish government and a legal system. As a result, the colonists themselves came together and 
authored the Mayflower Compact, which states,  
 
 “We, whose names are underwritten ... do by these Presents 
...covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body 
Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and 
Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid: And by Virtue hereof do 
enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal Laws, 
Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions, and Officers, from time to time, 
as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general 
Good of the Colony; unto which we promise all due Submission 
and Obedience.” 
 
This established for the first time the General Court of the Plymouth Colony. This institution was to 
carry out all the functions not only of the Judiciary but also of the executive and legislative 
branches of government. It was able to draft and implement statutes, decide and act upon disputes, 
and appoint Government officers. As a result, this institution became exceptionally powerful and 
influential in the early days of the Colony. It could be said that this is the first clear example of a 
court adopting its role as a proper sovereign in the absolute sense of the word. 
 
We shall now explore Bonham’s Case, the facts of which will be familiar to any scholar of legal 
history or sovereignty, but for the benefit of those unaware, Dr Bonham was a graduate of St John’s 
College, Cambridge, and was granted a medical doctorate from the University of Oxford. By 1602 
he had finished his studies, and subsequently moved to London where he began practicing, and 
associated with the Barber-Surgeon’s Company. However, due to a Royal Charter, medical 
practitioners in the City of London were regulated exclusively by the Royal College of Physicians. 
The charter, as well as a further Act of Parliament, the College of Physicians Act 1553, gave the 
College the authority to act as a court, and fine and to imprison indefinitely those they judged. For 
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Legal theorists, and those interested in the topic of Sovereignty, this case has been made famous by 
the obiter statement of Lord Chief Justice Coke, who said,  
 
"One cannot be Judge and attorney for any of the parties... And 
it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will 
controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be 
utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common 
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, 
the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be 
void."
81
 
 
This statement has become one of the most controversial in the study of the common law. Coke 
clearly defines here that the courts should and do have the authority to strike down statutes, 
provided that they are “against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed.” 
 
It should be remembered that, as Baroness Hale points out, “In a way Bonham’s case is water under 
the bridge, because we have had a revolution since then. In another way of course, you might, when 
you read the case and think about it, think that there was a certain commonality; not complete 
consistency, but a commonality in Coke's saying that the common law of England is a stronger 
thing than the power of the King.”82 
 
Naturally, the question to be raised is, when does an act of Parliament fulfill one of these 
requirements, and become repugnant, or contrary to right and reason? Regrettably, Coke did not 
elucidate on this point, although the question brings to mind the words of Isaiah Berlin who said, 
“the task in life of the wise is to undo that damage done by the good.”83 
 
The necessity for definition is not insignificant. Without it, we are unable to decide how and when a 
judge can use the power given to him by Coke in Bonham. It is only in recent history that we have 
seen any shift toward the powers envisioned by Coke, and this has been made possible by the 
introduction of a law taken to be higher than that of an Act of Parliament. 
 
By virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998, judges now derive definitions of citizens’ rights and 
liberties from ‘principles of the constitution’, or the European Convention on Human Rights84, and 
where a statute runs contrary to the European Convention, or European Union law, the court is able 
to issue a declaration of incompatibility. Of course, according to those who adhere to the principle 
of Parliamentary Sovereignty, the declaration lacks any real authority. Acting on this premise 
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Parliament is perfectly entitled, if it chooses, to ignore a declaration of incompatibility made by the 
court.
85
 In practice, however, this is not so simple. Where Parliament has been issued with a 
declaration of Incompatibility, especially where concerning human rights, there has always been 
made an effort to change the law so that it complies with the declaration. Such examples include the 
Freezing Order case (Ahmad v The Treasury), Prisoners’ Voting of 2011 and, of course, the sex 
offenders register case.  
 
From this, we could infer that an act which is contemporarily contrary to right and reason could be 
one incompatible with the Human Rights Act, currently the closest example the United Kingdom 
has to a codified bill of rights.  
 
Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, tells us that, “The law can never be against reason, our lawyers are 
agreed; and that not the letter, (that is every construction of it,) but that which is according to the 
intention of the legislator, is the law.” This seems to support the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty 
dominating judicial sovereignty, but the idea that the law cannot be against reason, and that the law 
is imbued in the spirit, if not the letter of the law, is a fundamental principle that drives judicial 
review. Hobbes goes on to say that this reason is “an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long 
study, observation, and experience.”86 There can clearly be no other subject that fits this description 
better than the judiciary. Clearly, Hobbes was describing the common law, and it’s evolution of 
rules through close observation of not only the law as it is written and interpreted, but also its 
human effect, and the impact of decisions, statutes and laws on present and future cases.  
 
Thankfully, Hobbes does present to us a useful definition of the sovereign. He first points out that 
the sovereign can take his title in one of two ways, the first of which being by institution. This is 
where,  
 
“a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one, with 
every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be 
given by the major part, the right to present the person of them 
all (that is to say, to be their representative;) every one, as well 
he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all 
the actions and judgements, of that man, or assembly of men, in 
the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live 
peaceably among themselves, and be protected against other 
men.” 
 
This is, in effect, the concept of the social contract, a social tool used to explain how societies are 
formed from the collective of individuals, who each agree to be governed together for their 
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communal, and individual, good. The idea of the social contract has been described and explored by 
a number of philosophers, including Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, and a more detailed explanation 
of this concept can be found in their respective works.
87
 
 
The sovereign, to Hobbes, was simply “one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual 
covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the 
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence.” 
 
Naturally it was Hobbes and his contemporaries, who had become akin to philosophy’s celebrities 
in the age of the Enlightenment, who discovered the importance of identifying the seat of absolute 
authority in a state, and worked toward a definition of the powers and fetters imposed upon the 
sovereign, and the manner of his relationship with the population. It was in this age of 
enlightenment that Grotius rediscovered the principle of Des Publica
88
, a feature of Roman law that 
passed responsibility to holders of office to act only in the public good. This could be considered as 
one of the earliest examples of a fetter against Sovereign power, and was so interwoven with the 
political system even at that time that to Locke, the idea of the Des Publica was ‘the most common 
of commonplace’, and in fact Locke dedicated little time on its consideration.89 
 
This idea of there being a ‘public trust’ conferred upon figures holding public office, created 
according to the theory of the social contract (a theory which held prominence throughout the age 
of the enlightenment), acts as a direct constraint on Parliamentary Sovereignty, and might be 
considered a convention due to its historic nature. It was, however, conveniently forgotten by the 
commentators of the nineteenth century such as Blackstone and Dicey, as they found it 
incompatible with their vision of an unfettered, solely Sovereign Parliament. These two, along with 
Hobbes, have been described as the “High priests of the mystery” of Parliamentary Sovereignty90 
RFV Henston describes the concept as being created “more by a series of obiter dicta by eminent 
persons, whether sitting on the bench or in the professorial study, than by clear judicial decision of 
binding authority.”91 According to one critic, “Dicey announced it was the law that Parliament was 
omnipotent, explained what this meant, and never devoted so much as a single line to fulfilling the 
promise he made to demonstrate that this was so.”92 
 
Hobbes, like many of his contemporaries defines identified certain distinct features unique to the 
Sovereign. Having been imbued with the authority of that title by means of a covenant of men in 
society, if any man should try to depose him then he is in breach of that same covenant, and takes 
away not the authority of the sovereign, but the sovereignty owned by the population themselves, 
having devolved that power to their representative. In removing that power from the sovereign, he 
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defies the collective will of the population. Moreover, Hobbes explains that the power of the 
sovereign cannot be forfeited. He says, “because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given 
to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; 
there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his 
subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection.” 
 
What Hobbes means by this, is that the population agree among themselves who it is they wish to 
represent them, and make no such agreement with the representative himself. This means that the 
sovereign, “maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand … because either he must make it 
with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant; or he must make a several covenant with 
every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one person: 
and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the 
sovereignty are void; because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach 
thereof; is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of 
every one of them in particular.” 
 
Surely, this creates a very serious problem with future definitions of sovereignty. By saying that the 
sovereign cannot refuse his title, we bind him to certain rules, and according to later definitions 
(Austin for example) the sovereign cannot be bound by anyone. In fact, this later derivation toward 
the unlimited sovereign is an even further step toward a definition of the sovereign that is 
impossible to fit to a modern institution. There cannot be, at least not in Western democratic states, 
a limitless source of law and power, unfettered by any rules whatsoever. Hobbes, in telling us that 
the sovereign is limited in his power, actually presents to us a more accurate idea of what the 
sovereign is and must be. In the United Kingdom, the prevalent concept of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty remains unchallenged, despite the number of incidents in the common law that have 
seriously limited the power of Parliament as, for example, a court in its own right. Even Bonham, in 
its own way, identifies that it must be the courts, and no other body, that has such extensive power 
to decide on imprisonment and fines.  
 
The next case we shall examine is that of the Sheriff of Middlesex
93
. This case came to become one 
of the most significant in defining the limitations of Parliament and shifting the balance of power 
more favorably toward the courts. The case concerned a libel action by the claimant, Stockdale, 
who had published and edited under the pseudonym Thomas Little, a medical text called On 
Diseases of the Generative System. Stockdale was a notorious pornographer, and the plates printed 
in the book were of questionable decency. Upon discovery of the text in Newgate prison during an 
inspection, the House of Commons ordered that Hansard publish a report that an indecent book was 
circulating in Newgate. Although Parliamentary papers are included in Parliamentary Privilege, a 
movement began in 1835 to make such papers available to the public, and as a result the report by 
Hansard was released. Stockdale argued that such circulation of a Parliamentary Paper which 
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claimed a book he had edited and published had been obscene was libelous. The publisher for the 
Commons, Hansard, argued that the paper had been protected by Parliamentary privilege and so no 
action could be brought.  
 
The court found that only the Crown in Parliament had the authority to make law, and so a 
declaration by the Commons that such papers were protected by privilege was not sufficient to 
constitute a rule unquestionable by the courts, opening the way for such rules on parliamentary 
procedure to be scrutinised in law. Moreover, the courts decided that Parliament did not have, as it 
had claimed, the ability to act as a court superior to any other, and that the House had no authority 
to order the circulation of libelous or defamatory publications outside of Parliament. 
 
This judgement became a landmark in defining the roles of the organs of power in a legal-political 
system. Although Parliament was later able to protect such papers under privilege using the 
Parliamentary Papers Act 1840, the courts had irrevocably defined the limitations of the individual 
Houses of Parliament, and had fully defined the parameters of their authority by claiming the right 
to scrutinise publicly the rules and regulations protecting Members of Parliament. 
 
This case follows Bonham quite neatly when considered for its constitutional consequences. As 
with Bonham, this case again decides in favor of the rule of law, and the authority of the courts over 
decisions of law. Coke said that, “One cannot be Judge and attorney for any of the parties…” It 
would appear in this case that Parliament sought to be a Judge to their own cause, which would be 
decidedly unconstitutional. As a result, it became necessary for the courts to redraw the  boundaries 
of Parliamentary authority again, deciding that Parliament cannot attempt to usurp the jurisdiction 
of the courts in matters of public cases. Effectively, the courts decided that where Parliament 
breached the rights of non-members, the victim of such a breach, in this case Stockdale could seek 
redress through the courts, and not through Parliament.  
 
This case effectively put an end to the idea of independent rule-making in Parliament governing 
procedures for the individual estates (i.e. The Upper House, The Lower House and The Crown), and 
enabled the courts to govern the operation of parliamentary rules where they had a negative effect 
on anyone outside the Palace of Westminster and built upon the common-law rules already 
developed in Bonham, limiting the power of the sovereign and can be viewed as a legal landmark as 
significant as the Bill of Rights (1689), outlining the powers and limitations of Parliament to be its 
own court, and shattered the illusion that the individual houses could write their own 
unquestionable rules, equally effective over non-members, without the scrutiny of the courts. The 
courts could finally claim that they were the final arbiters in matters of the law. 
 
The Impact of Marbury v Madison 
 
  
The final case I shall examine in this chapter is that of Marbury v Madison
94
. This is a case from the 
United States Supreme Court, so has had little impact in the United Kingdom, except to act as a 
glimpse of an alternative development of the common law in Britain, shifting power from the 
executive to the judiciary in the United States in a way the English legal system could only hope to 
echo.  
 
Marbury v Madison was a landmark case in the United States and provided their Supreme Court 
with the right to use the discretion of the court to choose “whether judges should follow a statute 
when it ran counter to their interpretation of the constitutional charter.”95   
 
The facts of the case are straightforward and begin with the American election of 1800, said to be 
one of the nastiest partisan campaigns in American history.
96
 Although the Federalist government 
had lost the presidency and control of Congress, the incumbent president was, under the mandate of 
the constitution, permitted to remain in office until March 1801.The outgoing President, John 
Adams, appointed John Marshall, a revolutionary war hero and political veteran, to be the fourth 
chief justice upon the retirement of Oliver Ellsworth.  
 
Moreover, the lame-duck Federalist congress passed the Organic Act, which permitted Adams to 
appoint forty-two justices of the peace for the District of Colombia. Marshall, at the time still acting 
as Secretary of State before taking on his new post as Chief Justice, instructed his brother James, 
acting as his assistant, to deliver the commissions, but in the final few days of Adams’ presidency, 
some of the commissions went undelivered and the incoming president, Thomas Jefferson, ordered 
his Secretary of State, James Madison, that the commissions not be delivered. 
Jefferson explained afterward that,  
 
“I found the commissions on the table of the Department of 
State… and I forbade their delivery. Whatever is in the 
Executive offices is certainly deemed to be in the hands of the 
president, and in this case, was actually in my hands, because 
when I countermanded them, there was as yet no Secretary of 
State.”97 
 
William Marbury, and three of the five who had been denied their commissions, asked the Supreme 
Court to issue a writ of Mandamus,
98
 ordering Madison to deliver the commissions. This was done 
through Section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which authorised the Supreme Court to issue writs of 
mandamus to anybody holding federal office. Reacting to this, the Federalists in Congress abolished 
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the 1802 term of the court, effectively delaying the decision, and some began talking openly of 
impeaching Federalist judges, including John Marshall himself.  
 
Marshall, aware as he was of the tense political climate, was faced with difficult circumstances. 
Wary of his cousin Thomas Jefferson’s radical tendencies, he was keen to curb his power but, being 
a cautious man, was equally wary of a direct confrontation with the President, who had the support 
of both Congress and the electorate, and so could easily crush a judiciary which, up until this point, 
had not shown signs of defiance against the Executive.  
 
When the case was finally decided, Marshall opened his decision with an assertion that Marbury, 
and the other three, were entitled to their commissions, and penned an attack on Jefferson’s ethics 
for refusing to have the commissions delivered. Moreover, Marbury asserted that section 13 of the 
Judiciary Act 1789, upon which Marbury had relied when bringing his case to the Supreme Court, 
had expanded the jurisdiction of the supreme court as defined in the constitution under article III. 
This claim allowed Marshall to claim that the issue at hand was in fact whether the Supreme Court 
had the jurisdiction to decide if they should follow a statute when it differed from their 
interpretation of the constitution.  
 
The case was and remains, one of the most significant constitutional landmarks in legal history. 
Marshall, in his opinion, told the court,  
 
“[t]he constitution is ether a superior paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other act, is alterable when the 
legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the 
alternative be true, then a legislative act, contrary to the 
constitution, is not law; if the latter part be true, then written 
constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to 
limit a power, in its own nature, illimitable.” 
 
What barriers exist then, to limit the courts in England and Wales from such a landmark decision? 
Naturally, Marshall speaks of the constitution as being a “superior paramount law”, which in the 
United States is taken to be the sovereign, and the font of law. The Supreme Court, after Marbury v 
Madison, took on the role of the defenders of the constitution against the executive. To illustrate, in 
its 177 year history the Supreme Court has struck down eighty-six different provisions of federal 
law over the course of seventy-eight cases and have interpreted modifications into countless more.
99
 
It has become the primary mode of recourse against unjust federal laws which violate the 
constitution, but the key difference is just that. The United States has a constitution, enshrined as 
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their highest form of law and an unquestionable pillar in the legal system. The United Kingdom has 
a constitution-in-pieces, broken into significant Acts of Parliament and common-law decisions. The 
question is not whether these documents, such as Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights are legally 
and culturally significant, of course they are, but the question that arises is are they held so highly in 
our regard that it would be impossible for us to dismiss them? Parliament claims absolute power to 
both make and unmake law, but no Parliament has ever challenged the authority of the Bill of 
Rights.  
 
The most recent addition to the significant constitutional documents of the United Kingdom is the 
Human Rights Act 1998, which has been both supported and derided by Members of Parliament 
both for its benefits and for its flaws. Notably, in recent history its supposed leniency toward illegal 
immigrants, able to avoid deportation under Article 8, the right to a family life, has become 
notorious thanks in no small part to the Home Secretary, Theresa May, who described in detail a 
series of cases which she believed demonstrated the negative impact the Human Rights Act was 
having on our society.
100
 
 
The historical cases which have been outlined here serve a single purpose, which is to illustrate that 
the power of Parliament is not limited and has been directly challenged by the courts both 
historically and contemporarily (as reflected in chapter one). If the courts are able to challenge the 
will (and laws) of Parliament, this only serves to erode the position Parliament has enjoyed as 
Sovereign in the United Kingdom. If a sovereign’s will can be challenged, changed or overturned, 
then clearly the definition cannot apply and Parliament must relinquish its title. In any given 
definition of the sovereign, and here I shall use both Austin and Hobbes’ definitions by way of 
example, if the power of the sovereign can be challenged, then the definition cannot be applied. 
Hobbes explains that “every subject is by the institution author of all the actions, and judgments of 
the sovereign instituted; it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his 
subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice.
101” 
 
This statement, Hobbes’ third part to his definition, claims that no subject can rightfully challenge 
the actions of the sovereign, however The Case of the Sheriff of Middlesex clearly shows 
Parliament’s authority being challenged, and that same challenge, at least in part, being successful. 
Since this is the case, Hobbes’ definition fails. Austin’s definition requires that the sovereign’s 
power be illimitable too, and so in this regard, the definition must fail. 
 
The Influence of H.L.A. Hart 
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We have so far omitted the enormous significance of H.L.A. Hart’s contribution to the topic of 
Sovereignty. Hart, whose work The Concept of Law, has become a staple for any student of 
jurisprudence, is helpful in understanding the Sovereign because he presents a neat and easily 
incorporated addition to the definition of the illimitable sovereign.  
 
Hart states that “the sovereign may in fact defer, in exercising legislative power, to popular opinion 
either from fear of the consequences of flouting it, or because he thinks himself morally bound to 
respect it.
102
 Note that this bond to popular opinion is shaped not by a constitutional or legal 
requirement, but by a moral attitude that forces complicity by the Sovereign to the will of the 
populace. In Hart’s definition, therefore, the Sovereign is still absolute in his power, but only 
chooses to defer to the will of the people for fear of his own moral caliber. 
 
This reshapes our understanding of the sovereign, not least of all because Austin has become “the 
sacrificial dragon” in a profession “which is supposed to thrive on slaying the dragons of the 
past.”103 In fact, so outmoded is Austin’s definition that Ireland challenges us to answer “why do we 
still teach students from lectures, notoriously unsuccessful in their own time, of a man who first 
published them one hundred and seventy years ago?” As developed from Austin by Hart, then, our 
understanding of the sovereign changes; now he may choose to allow popular opinion to make law 
in his stead, in much the same way as he chooses to devolve matters of justice to representatives, 
his judges. The only failing in this definition is that the sovereign could be forced to this deference 
of his authority. As was demonstrated in the signing of Magna Carta, it could be argued that a law 
would be valid even if the supposed sovereign enacted it under duress. A free and independent 
judiciary need not even consider devolving its authority to any other person or body, especially not 
the electorate.  
 
Hart’s contribution is useful in reflecting that the sovereign must be independent of the populace, 
existing outside the influence of public opinion and petty, partisan politics, in much the same way 
as the Judiciary does in the United Kingdom today. Whereas politics is for the most part 
anticipatory, enacting statutes to prevent or control behavior, the common law is, for the most part, 
reactionary. In order for a case to be brought, a wrong must have been committed. From there, the 
courts can begin the process of identifying and proving that a legal person has been wronged, 
finding a remedy and where the court has the authority, enacting the associated law  as a reported 
case. In the common law, enacting a law requires judicial opinion to create a new law and to 
describe the rule, or to reaffirm or reinterpret a decision made in a prior decision.  
 
With the exception of the Supreme Court, judicial proceedings are not currently televised; reports in 
the media of high-profile cases are not shared with jurors, and judges must be impartial, regardless 
of public opinion. Moreover, until a decision is finally made, the influence of the press on the final 
                                                 
102 Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law, 2nd Ed (Oxford: 1997) pp66 
103 Ireland, Richard, John Austin, H.L.A. Hart… Oh and W. Jethro Brown!, 34 Cambrian Law Review 2006 
  
decision must be minimal. Organisations can attempt to sway the court one way or another, but 
there can be no legitimate outcry until after the decision is made. How can it be that a newspaper 
can criticise a decision that has not yet been written? As a result, the pressures placed on Parliament 
to make decisions that appeal to the public, or a decision that is the least distasteful, become 
extremely high. This pressure, although it is exerted on the judiciary, is lessened given the freedoms 
allowed by virtue of judicial independence. Were the positions of judges to be elected instead, 
perhaps public opinion would have more influence over the decisions of the courts. As it stands 
however, our judiciary is appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission, an independent 
body composed on the whole of members of the legal and judicial professions, as well as the 
magistracy and lay persons.  
 
By removing the selection and appointment of judges from the hands of the Lord Chancellor, the 
appointment of judges can be impartial and independent which allows for a more balanced and fair 
Judicial system, as the judges themselves become less politicised while, it could be argued, the 
judges use their decisions to do the opposite: to expand their legal jurisdiction into politics. This is a 
feature of the legal system that we shall expand upon further in the next chapter, which concerns 
contemporary attitudes by the judiciary toward their increasing involvement in politics, and how 
they have used this involvement to expand their jurisdiction and further involve themselves in 
correcting a certain unfairness, most associated with the Natural Law, in the political system. 
 
In this chapter we have addressed the historical influences on the Common Law rule-making 
responsibilities of the courts, and in the next we shall examine the ways that the courts in the United 
Kingdom can continue to create rules, by examining key cases and judgements that have defined 
their role in the 20th and 21st centuries.
  
 
Chapter Three - Contemporary Challenges to Parliamentary Sovereignty 
 
“If Parliament is sovereign, there is nothing it cannot do by 
legislation; if there is nothing Parliament cannot do by 
legislation, it may bind itself hand and foot by legislation; if 
Parliament so binds itself by legislation there are things it 
cannot do by legislation; and if there are such things Parliament 
is not sovereign.”104 
Hamish R Gray 
 
In this chapter we shall look to modern challenges to Parliamentary Sovereignty, and in so doing 
shall attempt to consolidate this collection into a coherent argument spanning the twentieth century, 
as the Judiciary in the United Kingdom developed its own means of exercising jurisdiction where 
Parliament would seek to exclude it. The Anisminic
105
 case is one which is particularly significant 
in the authority of the courts overruling the statutory authority of parliament, and so we shall start 
here. The case is, according to William Wade, “the ultimate in judicial enterprise”106"/>, and has 
become the bread-and-butter citation for any argument regarding the authority of the Courts, with 
one New Zealand Supreme Court Judge declaring the case to be a “landmark”107.  
 
Further to such judicial challenges to Parliamentary Supremacy, Westminster must also contend 
with the rise of devolution in the United Kingdom, and the reality that the balance of political power 
is changing to the benefit of the home nations. Of course with greater devolved law-making power 
comes a marked change in the judicial system. Devolution in Wales, particularly after the 2006 
Government in Wales Act and the referendum it proscribed in 2010 which gave Cardiff Bay full 
legislative authority, has led to the inevitable creation of a two new legal jurisdictions. As Wales is 
granted more expanded legislative authority the divisions between the laws of England and Wales, 
separated by a physical boarder, will become more and more apparent, and will inevitably 
necessitate the the recognition of an independent Welsh legal jurisdiction, and all which that entails. 
However, as was pointed out above, devolution in Wales will lead to the creation of two 
jurisdictions: the first is Wales, and the second is England. Once divided, the historic jurisdiction of 
England and Wales will become the jurisdiction of England and the jurisdiction of Wales, and will 
lead to radical changes on both sides of Offa’s Dyke. 
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Anisminic and Its Long-Term Influence 
 
The case concerns the Suez Canal and its transfer into public from private ownership. The Canal, 
which was owned by a joint British and French company, was granted a fund by statute for 
reimbursing shareholders for their losses in the transfer. The statute gave effect to a tribunal whose 
responsibility would be to divide the fund, and whose authority, according to the statute, could “not 
be called into question in any court of law.” The findings of the tribunal were, however, questioned 
in all the superior courts, and the House of Lords finally found that the decision had been invalid.  
 
As Wade states, “the House of Lords, drawing on respectable precedents extending over several 
centuries, felt entitled to disregard the express ban on litigation in any case where the Commission 
was acting outside its jurisdiction ... The net result was that they had disobeyed the Act, although 
nominally they were merely construing it in a peculiar but traditional way.”108 He goes on to 
explain the value of this ruling, and identifies why the decision was so valuable to the development 
of the British Constitution. He tells us the courts recognise that “to exempt any public authority 
from judicial control is to give it dictatorial power, and this is so fundamentally objectionable that 
Parliament cannot really intend it.”109 If the Courts continue to usurp the authority of Parliament by 
avoiding terms of statutes excluding their jurisdiction then such terms, even those intentionally and 
deliberately expressed by Parliament will become meaningless, and “judges will be unable to deny 
that they are flatly disobeying Parliament.”110 
 
Naturally Anisminic was divisive, but it presented to the courts an opportunity to significantly 
expand their jurisdiction and demonstrate not only their power to exclude a statutory clause using 
precedent, but also their authority to defy Parliament in any circumstances where there is a question 
of law. The argument in the case was that a statute cannot exclude the jurisdiction of the court on a 
point of law, and this meant that the courts were not, in fact, defying the statute, but were 
manipulating the case by questioning the ruling of the tribunal on a point of law. The argument of 
the judiciary was that you cannot exclude the courts from ruling on a point of law, although they 
may agree on points of fact. According to Baroness Hale, “They [the House of Lords] said if the 
Commission makes an error of law it makes its decision ultra vires, which means it’s not a proper 
decision at all ... After that, attempts to oust the jurisdiction of the courts to control the reality of 
governmental bodies and the lower courts have been treated with the gravest of suspicion and 
usually interpreted around in the courts.”111 
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The purpose of establishing in the statute that the rulings of the Commission could not be 
questioned were simple and, from an administrative perspective, perhaps necessary. The 
Commission was required, promptly and effectively, to distribute a limited and pooled 
compensation fund to companies involved in the Suez Canal. As a result of this, it would have been 
inefficient to allow appeals against the Commission’s decisions in court. However, in this case the 
Courts recognised that to allow the Commission to act without judicial scrutiny of any kind was to 
grant it the kind of dictatorial power that Wade mentioned, and this was found to be unacceptable. 
The result of this ruling was that the courts in fact disobeyed the statute, but did so in a way that 
was unquestionable Using rational legal argument, and backed by the authority of the House of 
Lords, at the time the most superior court in the United Kingdom, the ruling deftly illustrates the 
ability of the court, when they are so inclined, to defy Parliament in a way that cannot be overruled 
except by statute which can, in turn, be interpreted into irrelevance by the courts if they should 
choose to do so.  
 
This of course is because of the changing nature of language, which is a key part of the law. Judicial 
decisions, like statutes, must be interpreted by others, and be understandable if the law  is to possess 
certainty but the very nature of language makes certainty in these judgements a time-sensitive 
business. 
 
When ideas are expressed in language, they inevitably become distorted. This can be applied to 
legal and political ideas as well as to anything else. The expression of the concept of “justice” for 
example is so broad that it becomes ambiguous. Even expressed in particular context, the 
multiplicity of this idea means that it will take on various meanings to the different readers, and this 
will inspire a different decision depending on the personal view of the judge, advocate or layman. 
Shared language, in whatever field, brings with it shared ideas and understanding but also the 
ambiguity of personal perspective and understanding, not only of circumstances themselves but of 
the very words used to describe them. 
 
The Courts and their Defence of Human Rights 
We shall next examine Liversidge v Anderson
112
. This case is particularly significant not because its 
ruling affected the nature of the courts or their relationship with Parliament, in fact it is a dissenting 
judgement with which we are concerned in this case. Of course, this is a strange choice of case 
when discussing the authority of the courts to create good law. Naturally, dissenting judgement 
doesn’t have the calibre of a prevailing judgement, which would grant it the authority of law, but 
this case deftly illustrates the role taken on by judges as a social conscience, prepared to challenge 
statutes enacted by Parliament where they believe they infringe too far on our civil liberties or basic 
freedoms. 
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The case is primarily concerned with a bill presented to Parliament in the summer of 1939. At this 
time, Europe was not yet embroiled in conflict with Nazi Germany, but the threat of war was 
present in the United Kingdom and so, in order to prepare for the domestic threats war brings, such 
as foreign agents or Nazi sympathisers, a bill was read in Parliament that would provide certain 
Emergency Powers, and allow the enactment of Defence Regulations that would, “(a) make the 
provision for the … detention of persons whose detention appears to the Secretary of State to be 
expedient in the interests of the public safety or defence of the Realm.”113 
 
Although there was some opposition to this clause in the House of Commons, the bill was enacted 
with this clause included, and the first application of these Defence Regulations was made; the 
wording of which was as follows: 
 
“The Secretary of State, if satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to prevent 
him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Realm it is 
necessary to do so, may make an order.” 
 
The danger is obvious. The Act gave the Secretary of State the authority to detain without trial any 
person he believes to be a threat to either Public Safety or the Defence of the Realm. This therefore 
granted the minister the authority to detain potentially innocent people for an indeterminate amount 
of time without their proper right to Habeas Corpus. 
 
The Regulations, after war finally broke out, were issued 1,428 times between May and August 
1940, so concerned was the Government at the prospect of there being subversive elements in the 
United Kingdom. One such order was used against Mr. Robert Liversidge, whose real  name was 
Jack Perlzweig, and who was serving as a Volunteer Pilot Officer in the Royal Air Force. The 
application of these emergency powers against Mr Liversidge (Perlzweig) meant that he was 
imprisoned without charge or opportunity to prove his guilt or innocence.  
 
Although the majority decision taken by the House of Lords was that Emergency Legislation in 
times of war should be given more, and not less effect, Lord Atkin, in his dissenting judgement, 
made an impassioned argument to reign in the power of the Executive by the Judiciary by applying 
appropriate safeguards against unlimited executive power, and proposed that the wording of the act, 
amended to read where the secretary of state has a reasonable cause, implied that there was an 
objective measure of reasonableness to apply this law, and that it was the court’s responsibility to 
determine this measurement and apply it accordingly. In his speech, Lord Atkin says,  
 
“In England, amidst the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak 
the same language in war as in peace. It has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the 
principles of liberty for which on recent authority we are now fighting, that the judges are no 
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respecters of persons and stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments on his liberty 
by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law.”114 
 
It is vital to recognise the last phrase of this quotation, that it is the responsibility of the court to be 
“alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law.” Atkin identifies here that it is the 
responsibility of the courts to define where the government is acting in a way that inexcusably 
grants excessive power to Government and unlawfully penalises ordinary citizens without the 
availability of any legal recourse. This is, in fact, the same argument used in Anisminic: that the 
courts cannot be excused of their authority to rule whether a government body is acting outside, or 
making incorrect use of, the law through statute. As a result, Atkin’s speech is in fact quite 
significant.  
 
Atkin went on to say , “I know of only one authority, which might justify the suggested method of 
construction. 'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just 
what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less'. 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make 
words mean so many different things.' 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be the 
master, that's all.' After all this long discussion, the question is whether the words 'If a man has' can 
mean 'If a man thinks he has'. I have an opinion that they cannot and the case should be decided 
accordingly.” 
 
The speech eloquently asserts that it is not the right of ministers to arbitrarily decide where 
someone should be imprisoned, and be deprived of their liberties. He argues that responsibility to 
prevent this behavior lies with the courts, who are empowered to decide how statutes should be 
interpreted when such a question is raised. This echoes A.C. Gray, mentioned above, who wrote 
that, ‘“Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is 
truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them”; a 
fortiori, whoever hath absolute authority not only to interpret the Law, but to say what the Law is, is 
truly the Law-giver.’115 
 
We shall now discuss the Freezing Order Case.
116
 In 1946 Parliament, by way of The United 
Nations Act, conferred upon the treasury certain powers which would allow them to enact orders, 
requiring no parliamentary scrutiny, which could freeze the assets of those suspected of being 
terrorists. One such Order, designed to prevent acts of terrorism, was implemented by the Treasury 
to freeze the assets of a terror suspect, and denying his family and associates the right to provide to 
him any financial assistance. The Treasury had, in effect, made the appellant an indefinite prisoner 
of the state. 
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This case is particularly significant, in that it demonstrates a modern example of the courts defying 
government policy using the same rhetoric as was used in Liversidge and Anisminic - i.e. that the 
courts are not defying the statute, only reinterpreting it in a way that ensures that the Act cannot be 
implemented by Government ultra vires. The key issue at the heart of Ahmed is that, like 
Liversidge, the application of the law as it stood created such a fundamental breach of a person’s 
human rights by the state that it was inexcusable to allow the law to operate.  As a result, the 
Supreme Court felt obliged to rule in favor of the appellant, but to do so would be to defy statute. 
For the Supreme Court there is, however, a simple remedy to this constitutional crisis. The Courts 
will, in this situation, often claim that they are reinterpreting the statute according to Parliament’s 
intent, and not necessarily the wording of the Statute itself. Naturally, the Supreme Court followed 
the spirit of Atkin’s speech from Liversidge, and reinterpreted the statute in a way that made the 
original order redundant. In this regard, it could be that the Supreme Court exercised its authority, 
as determined by Coke in 1612, to declare void any act which is determined to be anathema to the 
public good, but it did so in a way that avoided a constitutional crisis that would have led to a direct 
confrontation with Parliament. 
 
The Freezing Order Case leads perfectly on to the next case to be considered, which is the Belmarsh 
case
117
. Once again concerning terrorism, this case was concerned with literal, rather than effective 
imprisonment by the state. In this case, eight men were arrested and held indefinitely in December 
2001 under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, with a ninth in February 2002. The 
Act provides the Home Secretary with the authority to certify suspects as being threats to national 
security, and to imprison such persons indefinitely. Of the  nine suspects certified by the Home 
secretary, two volunteered to exercise their right to leave the United Kingdom: one to Morocco and 
the other to France, on December 22 2001 and March 13 2002 respectively. One of the December 
detainees was held at Broadmoor Hospital on the grounds of mental illness; another released on bail 
(though under very strict conditions); and another had his certification under the act rescinded by 
the Home Secretary and was released without restriction. 
 
All the appellants in this case questioned the legality of their detention, and argued that it deviated 
from the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated into domestic law in the Human 
Rights Act 1998. This case is not unique, and the same circumstances had been witnessed in other 
cases heard in the past. In particular, Lawless v Ireland (No 3)
118
 reflects accurately the same facts 
and illustrates the position of the court concerning cases such as this one. Here, the case is 
concerned with low level IRA terrorist activity in Northern Ireland between 1954 and 1957. The 
Irish Government derogated from Article 5 of the European Convention
119
 on the 5th July 1957, 
and the applicant was held from July to December 1957. Although he could have accepted release 
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on the condition that he undertook to observe the law and refrain from activities contrary to the 
Offenses Against the State (Amendment) Act 1940, instead he chose to challenge the legitimacy of 
his detention by the Irish Government by claiming that to do so was contrary to Article 5 of the 
Convention, which subsequently failed. At paragraph 22, the court stated that “it is for the Court to 
determine whether the conditions laid down in Article 15 (art. 15) for the exercise of the 
exceptional right of derogation have been fulfilled in the present case,” being for these purposes 
whether there is or was the “existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.120” 
 
The judgement in the Belmarsh cases, therefore, hinged on the same principle of law: whether the 
government could rely on a special exemption laid out in article 15 of the ECHR in order to 
legitimise holding terror suspects indefinitely without trial. Of course, the United Kingdom 
government was able to rely on two exemptions in this case, the first being the excemption where 
there exists a public emergency threatening the nation, and also the exemption where a suspect can 
be held indefinitely while involved in extradition or deportation proceedings. It was this exemption 
that the Government relied upon in the case of Chahal v United Kingdom,
121
 an ECHR decision 
which has been relied upon most recently in cases such as this one. In this case the then Home 
Secretary decided that the appellant, an Indian Sikh activist, should be deported on the grounds that 
his activities as a Sikh separatist was not conducive to the public good in the fight against terrorism. 
He resisted deportation on the grounds that if returned to India he faced a real risk of death or 
torture, forbidden under the European Convention, and challenged his detention, which had lasted a 
number of years, as being contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligation under the European 
Convention to his right to liberty. The United Kingdom sought to qualify the detention by relying 
on section 15, and on part (f) of section 5, which provides that where deportation proceedings are 
being carried out, the period of detention can last for the duration of these proceedings.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights held that the United Kingdom had not deviated from its 
obligations under the European Convention, since the appellant was being held only for the duration 
of the deportation proceedings, but it reasserted that "any deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1)(f) 
will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress." As a result, the Courts 
reaffirmed that no state has the right to hold any suspect in detention indefinitely without good 
cause.  
 
The qualification of detention where there is a public emergency was defined in the Greek Case
122
 
where a public emergency was defined as having certain distinctive features:  
"153.  Such a public emergency may then be seen to have, in particular, the following 
characteristics: 
■ (1) It must be actual or imminent. 
■ (2) Its effects must involve the whole nation. 
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■ (3) The continuance of the organised life of the community must be threatened 
■ (4) The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions, 
permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, are 
plainly inadequate." 
On this matter, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Ireland v United Kingdom
123
 that the 
test for a public emergency had been met, but also made important comments regarding the role of 
the judiciary, and in particular the role of the European Court of Human Rights in deciding cases of 
this nature. At 207 the Court ruled that “States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect. The 
Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the observance of the States' 
engagements (Art. 19), is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the 'extent 
strictly required by the exigencies' of the crisis. The domestic margin of appreciation is thus 
accompanied by a European supervision.” 
 
In the Belmarsh case, the court recognised that it is the Government which is best suited to make 
decisions of policy, just as it is the Courts which are best suited to make decisions of law. As Lord 
Hope said in the judgement,  
 
“The more purely political (in a broad or narrow sense) a 
question is, the more appropriate it will be for political 
resolution and the less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for 
judicial decision. The smaller, therefore, will be the potential 
role of the court. It is the function of political and not judicial 
bodies to resolve political questions. Conversely, the greater the 
legal content of any issue, the greater the potential role of the 
court, because under our constitution and subject to the 
sovereign power of Parliament it is the function of the courts 
and not of political bodies to resolve legal questions.” 
 
This is an opinion supported by many in the judiciary, and was echoed overseas in MacDonald Inc 
v Attorney General of Canada,
124
 where it was held that "Courts are specialists in the protection of 
liberty and the interpretation of legislation and are, accordingly, well placed to subject criminal 
justice legislation to careful scrutiny. However, courts are not specialists in the realm of policy-
making, nor should they be." 
 
In Aksoy v Turkey
125
 the court, clearly referring to domestic as well as international courts, held that 
“Judicial control of interferences by the executive with the individual's right to liberty is an 
essential feature of the guarantee embodied in Article 5(3), which is intended to minimise the risk 
of arbitrariness and to ensure the rule of law." Even in the United States, in Korematsu v United 
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States
126
 holds that “in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national security must 
not be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability” and in order to 
do this the citizen must rely on the courts to uphold the rule of law and ensure accountability for the 
actions of Government. 
In his own judgement in Belmarsh, Lord Nicholls, at 79 said that “All courts are very much aware 
of the heavy burden, resting on the elected government and not the judiciary, to protect the security 
of this country and all who live here. All courts are acutely conscious that the government alone is 
able to evaluate and decide what counter-terrorism steps are needed and what steps will suffice. 
Courts are not equipped to make such decisions, nor are they charged with that responsibility.” This 
is a reasonable response to the assertion that Parliament and Government are best suited to 
questions of policy, but it is vital to remember that the operation of government for the protection 
and well-being of citizens in that state relies upon questions of law equally as questions of policy. 
Commenting on this point, Lord Nicholls went on to say that, “Parliament has charged the courts 
with a particular responsibility. It is a responsibility as much applicable to the 2001 Act and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 as it is to all other legislation and 
ministers' decisions. The duty of the courts is to check that legislation and ministerial decisions do 
not overlook the human rights of persons adversely affected.” 
It is not the place of Parliament to make decisions that overlook rights enshrined in international 
treaties and in the domestic law of the state. It is up to the courts to ensure that the Government of 
the day does not, through its implementation of policy or in drafting statutes, intentionally or 
unintentionally violate the rights expressly granted to those within the confines of its boarders and 
legal system, and to ensure that it’s operations are carried out within the confines of the rule of law. 
But it is up to Government to ensure their compliance with protected rights and freedoms before the 
courts are required to step in. In this case, the Government failed to recognise that, 
“the human right in question, the right to individual liberty, is 
one of the most fundamental of human rights. Indefinite 
detention without trial wholly negates that right for an indefinite 
period. With one exception all the individuals currently detained 
have been imprisoned now for three years and there is no 
prospect of imminent release. It is true that those detained may 
at any time walk away from their place of detention if they leave 
this country. Their prison, it is said, has only three walls. But 
this freedom is more theoretical than real. This is demonstrated 
by the continuing presence in Belmarsh of most of those 
detained. They prefer to stay in prison rather than face the 
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prospect of ill treatment in any country willing to admit 
them.”127 
For the Belmarsh appellants, their rights were recognised and upheld by the courts, who defied the 
Government and ordered their detention to be quashed. They also issued a declaration against 
Section 23 of the Act, stating that it was incompatible with the Convention. This case was a direct 
challenge to Parliament, and the Court clarified its position that if ever Government disregarded the 
most fundamental rights of its citizens, or should it attempt to overturn centuries of established law, 
such as that of Habeas Corpus, the Judiciary will not turn a blind eye. As Lord Walker stated in his 
own, dissenting judgement, “Whether or not patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, national 
security can be the last refuge of the tyrant. It is sufficient to refer ... to the show trial and repression 
which followed the Reichstag fire in Berlin and the terror associated with the show trials of 
Zinoviev, Bukharin and others in Moscow during the 1930s.” 
 
Of course, this case was not unique in its ideological implications. Governments have always tested 
the bounds of their authority to infringe on the rights of their citizens. It is for this reason that the 
courts exist, and it is what gives them their most vital function: to protect citizens from their 
Government. Another example of the government overstepping their bounds is to be found in the 
Control Orders case.  
 
The control orders case primarily concerned the use of special advocates and closed evidence in 
trial. In the aftermath of the September 11th Terror attacks in the United States, the Government of 
the day in the United Kingdom adopted a Canadian anti-terror measure where secret evidence, 
which was thought to be too sensitive to be released to the public, was used against a defendant, the 
evidence did not need to be disclosed to him. Instead, it could be revealed to a Special Advocate, 
who could represent the defendant without informing him of the evidence against him. This brought 
about a number of criticisms, not least of which that the evidence was not available to the 
defendant, as well as the defendant’s inability to instruct his Advocate properly, and so could not 
guarantee a fair trial. The main issue at hand was that the use of this closed evidence and special 
advocacy meant that it would be impossible for a defendant to have a fair trial should it be used, as 
access to information and evidence relied upon to convict would not be available to the defendant to 
answer. As a result, the courts felt it was necessary to alter the law in its original form so as to 
create something more just.  
 
Their response was to reinterpret the legislation so that the Home Secretary could rely on the 
evidence, but only if it was disclosed to the defendant. In effect, the Home Secretary could not be 
forced to disclose the closed material if he didn't want to, but if the defendent would be unable to 
have a fair hearing without it being disclosed, the Home Secretary cannot rely on it for the purposes 
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of persuading the court to make the order
128
. In this way, and without forcing the court to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility, the Court was able to reverse the meaning of the legislation and 
effectively change the law. In his judgement in this case, Lord Hoffman said,  
“The consequences of a successful terrorist attack are likely to be 
so appalling that there is an understandable wish to support the 
system that keeps those who are considered to be most dangerous 
out of circulation for as long as possible. But the slow creep of 
complacency must be resisted. If the rule of law is to mean 
anything, it is in cases such as these that the court must stand by 
principle. It must insist that the person affected be told what is 
alleged against him. The principle is easy to state, but its 
application in practice is likely to be much more difficult.”129 
 
This case is one of a series of recent cases that have directly challenged a rule enacted by 
Parliament, and represents a shift from the widely held position on Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
Unless an alternative theory on sovereignty, placing greater emphasis on the role of judiciary is 
proposed, this trend in judicial decision-making, to become more bold in their challenges to 
Parliament, will inevitably lead to greater conflict with government, and ultimately a constitutional 
crisis.  
 
Jackson v HM Attorney General 
 
The case of Jackson v Attorney General has been described as a “case of major constitutional 
significance.”130 The case concerns the enactment of the Hunting Act 2004, and the procedure 
whereby the Commons gained royal assent for a bill without the agreement of the House of Lords. 
This was achieved with the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. These acts serve to increase the power 
of the Commons, curtail the authority of the House of Lords and provide for a means of enacting 
bills without the scrutiny of the Upper House by limiting the number of times the Lords can reject a 
bill
131
 to three in two years, and providing no means for the Lords to reject money bills. The 1949 
Act further increased these limitations from three to two rejections in one year from two.  
 
The Parliament Act 1911 was designed to solve a constitutional crisis. The Conservative dominated 
House of Lords had been throughout the nineteenth century opposed to successive liberal 
governments, and used its authority to defeat numerous attempts at implementing Home Rule in 
Ireland and the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales.When the Lords rejected Lloyd-
George’s ‘People’s Budget’ it was considered that the authority of an Upper House populated 
largely by hereditary peers must be curtailed until suitable reforms to the Lords could be made.  
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The Parliament Act 1011 passed the Commons vote, and was forced through the Lords despite 
opposition by threatening the creation of liberal peers en masse. The Act was used subsequently to 
pass those liberal measures so vehemently opposed by the Tory peers, such as Home Rule Act 1914 
and the Church in Wales Act 1914.  
 
The Parliament Act 1949 was drafted to amend the original Parliament Act by, as was mentioned 
above, further limiting the period in which the Lords can debate and reject bills from two years to 
one. The Parliament Act 1949, however, was passed using the powers of the original Act, and 
without the assent of the House of Lords. It was using the 1949 Act that the Labour government in 
2004 passed the Hunting Act, which had been radically opposed in the House of Lords and by a 
vocal proportion of the population. However the bill was passed and the Hunting Act entered into 
force in 2005.  
 
The question brought before the Court in Jackson, was whether or not, by using the Parliament Act 
1949, the Hunting Act was in fact subordinate legislation, and so did not bear the same authority 
that statutes enjoy. The case was significant because it invited the Courts to consider whether an act 
of Parliament passed under the 1949 act could ever be invalid. Although the Courts did find in favor 
of the government, it was held by the judges that the case had inspired a serious constitutional issue: 
that “there was no absolute rule that the courts could not consider the validity of a statute and that 
the issue as to the validity of the Hunting Act 2004 was one of statutory interpretation.”132 If this 
were the case, then the courts would, in fact, be free to decide on the validity of Acts simply 
through interpretation and this would threaten the Sovereignty of Parliament.  
 
The issue at hand, of course, is that the Courts could easily have found that the Act did not bear all 
the necessary hallmarks of a statute, and so was not good law. This would have complicated matters 
constitutionally, however, and questions regarding the validity of the 1949 Act, and any statutes 
passed as a result of of it, would be brought to the surface. This would only serve to make the law 
less certain, and so it was a matter of constitutional urgency that the courts did not find that the Act 
was void. It would seem appropriate to apply this same logic to other challenges to Parliamentary 
Sovereignty by the courts. This issue is not that the case must find in favor of the courts over 
Parliament, but to maintain the certainty of law and the continuation of government. The 
Sovereignty of Parliament may not be an accurate model, and though “It is no longer right to say 
that [Parliament’s] freedom to legislate admits of no qualification whatever” but it is a convenient 
means of providing a theoretical constant which allows the model to function.  
 
The process is not unlike a physicist creating a theoretical simulation of the universe. The 
simulation has a number of variables that effect how the model will behave, and these are based 
upon known variables that we are certain will have an effect. However, in order to create an 
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accurate model that works in a manner identical to our own universe, our physicist must fill in gaps 
in his knowledge by using theoretical variables that, although unproven or impossible in reality, 
cause the model to behave as expected in theory. This is much the same as the principle of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. Although on paper it is unquestionably the nature of our legal and 
political system, in practice it is impossible to protect Parliamentary Sovereignty from erosion by 
the Courts and International Law. 
 
The Courts vs Parliament: MPs Who Misbehave 
 
We shall next turn our attentions to the Woolas case. As was described in chapter one, Woolas was 
a career MP who, after four prior successful election wins, stood as a candidate in the elections to 
the United Kingdom Parliament in 2010. The results of the election in his constituency led to his 
being re-elected to Parliament, but it was revealed that in his campaign, he had published statements 
which were not only inflammatory, but also libelous, and the victim of his statements challenged 
the validity of his electoral win. As a result, the judiciary was called upon to reach a decision, and 
so a special Electoral Court, first created in 1868 by the Parliamentary Elections Act 1868 (though 
it did not acquire this name until the Corrupt Practices (Municipal Elections) Act 1872), was 
convened to hear evidence and decide on the most effective remedy. The Electoral Court, it was 
claimed by some, had assumed a position superior to democracy by deciding to remove Mr Woolas 
from his seat. 
 
Historically, of course, the Courts have had no interest in deciding on matters of elections. When 
the 1868 bill was first proposed, the judiciary expressed its aversion to cases regarding elections in 
a letter from the Chief Justice to the Lord Chancellor stating that the public had a certain confidence 
in the impartiality of the judiciary, and that,  
 
“this confidence will speedily be destroyed, if after the heat and 
excitement of a contested election, a Judge is to proceed to the 
scene of recent conflict, while men’s passions are still roused, 
and in the midst of eager and violent partisans, is to go into all 
the details of electioneering practices, and to decide on 
questions of general or individual corruption, not unfrequently 
supported or resisted by evidence of the most questionable 
character. The decision of the judge given under such 
circumstances will too often fail to secure the respect which 
judicial decisions command on other occasions. Angry and 
excited partisans will not be unlikely to question the motives 
that led to the judgement. Their sentiments may be echoed by 
the press. Such is the influence of party conflict, that it is apt to 
  
inspire distrust and dislike of whatever interferes with party 
objects and party triumphs.”133 
 
The Bill’s success inevitably led to the creation of this Court, despite reservations from the 
Judiciary, and included an amendment to allow for appeals against decisions on points of law.  
 
On Appeal, the High Court only examines points of law, and not points of facts; they were first 
whether a right to appeal existed (since it is ordinarily not possible to appeal an Election Court 
decision), whether the original ruling was incorrect in its interpretation of a false statement (the 
Administrative Court disagreed that such a statement could relate both to a candidate's public and 
personal character) and finally whether his statements were protected by the freedom of expression 
granted by the Human Rights Act.  
 
The Court found that in these circumstances, despite the wording of the statute, Parliament must 
have intended that where there is an error in law, there must be an avenue for appeal. This echoes 
the Anisminic case, above. Moreover, it found that Woolas' statements had indeed been contrary to 
the Statute and that freedom of expression does not extend to making false statements. For these 
reasons, the Court upheld the judgement. However, since Woolas' case has moved from the 
Election Court to the normal procedures for Judicial Review, it was subsequently possible for 
Woolas to appeal to the Court of Appeal or, more likely in the circumstances, the Supreme Court, 
but given his comments after the failure of his appeal, he will not pursue this issue. The case was 
reported in the Telegraph, where Martin Beckford wrote that,  
 
“The court has decided that an election should be overturned and an MP should lose his seat and be 
incapable of being elected to the House of Commons for three years because statements which 
attacked a candidate's 'political conduct' were also attacks on his ‘honour’ and ‘purity’.” The court 
decided that the Oldham election should be be re-run, and that Mr Woolas should lose his seat and 
be barred from being elected to the House of Commons for three years.”134 
 
The reason why this case is so significant, and why the judgement was criticised, is that the Courts 
had unseated a Member of Parliament, but the House of Commons claimed that only it has the 
authority to discipline and, if necessary, remove MPs, Also, many claimed that in a democracy it 
should be the constituents who decide to remove Mr Woolas. The challenge to Parliament's 
authority bears similar hallmarks to the Hansard case of the nineteenth century, where the House of 
Commons was found not to have jurisdiction where its members break the law.  
 
A further problem the judgement created is that after Woolas had been removed, Parliament would 
need to order a by-election, but if Woolas had been successful on appeal to the Upper Courts, the 
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constituency could be left with two Members of Parliament. Fortunately in this case the Speaker of 
the House delayed the by-election until the appeals procedure had come to an end, but had Woolas 
appealed still further, the consequences could have been much more serious.  
 
Of course it is natural to assume that the courts play a minor role in controlling Parliament, but the 
reality is that judges play a much wider part than was previously believed. Woolas, drawing from 
decisions like Anisminic have reshaped the way we perceive the role of the Judiciary when 
Parliament misbehaves, but it is much wider than that. Woolas is only one of several examples of a 
new attitude being adopted by the Judiciary, that leans more toward natural law, and sees a shift 
away from the ordinary, positivist position that the judiciary needed to adhere to if their unbending 
perspective on Parliamentary Sovereignty was to be perpetuated.  
 
One of the most criticised decisions of the Supreme Court’s short history has been that of 
Parliamentary expenses
135
, significant not because it brought public attention to an inherent 
dishonesty displayed by MPs when using public money, but also because it shifted jurisdiction over 
MPs’ behavior from the Commons, where many feel it should be, to the Judiciary. The courts were 
able to adopt this jurisdiction not because they have been given it constitutionally, but because they 
simply laid claim to it
136
. The facts of this case are widely known, but I shall recount them here to 
provide some background.  
 
In 2009, the Telegraph Group of newspapers leaked an un-redacted document listing all claims by 
Members of Parliament for expenses which are “wholly exclusively and necessarily to enable me to 
stay overnight away from my only or main home for the purpose of performing m duties as a 
member of Parliament.”137 The gravity and extent of the scandal led to fierce public backlash, and a 
number of MPs resigned or were banned from standing by their political party. A number of MPs 
were prosecuted for their fraudulent claims, but three (David Chaytor, Elliot Morley and Jim 
Devine) contested in the Appeal Court that the courts’ jurisdiction did not include their case, 
claiming that as MPs they should be disciplined by the House, and that their expenses were covered 
by Parliamentary privilege and  so could not be used in evidence. These were the first criminal 
prosecutions of Members of the House of Commons in relation either to a statement made in or to 
Parliament or its delegates, or based on a member's dealings with Parliament - for over 300 years. 
Their case was heard in the Court of Appeal by a tribunal of senior judges, including the Master of 
the Rolls, Lord Neuberger, and Sir Anthony May, the President of the Queen’s Bench. Their appeal 
was dismissed, and they appealed again to the Supreme Court. 
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Drawing from the doctrine laid out in Anisminic, the Senior Courts of Record are able to claim the 
right to hear appeals from final decisions, even where that finality is stipulated in an Act of 
Parliament, because the courts will always assert their right to decide on points of law. In this case 
the Courts have done more than simply decide that Parliamentary Privilege laid down in the 1688 
Bill of Rights does not apply to Parliamentary expenses, they have redrawn the lines of jurisdiction 
to provide a means of redress where Members of Parliament who have committed a crime would 
otherwise hide behind Parliamentary privilege.  
 
This assertion of jurisdiction is questioned even by Parliament itself. The Clerk of Parliaments 
wrote to the solicitor acting for one of the defendants stating that, “Article 9 limits the application 
of parliamentary privilege to ‘proceedings in Parliament.’ The decision as to what constitutes a 
‘proceeding in Parliament’, and therefore what is or is not admissible as evidence, is ultimately a 
matter for the court, not the House.”138 This letter received the approval of both the court and the 
Committee for Privileges in the House of Commons. Seemingly, jurisdiction on this matter was 
anything but historical.  
 
The means by which the courts asserted their jurisdiction was through evidence, claiming that 
privilege did not attach to “criminal conduct within the House which was not connected to  the 
activities of the House. Such conduct could be described as “ordinary criminal conduct”. This 
covered such criminal offenses as an assault in the corridors of the House, theft of another 
Member’s money, or a sexual offense, none of which related to parliamentary activity or 
proceedings in Parliament.”139 As a result, the Supreme Court claimed jurisdiction over documents 
which were, it was claimed, covered by privilege, since if they were unable to see this documents, it 
would be impossible to determine whether this was “ordinary criminal conduct” or proceedings of 
the House, which would have been subject to privilege. 
 
In the original judgement, Saunders J expressed that, “While an instinctive reaction might be that, 
while honest claims are covered by privilege, dishonest ones are not, the prosecution accept that, if 
the submission of forms by an MP is covered by privilege then dishonest claims are also covered. 
That is because, in order to prove dishonesty, the prosecution would have to question the document, 
which is not permitted if it is covered by privilege.”140 In the final instance of Judicial activism that 
I shall demonstrate here, the courts’ impact on the relationship between themselves and Parliament 
was proportionally smaller than the political storm that it created in its aftermath.  
 
In 2009 the Supreme Court ruled on an issue that had previously been sent to the European Court of 
Human Rights for consideration; the issue at hand was prisoner voting, and the political 
consequences of this decision verged on the unconstitutional, given the severity of the criticism 
leveled on the Supreme Court for its judgement. The history of the case is well known; the 
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European Court of Justice had found in an earlier case against Italy that a sentence that 
disenfranchised a person indefinitely was contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
and as a result, ruled that certain prisoners should not be disenfranchised simply because they were 
incarcerated. 
 
This decision prompted the Supreme Court in the United Kingdom to rule in a similar case in a way 
that made it necessary for the Government to alter the legislation to allow for prisoners exercising 
their right to vote while incarcerated. This led to a political maelstrom, and fed controversy that 
threatened the common-law system as we know it today. The response of Government was a fierce 
barrage of aggressive language against the courts, deriding the decision and accusing the Judges of 
making law in place of Parliament. Such accusations reflect the ignorance of politicians on the 
subject of the ancient English Common Law, but do nothing to change the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional place, which is to play its part in creating and developing common law rules and, 
where necessary overturning statutes just as Lord Coke had intended the Courts do, and just as 
Supreme Courts in other Jurisdictions, such as that of the United States, do annually. 
 
We shall now examine in greater depth the issue of devolution in the United Kingdom, how it will 
inevitably lead to the creation of a new jurisdiction for Wales and how this will effect the doctrine 
of Parliamentary Sovereignty.  
 
Since Wales’ devolution was put into motion by the Government of Wales Act 1998, Wales has 
enjoyed it’s greatest legal independence since the Laws in Wales Acts abolished the country’s 
original legal system in 1535. After a referendum in 2011, in accordance with the Government of 
Wales Act 2006, the Welsh government was formally granted further-extended powers of 
governance over the 20 devolved areas
141
 which allowed the Assembly to pass legislation that has 
primacy in law within the political jurisdiction of Wales. However, this divergence from English 
law will only lead to a more urgent need for a separate and official jurisdiction for Wales in order to 
properly adjudicate in matters that relate only to Welsh law.  
 
This Welsh law in fact already exists, having been created previously by the Assembly as 
Measures, which are proscribed by the Government in Wales Act 1998 Part 3. Although part 4 of 
the 2006 Act and the later referendum gave the Assembly the authority to pass Acts without 
scrutiny from Westminster, there has been a de facto Welsh jurisdiction since the Assembly began 
passing Measures in 1998. As a result, it could be argued that this jurisdiction would exist even  had 
the Assembly been granted but the most minuscule of law-making powers. 
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Devolution and Wales: Past and Future 
 
The Welsh legal system - until the passing of Laws in Wales Acts of 1535-1542, was distinct from 
that of the English and drew upon a rich history of tradition, common law rules and sovereign 
statutes. The most recent detailed source of Welsh law still available to us is the codified Laws of 
Hywel Dda, named for the Welsh King who, at some point between 942 and 950
142, “summoned to 
him from every commote of his kingdom six men who were practised in authority and 
jurisprudence… to the place called the White House on the Taf in Dyfed. … And at the end of Lent 
the king selected from that assembly the twelve most skilled laymen of his men and the one most 
skilled scholar who was called Master Blegywryd, to form and interpret for him and for his 
kingdom, laws and usages…”143 
 
These laws were detailed and progressive, allowing for extended rights for women, and an 
unconventional approach to criminal law. Moore comments that, “Welsh law fell into the juristic 
category of Volksrecht ("people's law"), which did not lay great stress on royal power, as opposed 
to the Kaisersrecht or Königsrecht ("king's law") of both England and Scotland, where it was 
emphasised that both civil and common law were imposed by the state.”144 
 
It was not until the Laws in Wales Acts, passed between 1535 and 1542 by Henry VIII, that Wales’ 
legal system was completely replaced by that of England, and the two jurisdictions became one. 
Unlike the devolved systems of Northern Ireland and Scotland however, Wales still shares its legal 
system with England, and although acts passed in Wales are only applicable in the principality, Acts 
of the Assembly
145
 nonetheless become a part of the law of England and Wales.  
 
The 1997 general election saw victory for New Labour who, under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Tony Blair, set about fulfilling their manifesto pledge for “Devolved power in Scotland and 
Wales.”146 The fruits of this effort were realised in 1998 when the Government of Wales Act was 
passed. This act proscribed the creation of a new Assembly for Wales, which was to be a 
democratically elected institution with the power to pass Assembly Measures. Although these 
Measures carried the same force as Statute, any Measure passed by the Assembly had to be 
approved by Parliament before it could receive Royal Assent, and applied only in Wales.  
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The Government of Wales Act 1998 was amended by the 2006 Act of the same name, but this new 
statute made allowance for a referendum
147
 which would provide a mandate for the extension of 
Assembly powers to include Acts of the Assembly. This referendum was carried out in 2011 and 
resulted in a majority ‘Yes’ vote for the extension of Assembly powers. Unlike Measures, the Acts  
of the Assembly allowed for by the 2006 Act do not require Parliamentary approval in order to 
receive Royal Assent. This represents a major transfer of power from Westminster to Cardiff, and 
raises a number of constitutional questions, including whether the creation of an official Welsh 
jurisdiction would be appropriate.  
 
Separate but Equal: Independent Jurisdictions in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
 
For the other devolved states, a separate jurisdiction is already a reality. In Northern Ireland, a state 
which has enjoyed devolution since the Government of Ireland Act 1920, the legal system is 
distinct from that of England and Wales, and is made up not only of Acts of the British Parliament 
and common law rules, but its own distinct statutes, enacted by the Irish Parliament before the Act 
of Union of 1800, the Parliament of Northern Ireland between 1921 and the end of devolved 
government in 1972, and the more recent Northern Irish Assembly at Stormont, Belfast, created in 
1998 as part of the Good Friday Agreement. 
 
For Scotland, the situation is very similar. Following the Act of Union in 1707, the Parliaments of 
Scotland and England were merged, but the Act allowed the separate authority of the College of 
Justice, Court of Session and Court of Justiciary
148
 to continue in the Scottish jurisdiction. As a 
result, the common law differs between that of Scotland and that of the English - for example; the 
lack of a distinct and separate law of Equity marks Scottish Law apart from that of the rest of the 
UK.
149
 The Scottish Parliament was dissolved following the 1707 Act, but the Scotland Act of 1998 
returned law-making power to the unicameral Scottish Parliament at Holyrood, which has full 
authority to create statutes on any of the issues fully devolved to it. When devolution was fully 
engaged in 1997, Scotland and Ireland already had separate legal jurisdictions and only lacked 
independent law-making authority, while Wales lacked any kind of legal or political independence 
from Westminster.  
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In Wales an average 100 additional potential clients are placed upon the normal legal practitioner 
compared to his English counterpart, but despite this the legal profession in Wales continues to 
adequately serve the needs of the Welsh population operating under the present system of 
jurisdiction, and so the question of whether there would be enough trained professional lawyers in 
Wales to justify the change should not be a bar to the development of a separate jurisdiction. A key 
concern regarding practitioners in drawing up a new jurisdiction for Wales was pointed out in an 
Assembly memo written by Cardiff Law School Professor Dan Wincott and Morgan Cole solicitors' 
partner Emyr Lewis, who raised the issue of “whether lawyers could normally continue to practice 
on both sides of Offa’s Dyke after the creation of a distinct jurisdiction in Wales. Similar 
considerations would apply to the appointment of judges.”150 
 
Therefore the expansion of Assembly powers to include Acts must also mean that professionals 
must demonstrate their ability to practise within the framework of the Welsh Assembly’s new laws, 
and an understanding that these rules will only apply in Wales. Even without considering this 
expansion of power to the Senedd, Wales already has a de facto separate jurisdiction formed of 
tribunals created by Assembly Measures, even if not defined by an Act of Parliament. This is a view 
supported by Professor Wincott, who wrote in his memo that “In many areas, there are distinct 
Welsh Tribunals or other fora, with jurisdiction over Welsh cases. Some of these are administered 
by the Welsh Government, some are not. One tribunal has been created by legislation of the Welsh 
Assembly, and has no counterpart outside Wales.”151 As a result, the competence of Welsh 
practitioners and judges is already being tested, but the jurisdiction lacks the legitimacy an Act of 
Parliament could provide. 
 
The fundamental issue at the heart of Welsh law-making authority is that if the Assembly is granted 
the same law-making power as the Scottish Parliament or Northern Irish Assembly, as this 
referendum has guaranteed, then basic principles of law would become distinct from those of 
England, and by degrees the courts would be called upon to adjudicate upon those distinct and 
different principles. As a result, it would become necessary “for different systems of legal 
education, different sets of judges and lawyers and different courts. England and Wales would 
become separate legal jurisdictions.”152 
 
A New Jurisdiction for England? 
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A further issue created by the introduction of a new Welsh jurisdiction is that to do so would 
inevitably create a new jurisdiction for England as well. This raises a number of questions; 
including whether the separate Welsh courts would have the authority to decide on matters outside 
of the 20 devolved areas - or, if their competence lies only in the matters controlled by Schedule 7. 
Moreover, along the populous land boarder between England and Wales, questions of geographical 
jurisdiction would become a serious issue, as questions brought before the Welsh courts would not 
only surround whether the court was competent to hear the complaint under schedule 7 (if this 
caveat were to apply), but also whether the complaint could be heard in Wales or England 
depending on where the parties lived.  
 
For example, if a complaint was brought by a farmer in Powys against his neighbor in 
Herefordshire relating to the use of a pollutant pesticide that was affecting the quality and safety of 
his crops, it would be necessary to determine whether the complaint should be heard in Wales or 
England. Even if a separate Welsh jurisdiction was not officially instated (or rather, re-instated), the 
Assembly still has competence over food safety, animal welfare, agriculture and pollution, and so 
there should be distinct differences between the laws of England, that would operate in 
Herefordshire, and the laws of Wales, that would apply in Powys. The only absolute similarity 
between the two jurisdictions would be the supremacy of the Supreme Court as the highest court of 
appeal, as is the case for Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, as the Northern Irish and 
Scottish jurisdictions are allocated a representative on the bench in the Supreme Court, it may too 
become necessary to provide this same representation for Wales as the deviation between English 
and Welsh law becomes more apparent, and the impact of such a deviation is more forcibly felt.  
 
Of course, as devolution transfers greater power to Cardiff, Stormont and Holyrood, the 
Westminster Parliament will find itself legislating on matters that concern only England, and as a 
result Wales may find itself in a separate jurisdiction more out of consequence than intentional 
constitutional reform. 
 
The Assembly’s New Powers and the Changing Legal Landscape 
 
Last year’s referendum can be considered as the ‘switch’ for Part 4 of the Government of Wales Act 
2006. Had the result been different, then Part 3 would have continued to operate and the Assembly 
would not have been able to legislate independently of Parliament. However, Part 4 now grants the 
Assembly the authority to legislate “in respect of matters which relate to subjects under headings in 
  
Schedule 7.”153 If the Assembly is able to legislate in relation to any matter that relates to subjects 
under Schedule 7, then the authority of the Assembly to legislate is considerably expanded. Rather 
than only legislating very narrowly on matters that relate directly to the headings under Schedule 7, 
the Assembly now has the power to legislate on a wide array of topics and can legitimise this 
legislation so long as it relates in some way to the devolved areas. A test for how related a law must 
be has not yet been proposed, but it must presumably be within the spirit of the devolved area, and 
be directly affective upon the industry or sector that it seeks to legislate under. Again, this 
legislation will apply only in Wales, and therefore can be seen to be the Assembly creating 
legislation on a wide range of issues that apply only within the strict legal jurisdiction of Wales. A 
competent legal profession, well-versed in these laws must also be created, in order for clients in 
Wales to be satisfied that their legal representation is properly able to argue under this separate 
Welsh law, and this is a matter to be addressed once the question of separate jurisdiction has been 
settled at Westminster. 
 
The framers of the 2006 Act may find that the Welsh Assembly is able to go far beyond the initial 
intentions of Parliament, presumably to legislate within the Schedule 7 devolved areas, and may 
take advantage of the wording of the Act to allow legislation passed by the Assembly to go beyond 
strict adherence to the 20 devolved issues, and may begin passing legislation that is only related to 
one of the issues, even only tenuously. For example, the Assembly may decide to legislate in order 
to make export of livestock a criminal offense where this would lead to the animal suffering 
unnecessarily. As a result, farmers in Wales would be more cautious to deliver livestock to farms in 
England whose rules on animal cruelty differ from that of Wales. Where England and Wales have 
differing definitions on what constitutes cruelty to animals, this would lead to a conflict with 
Westminster as it negatively affects cross-boarder trade between England and the Principality. This 
issue further invites questions of whether people suspected of committing Welsh crimes, but who 
are domiciled in England, could be extradited to the Principality. If such a scenario were to happen, 
the Assembly would be opening a political Pandora’s Box that they may not be able to close. If the 
Assembly pushes too far the authority granted to them by Parliament, they may find that a separate 
jurisdiction becomes impossible, especially if the Westminster Parliament, acting as Sovereign, 
were to decide that the Assembly were acting ultra-vires by enacting legislation not closely enough 
related to the devolved areas. However, this could only be successful if the sovereignty of 
Parliament over the Welsh Assembly was recognised in both jurisdictions. Such a situation can only 
still continue to be possible while the Welsh Assembly Government is only permitted minimal 
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legislative authority. Inevitably however, the question of the validity of Welsh law over English 
law, or the question of exceeding authority, must be decided by the courts.  
 
It is clear that the creation of a separate Welsh jurisdiction is inevitable, though it could be asserted 
that a separate de facto jurisdiction already exists in Wales; created by the development of separate 
Welsh law when devolution in Wales began in 1998. The issue at hand is, therefore, not whether or 
not this jurisdiction will come to exist, but how it will continue to colour the constitutional 
landscape of England and Wales, and how it’s development will change the makeup of the Union as 
a whole. The primacy of Welsh legislation in Wales was intended to give Wales a separate legal 
system to that of England, or else devolution as a whole was an exercise in futility. However, the 
continued expansion of Welsh Assembly powers must lead to a conflict with the Sovereignty of 
Parliament as the expansion of the Welsh Jurisdiction begins to  The only way that devolution can 
continue, aside from an expansion of the powers of the Assembly beyond the 20 devolved areas, is 
to categorically provide for a separate Welsh jurisdiction, with competence over issues directly 
relating to devolution, which can be allowed to decide based upon the primacy of Assembly 
legislation and with a specifically Welsh perspective, i.e. That decisions are made based on the Rule 
of Law as it exists within a Welsh jurisdiction, and not the jurisdiction of England and Wales.  
 
Of course, as was mentioned above, it is possible for the United Kingdom to avoid granting 
complete sovereign independence to home nations, despite a growing trend in devolution amongst 
the political classes in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The proposed solution is to create a 
federal state, composed of the Home Nations and England, each with their own legislative bodies, 
and all working within a framework of layered statutes. The first layer, state law, will be good law 
in the state in which it was passed, but is inferior to the second layer, or federal law, which operates 
across the nation. The United States of America is one of the most successful examples of a federal 
system of government, and it is the USA that shall be examined in the next chapter alongside New 
Zealand, a unitary state, which shall serve as a point of comparison. 
  
 
Chapter Four - “If the President Does it, that means that it is not illegal”154 
 
This chapter is concerned with the Sovereign as a concept in other jurisdictions. In order to examine 
this topic adequately, we shall be examining two jurisdictions, that of the United States and that of 
New Zealand. Although they are very different culturally, they share certain attributes that make 
them ideal for comparison. The United States, like both New Zealand and the United Kingdom, 
uses the Common Law. However, the US benefits from a written constitution, unlike the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. New Zealand, on the other hand, has a more radical judiciary, unafraid 
to take on a more direct political role. As  a result, these two case studies give us the opportunity to 
examine two separate systems, which bear the same hallmarks as the United Kingdom’s legal 
system, yet also enjoy some fundamental differences which serve to highlight the authority of 
judges in other jurisdictions. 
 
The President/Commander-in-Chief Dichotomy  
 
Thomas Fuller’s quote, “Be you ever so high, the law is above you,” is one nearly inescapable in 
any text on the Rule of Law, or any discussion of sovereignty. The term is well-worn, but remains 
an important illustrative axiom, which serves to remind the traditional leaders of the past, such as 
monarchs and presidents, as well as the powerful and influential leaders of today (media moguls 
and political lobbyists, for example), that nobody can escape the Rule of Law. Though for lawyers 
it may be a phrase impossible to forget, in politics there are countless examples in modern political 
history demonstrating that to politicians it is a phrase easily overlooked. Nixon, for example may be 
glad to know that the Bush Administration would, in the space of ten years, vindicate the title quote 
so completely, and aim to dismiss Fuller’s phrase so totally, in their pursuit of victory in the War on 
Terror. 
 
Bush, a president whose term was marred with accusations of illegal spying, wiretapping, rendition, 
human rights abuses and the ongoing debate over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, pursued a political 
philosophy that “asserts a conception of executive power which is unlimited; which cannot be 
constrained by the other branches of government, by Congress or by the Courts, when the president 
is acting as Commander-in-Chief.”155 In short, Bush sought a presidency fused with legal 
sovereignty. Both Americans and observers overseas would be familiar with this perspective, since 
it was shared by Richard Nixon during his term in office and afterward. 
 
Nixon, who was also dogged by accusations of at least questionable, at most illegal practices while 
in office, believed that as President he had absolute authority to authorise actions which would 
otherwise have been statutorily criminal. The difference is that Nixon believed that the President 
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was beyond the rule of law in all circumstances. As was demonstrated in the quote above, Bush’s 
perspective mirrored Nixon’s, but was different in one crucial respect: that the unlimited power of 
the President was granted only when acting as Commander-in-Chief.  
 
Whatever the differences in their philosophy, both assumed that as President they adopted the role 
of Sovereign in the legal-political system of the United States of America. The legitimacy of this 
claim is, of course, not possible to assume. Just as Nixon learned following the Houston plan and 
the Watergate scandal, Bush found that there are no circumstances in which the President is granted 
absolute authority to act beyond the law. 
 
The fundamental difference, of course, between the United States and the United Kingdom is that 
the United States has a formal constitution, which outlines the fundamental rights and 
responsibilities of government, and is defined in Eakin v Raub.
156
 In this case Gibson, dissenting, 
states “What is a Constitution? It is an act of extraordinary legislation, by which the people 
establish the structure and mechanism of their government; and in which they prescribe 
fundamental rules to regulate the motion of the several parts.”157 The United Kingdom does not 
have a formal constitution, but instead, as was explained above, has a number of leading cases and 
‘ordinary’ legislation, which defines the powers and limits of the Government, as well as the most 
fundamental rights and responsibilities of subjects. The case for Britain adopting a constitution will 
be discussed in further chapters. 
 
The Constitution of the United States, in the Fourth Amendment, guarantees the right of Americans 
against unlawful search and seizure, and this has, alongside the development of more sophisticated 
communications technology, been expanded to include controls over the use of wiretapping, 
interception of email and the monitoring of internet use. The Bush administration however decided 
that the President, while acting as Commander-in-Chief, could exercise his Constitutional role to 
protect the United States from threats by issuing orders to tap the communications of domestic 
citizens of the United States without a warrant, where their communications were with a recipient 
outside the country. According to The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
158
 the 
president has the authority to authorise wiretaps without a warrant where they are directed at 
persons who are not citizens and are outside the United States. It also provides that the President 
can issue orders for warrantless wiretaps within fifteen calendar days of a declaration of war by 
Congress. The Congressional Research Service, however, reported in 2006 that,  
 
“...media revelations that the President authorized the National 
Security Agency (NSA) to collect signals intelligence from 
communications involving U.S. persons within the United 
States, without obtaining a warrant or court order, raise 
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numerous questions regarding the President’s authority to order 
warrantless electronic surveillance.  Little information is 
currently known about the full extent of the NSA domestic 
surveillance, which was revealed by the New York Times in 
December, 2005, but allegedly began after the President issued a 
secret order in 2002.”159 
 
These revelations came when an article published in the New York Times claimed that Bush 
ordered the NSA (National Security Agency) to carry out wiretaps against domestic American 
citizens without a court order
160
. Given that this is illegal under FISA, except within fifteen calendar 
days of a declaration of war, this should ordinarily have attracted the attention of the courts (thus 
leading to a constitutional stand-off between the Judiciary and the Executive). However in these 
circumstances the Bush administration argued that the President, acting in his capacity as 
Commander-in-Chief, was granted unlimited power to carry out any intelligence gathering he saw 
fit to engage the enemy (in this case, potential terrorists and other threats).  
 
The article asserts that “Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency has 
monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail messages of ... perhaps 
thousands of people inside the United States without warrants over the past three years in an effort 
to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda.” 
 
In 2002, a supplemental brief for the US Department of Justice for the US Foreign Intelligence 
Court (herein referred to as ‘the brief’) was authored by the US Department of Justice outlining the 
authority of the Executive to engage in illegal wiretapping activity against domestic US citizens, 
which asserted that, “the Constitution vests in the President inherent authority to conduct 
warrantless intelligence surveillance (electronic or otherwise) of foreign powers or their agents, and 
Congress cannot by statute extinguish that constitutional authority.”161 The most obvious criticism 
of this assertion is that the President cannot be above the law. Neither can he, even when exercising 
his authority as Commander-in-Chief, or even when securing the safety and security of the nation, 
excuse the breach of Constitutionally guaranteed rights such as the Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy of communications.
162
  
 
The Constitution itself states that the role of the President is to defend and protect the Constitution 
of the United States
163
, but the question to be asked is whether the President has the right to defend 
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his own constitutionally authorised role as Commander-in-Chief against the Fourth Amendment, 
which would seek to limit the President’s authority to carry out warrantless wiretaps against US 
citizens. Naturally, at first glance the answer to this riddle is simple: the Constitution, and not the 
President is sovereign in the United States, and so the President must uphold and respect the Fourth 
Amendment. But by doing so, he must concede that his role as commander-in-chief is not unlimited 
and so he must abide by the provisions of FISA. This argument was, however, dismissed in the 
brief, which claimed that “in considering the constitutionality of the amended FISA, it is important 
to understand that FISA is not required by the Constitution.” This bold statement asserts that the 
President, in exercising his role as Commander-in-Chief, has the authority to sweep aside inferior 
statutes (i.e. Any laws which are not constitutional) that preclude his ability to carry out actions 
which he considers to be necessary to secure the safety of the United States.  
 
It has been made clear, however, that the courts do not agree with this position. In Butenko
164
, for 
example, the court found that, “The President in his constitutionally designated role as Chief 
Executive is charged with the duty to see that the laws of the United States are enforced and 
obeyed. Yet it is incontrovertible that the President, through his subordinates, cannot ignore the 
admonitions of the Fourth Amendment when investigating criminal activity unrelated to foreign 
affairs. Thus, evidence seized in the investigation of domestic crimes as a result of actions outside 
the bounds of the Amendment would not be admissible in a criminal prosecution.” 
This case, along with two others, was relied upon in the brief to legitimise the President’s claim to 
unlimited authority
165. However, it is clear that the Brief mistakes the President’s authority to carry 
out wiretaps in the interest of Foreign relations and international affairs with his authority to carry 
out those same acts against domestic US citizens. FISA grants the President the authority to allow 
warrantless wiretaps on non-US citizens where it is in the interests of foreign relations, but there are 
few exceptions pertaining to citizens, and even where these are stipulated there are nonetheless 
strict safeguards to ensure that this authority is not abused. The judgement in Butenko goes on to 
explain that, 
 
“The President's authority to conduct foreign affairs ... is 
implied, at least in part, from the language contained in Article 
II of the Constitution. The Constitution contains no express 
provision authorizing the President to conduct surveillance, but 
it would appear that such power is similarly implied from his 
duty to conduct the nation's foreign affairs. Although direct 
threats to the existence of governmental institutions or to 
territorial integrity are of immeasurable gravity, there would 
seem to be nothing in the language of the Constitution to justify 
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completely removing the Fourth Amendment's requirements in 
the foreign affairs field and, concurrently, imposing those 
requirements in all other situations.”166 
 
The second case the brief sought to rely on to justify the President’s authority to carry out 
wiretapping without warrant was Truong,
167
 which states that “the President may authorize 
surveillance without seeking a judicial warrant because of his constitutional prerogatives in the area 
of foreign affairs … only so long as the investigation was "primarily" a foreign intelligence 
investigation.” This case also, therefore, refutes the notion that the President is above the law, and 
reaffirms the fact that where the President permits an illegal wiretap, or any act not permitted  
according to statute or which is not in accordance with the constitution, he acts ultra vires, and 
therefore his actions cannot be permissible under the law.  
 
It is easy to forget when discussing the more general rights and liberties of citizens, that the 
argument of the Government rests on the notion that the Executive branch may be granted absolute 
discretion to intercept private conversations and communications without any judicial review. As 
was stated neatly in United States v. United States District Court (Keith)
168, “The price of lawful 
public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the 
fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of 
Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, 
is essential to our free society.” 
 
This principle has its roots in English common law, long before it was enshrined in the United 
States Constitution under the Fourth Amendment. Lord Mansfield, in Leach v Three of the Kings 
Messengers,
169
 says that “It is not fit that the receiving or judging of the information should be left 
to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should give certain directions to 
the officer.” 
 
This statement has held in the Common law in the United Kingdom just as well as the Constitution 
has protected this right in the United States. The Constitution, although useful in securing and 
defining the basic rights of citizens and the operation of government, adds nothing useful to the 
protection of those rights except a more difficult means of expunging them. Although valuable in 
itself, the mere ability to keep the right secure is one just as well defended by the courts in the 
common law. Indeed, given the length of time and number of cases giving ample chances to remove 
or infringe this right, the common law has stood fast, and has prevailed. Now, with the introduction 
of the Human Rights Act, this right has been written into our body of Constitutional documents, and 
will now no doubt prove just as hard to expunge as a right in the US constitution.  
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The controversy surrounding illegal wiretaps came to a head in 2006, after the revelations in the 
press, and the practice was widely condemned both by the public and the courts. Speaking in 
judgement in a Federal Court in Michigan, Judge Anna Diggs Taylor ruled that the arbitrary 
violations of Fourth amendment rights were unlawful, and that “there are no hereditary kings in 
America.”170Bowing to public and legal pressure, President Bush finally conceded to end the NSA’s 
secret wiretapping programme in January 2008, proving at last that everyone, the President being 
no exception, is subject to the rule of law as defined by the courts.
171
 
 
Nixon, of course, is a President who did not learn this valuable lesson. His presidency is 
remembered for the Watergate and Houston scandals, both of which helped to redefine the accepted 
view of the powers and authority of the President of the United States in a legal capacity. 
 
As has already been explained, the President has the authority to issue orders for wiretaps against 
domestic citizens only in specific circumstances and only if a warrant is authorised either before or 
immediately following the wiretap. If the wiretap is rejected, the evidence gathered cannot be used 
(the fruit of the illegal act). This is the basic circumstance of the Houston Scandal, which shares 
many similarities with the NSA Terrorist wiretapping programme carried out under the Bush 
Administration. The Houston Plan was a programme of warrantless wiretapping against domestic 
US citizens whom were suspected of aiding the Vietnamese during the American incursion in the 
middle of the twentieth century.  Although Nixon personally authorised the operation, it was 
shelved before wiretaps could begin due to pressure from J Edgar Hoover, the director of the FBI, 
who felt that such an incursion was unconscionable.
172
 The Parallels with the Bush administration 
are obvious, the only difference being that Nixon defended his position not by claiming that he was 
constitutionally authorised to do anything when acting in a certain constitutional capacity, as Bush 
argued. Instead, Nixon claimed that when the President commits any offense he cannot be 
prosecuted, because as President he is above the law. Naturally this was not true, as his 
impeachment testifies. The Houston plan is historic now, and has been replaced by the NSA 
Wiretapping affair, but it is Watergate that is arguably Nixon’s most damning criminal scandal. 
 
Watergate began in 1972, when the Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate Building, 
Washington D.C. was the target of a break-in. Eventually, it was revealed that the order for the 
break-in had come from the Oval Office, and that the President may have been directly involved. 
This was an immensely important allegation, as it would be a direct accusation of the President in a 
statutory crime. Two years after the break-in, the Special Prosecutor in charge of investigating the 
scandal, Leon Jaworski, obtained a subpoena requiring the President to release certain tapes and 
transcripts of meetings and conversations he had held with suspects indicted by the grand jury. 
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Nixon, bowing to pressure to appease the public mood, released edited transcripts of forty 
conversations, including twenty conversations ordered in the subpoena. Nixon’s attorney, James D 
Sinclair, told the court that, “The President wants me to argue that he is as powerful a monarch as 
Louis XIV, only four years at a time, and is not subject to the processes of any court in the land 
except the court of impeachment.”173 
 
Naturally the court rejected this statement and demanded the release of all the tapes and transcripts, 
unedited, to be delivered to the court by the 31st May 1974. Upon referral to the Supreme Court, it 
was decided that the transcripts may indeed contain evidence of wrongdoing and, despite the 
President’s claim that he had the right to protect all privileged government communications, the 
court decided that Nixon had no right to “an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of 
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.”174 
 
This case redefined the role of the president politically and legally in the United States. The 
Supreme Court exercised its authority and made clear that even the President can be subject to the 
rule of law as enacted through decisions of the courts.   
 
It is evident therefore that the courts are unafraid of interpreting the constitution in a way that is 
damaging to the executive or the legislative branches of government. In Congress Versus The 
Supreme Court,
175
 C Herman Pritchett provides evidence in detail of the frequent constitutional 
battles between the legislative and the judicial branches, and this he covers on only a small period 
between 1957-60. Beyond this time frame the US Supreme Court has been called upon to challenge 
the decisions and actions of the other branches of government and has succeeded (in the sense that 
the court remains intact, and its powers of judicial review remain untouched). It is easy to forget 
some of the more serious flaws in the American judicial system, especially given that to be elected 
to the Supreme Court is still a political appointment. So long as this is the case, noble though the 
cause and victories of the Supreme Court may be, it will always be true that “the Constitution says 
whatever the Supreme Court says it says.  As for what the Supreme Court says, that all depends on 
who's president.
176” Equally, it is easy to demonstrate the power of the courts when reflecting on a 
country whose sovereign legal document is the constitution. For countries with no formal 
constitution, such as the United Kingdom and those countries who follow the Westminster System, 
how can the court define its role when there is no precedent to identify it? For this reason it is vital 
that we explore the role of the courts in other foreign jurisdictions, and the legal system of closest 
relevance to that of the United Kingdom is that of New Zealand.  
 
Judicial Activism in New Zealand 
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New Zealand is a member of the Commonwealth whose head of state is the Monarch of the United 
Kingdom, the Queen. It follows the Westminster system, in that there is no formal, codified 
constitution and relies on a mix of primary and secondary legislation, as well as selected statutes 
from the United Kingdom legal system, to formulate its constitutional doctrines
177
. New Zealand 
relies on the Imperial Laws Application Act, first passed in 1854, which affirmed the application of 
certain statutes and common law principles from the United Kingdom. Included in the list of such 
laws are Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Acts, the Petition of Right and the Bill of Rights. What is 
more, the Act also provides the Governor General the right to create subordinate legislation under 
the laws contained within the Act. This authority demonstrates that the Attorney-General acts as the 
political ‘Sovereign’ for New Zealand, and as country’s the Head of State. For this reason, the 
Imperial Laws Application Act is one of the most vital laws of New Zealand, and could be 
described as a fundamental, constitutionally significant law.  
 
The Imperial Laws Application Act is not the only constitutionally significant act that New Zealand 
boasts, however. In addition one of the most fundamental laws, and also one of the most 
controversial, is the Treaty of Waitangi. Signed in 1840 by more than 50 tribal leaders of the Maori 
people (of which 13 were women) on both the North and South Islands, as well as a representative 
of the British Crown, the treaty guaranteed certain rights of the Maori people as well as conferring 
upon the Imperial British Crown the right to govern the unified New Zealand protectorate. The 
treaty, outlining these rights in three parts, guaranteed the Maori their right to own property, their 
independence and to their own self governance under the British Crown (although the differing 
interpretations of the Maori and English versions call this into question). The treaty also established 
a British government in New Zealand, as well as creating the position of Governor-General, who 
would act as Head of State for the Crown in absentia.  
 
The Treaty of Waitangi has, because of its differing versions, led to a series of difficulties in 
interpretation and application, and led eventually to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1974 which 
established the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal, which hears arguments when the government is 
accused of breaking the terms of the accord. The most famous implementation of the Treaty of 
Waitangi was in the case of New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General.
178
 This case was 
groundbreaking if only because, although the act to which the case refers
179
 states that “Nothing in 
this act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi," the Courts themselves were tasked to determine what exactly these principles 
were. It was Lord Cooke, one of New Zealand’s foremost jurists, who delivered the judgement and 
who was responsible for determining standards regarding the relationship between the Maori and 
the Crown in New Zealand. This is a significant development in the argument that the courts are 
sovereign. Here the courts have abandoned using the traditional method of statutory interpretation, 
that is, the Purposive, Literal and Integrated approaches. For these approaches, the courts usually 
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interpret statutes according to strict guidelines. For the Literal approach, the courts will rule on the  
meaning of a law or the intention of Parliament according to the literal definition of the word whose 
interpretation is required. For example, Lord Reid said, “We often say that we are looking for the 
intention of Parliament, but that is not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words 
which Parliament used.”180  
 
The Purposive approach is an approach more flexible than the literal, and requires the court to try 
and understand the aims of Parliament in a statute, in order to not, as Lord Denning put it, “pull the 
language of Parliament to pieces and make nonsense of it. We sit here to find out the intention of 
Parliament and carry it out and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the 
enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis.”181 
 
The Integrated approach is one that takes elements from both and uses both a respect for the words 
in the statute and their context and assumed purpose to reach a judgement. As Denning stated, the 
task of the court is filling in the gaps that Parliament might have left when drafting legislation. Of 
course, this view was challenged, and when the case reached the House of Lords Denning’s 
approach was dismissed by Lord Simonds as a “naked usurpation of the legislative function under 
the thin guise of interpretation…if a gap is disclosed the remedy lies in an amending Act.”182 
 
Denning’s approach, therefore, is one of cautious law-making. Where Parliament leaves a gap in 
interpretation, it is the courts’ duty, says Denning, to fill in those gaps and complete the law. This 
may not be how judges such as Lord Simonds would prefer the process be described, but it is the 
way the system works nonetheless.  
 
In New Zealand Maori Council, the court was asked not to interpret the terms of the treaty; it would 
be impossible given the differing meanings of the Maori and English translations; but to infer from 
it the rights and responsibilities of the signatories party to the original agreement. In the case, 
Cooke says that,  
 
“The differences between the texts and the shades of meaning 
do not matter for the purposes of this case. What matters is the 
spirit. This approach accords with the oral character of Maori 
tradition and culture … The relatively sophisticated society for 
whose needs the State-Owned Enterprises Act has been devised 
could not possibly have been foreseen by those who participated 
in the making of the 1840 Treaty. In brief the basic terms of the 
bargain were that the Queen was to govern and the Maoris were 
to be her subjects; in return their chieftainships and possessions 
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were to be protected, but sales of land to the Crown could be 
negotiated. These aims partly conflicted. The Treaty has to be 
seen as an embryo rather than a fully developed and integrated 
set of ideas.”183 
 
This is a clear example of a judge ‘filling the gaps’ but on a truly huge scale. Cooke tells us that,  
 
“It does not follow that in each instance the question will admit 
of only one answer. If the Crown acting reasonably and in good 
faith satisfies itself that known or foreseeable Maori claims do 
not require retention of certain land, no principle of the Treaty 
will prevent a transfer. 
“I use "reasonably" here in the ordinary sense of in accordance 
with or within the limits of reason. The distinction is between on 
the one hand what a reasonable person could do or decide, and 
on the other what would be irrational or capricious or 
misdirected. Lawyers often speak of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, in allusion to the case reported on page 223 of 
the King’s Bench Reports 1948, volume 1, but I think that it 
comes to the same thing.” 
Cooke was, in this passage, defining the terms of the treaty and setting the boundaries which 
constrain both the Maori tribes and the Crown in their dealings with each other. He puts into place a 
test of reasonableness when determining if a transfer of property can be carried out between the 
Maori and the Crown. Moreover, he defines the test of reasonableness underneath and, therefore, 
creates a rule with clearly defined requisites for operation, and a penalty for non-completion (i.e. 
The transfer will be void). Technically the Crown is, as with the United Kingdom, Sovereign in 
New Zealand. This means that in this ruling the courts are constraining the powers of the Crown by 
creating the rules in a treaty binding the sovereign. If the courts are able to act in this way, and 
constrain the Crown in this manner, then how can it be that the Crown is Sovereign?  
 
Naturally, the answer is that it cannot be. Of course, the Crown in New Zealand differs from the 
Crown in the United Kingdom. In New Zealand it is a nominal concept, and the power of the 
Sovereign is de facto vested in the Attorney-General, although de jure the sovereign is still the 
British Monarch. In this sense, therefore, the Governor-General for New Zealand can be seen as a 
head-of-state akin to the President in the United States. Despite this however, since New Zealand 
follows the Westminster System, Sovereignty is still found with the Queen in Parliament as with 
The United Kingdom. As a result of this, and lacking a formal constitution defining the roles and 
powers of the three branches of government, it can only be possible for the Courts to prove their 
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sovereignty where there is a challenge to the authority of Parliament or where the courts create a 
new law based upon a novel question brought before a higher court able to issue judgements that 
will have a binding effect.  
 
However Lord Cooke, mentioned above, has contributed to the movement in New Zealand that the 
courts are responsible for making law. In his article An Impossible Distinction
184
 he argues that the 
common law has developed and invented law in situations where no law previously existed (and 
this is to him especially true of the courts in New Zealand) doing so sometimes before the House of 
Lords in the United Kingdom. This leads him to the conclusion that the common law of New 
Zealand should not only be in a position to be cited as primary law in its own right, but that also, in 
cases heard by courts in other jurisdictions, common law judgements should be relied upon as 
persuasive. This argument puts the courts in a position where they can claim law-making authority 
and so allows provides the opportunity to establish themselves as sovereign in a common law 
system. 
 
For his argument he draws heavily from the case law of England and Wales, while reminding us 
that the same rules are of importance in the legal system of New Zealand: “It may be doubted 
whether the is any overseas jurisdiction where the work of the United Kingdom courts is more 
deeply respected and influential than it is in New Zealand.”185 
 
In the course of his argument, he explains that the courts inevitably create new law, simply by  
altering or expanding upon the existing case law or by interpreting statutes that have any gaps that 
need filling in. The common law by its definition is a system of evolution; slow and carefully 
considered incremental changes to the law which culminate in a refined rule which can provide a 
certain outcome for a variety of circumstances. 
 
Beyond New Zealand but also in the other common-law jurisdiction that shares the Westminster 
System, Australia, Cooke tells us that there are two schools covering the creation of law; by 
proximity or by incrementalism. These schools are explained simply by their titles, and it is 
incrementalism that shall be focused upon here. This method is the progression of laws through 
precedent, and results in a wider reaching law than would exist thanks to a single judgement. An 
example of such a rule could be found in Dutton, the facts of which are further explained below. 
 
Cooke points out, however, that “It has to be remembered ... that what is a jump to one person may 
be quite a small and necessary step to another.” Filling in a gap in the sense that Denning describes, 
or creating a new common-law rule may be to anyone else a leap beyond the perceived role of the 
judge in the common law. Moreover, he goes on to affirm that “it may conduce to perspective to 
remember that when a truly new point arises any solution of it is truly judicial legislation”. Dutton v 
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Bognor Regis Urban District Council
186
 is the example Cooke provides in his analysis.  In this case, 
a local authority approved in negligence a construction project, and this negligence led to the 
property being less valuable to the ultimate purchaser than would have been the case if the 
inspection had not been negligent. Counsel for the appellant opened his case in the Court of Appeal 
by stating, “The case raises for the first time in this country the question whether where someone 
like a local authority, exercising a right to inspect during manufacture or construction of buildings 
or goods, negligently approves the construction or manufacture so that the property of the goods 
turns out to be less valuable to the ultimate purchaser than they would have been if there had been 
no negligence, the ultimate purchaser will have a right of action in tort against the inspecting body.” 
 
Cooke reaches the logical conclusion that whatever the decision in Dutton, the Court would still be 
writing a new law covering an area neither legislated for by Parliament or decided in the common 
law. This case was overruled by the House of Lords in Murphy v Brentwood District Council
187
 
which decided that the council, absent of physical injury, could not be liable for the economic loss 
as Dutton had said. Despite being overruled, courts in any common law jurisdiction must agree to a 
responsibility that in situations such as this, Judges are acting as a legislator, and indeed in a 
capacity as Sovereign, in creating these laws. This of course is the accepted academic view of the 
Common Law system, except that we can see that the justices’ decisions can both create new laws 
and amend old ones, be they statute or common law rules. 
 
We can see, therefore, that in Australia and New Zealand there is a more significant movement to 
accept that the Courts do bear responsibility for creating law (a reality that any common law 
jurisdiction needs to accept). For Lord Cooke, the Courts play a vital role in the innovation and 
development of new law by incremental steps, though sometimes they are called upon to 
manufacture laws for novel circumstances for which no previous rule exists.  
 
The Treaty of Waitangi also provides us with a excellent example of the courts defining not just the 
meaning of terms in a law, but what the law of a statute in fact is. In New Zealand Maori Council 
there is a clearly defined set of principles laid out to govern the interaction between the Crown and 
the Maori tribes and these terms were not clarified in the treaty; it is hard enough to provide a 
common translation that satisfies the perceived meanings found in both the Maori and English 
versions. In circumstances such as this, the courts have two choices: either wait for Parliament to 
draft an explanatory amendment or simply fill in the gaps themselves. In this circumstance, and 
relying upon the English case law cited by Cooke in An Impossible Distinction, it becomes clear to 
see that for New Zealand, there is no argument that the Courts are granted sovereignty to make law 
through the common law even on matters of constitutional significance such as the Treaty of 
Waitangi.  
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For the United States, the power of the courts in addition to their common-law responsibility for 
creating new judge-made rules, such as the kind found in Dutton, also include the authority to defy 
both the executive and the legislative branches of government in the name of the constitution. This 
provides them with a legitimacy to rule against political figures and authorities, like the President, 
since all authority for all political activity is drawn from the same well as that of the power of the 
Courts. 
 
Of course, the hypocrisy of this circumstance is that although Justices of the Supreme Court in the 
United States are aware of their constitutional authority, they choose not to act upon it in some 
circumstances simply because the nature of their appointment to the Court is political in nature. An 
example of this could be drawn, as above, with wiretapping; - since this was not widely condemned 
under Bush until the affair came to light in the press. On the other hand, there are circumstances 
where the Court is prepared to make decisions that do not comply with national or state policy, such 
as Brown v Board of Education of Topeka
188
 which held that state laws that established segregated 
public schools were unconstitutional according to the Fourteenth Amendment of the US 
Constitution
189, since “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” This demonstrates 
that, at a time when the United States actively implemented a system of segregation the Court was 
prepared to defy that popular, if odious zeitgeist, and judge reasonably and according to the 
constitution. That is not to say, however, that Brown was designed to combat segregation because it 
caused the black students to feel inferior. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, in his 
judgement in Missouri v Jenkins
190
 said that,  
 
“Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have 
caused psychological feelings of inferiority. Public school 
systems that separated blacks and provided them with superior 
educational resources making blacks “feel” superior to whites 
sent to lesser schools - would violate the fourteenth amendment, 
whether or not the white students felt stigmatized, just as do 
school systems in which the positions of the races are reversed. 
Psychological injury or benefit is irrelevant.”191 
 
For the Supreme Court in this case, the issue at hand was not whether black students were made to 
feel inferior but that any minority were; and that this was an unacceptable breach of their 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. As this shows, the Supreme Court of the United States as well as the 
courts of New Zealand and Australia are not afraid to admit to their authority to challenge other 
branches of government, and pass laws through their judgements that will have wide-reaching and 
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lasting implications for not only their own legal-political systems, but for the legal systems of any 
common-law jurisdiction that tends to rely on overseas judgments to decide on cases of their own. 
Indeed, given the nature of the American legal system, lawyers and lawmakers alike look to the 
judgments of the Supreme Court to identify what the law is in certain circumstances. It is the 
responsibility of the Supreme Court to decide what is or is not constitutional, and as a result their 
decisions can have extraordinary implications. In 2013 for example the justices will decide on the 
issue of gay marriage in the USA, which will be scrutinised carefully by parties on both sides of the 
debate. 
 
This is not to say, however, that the legal systems that institute this approach are not without 
shortcomings of their own. The US Supreme Court has its own outspoken critics, not of the work 
they do, but the way in which they carry it out. For the US, the higher courts are political as much 
as they are legal, and this brings challenges unique to the United States. Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court are political appointments made by the incumbent president. As a result, 
there is often a mix of conservative and liberal judges on the bench, appointed for life by various 
administrations over any number of years. This means that justices are open to make their decisions 
according to the policy of their party affiliation, which can cause difficulties in matters of justice, 
especially where the prevailing political attitude is legally questionable. This makes establishing 
such a system in the United Kingdom less attractive, and ultimately means that a different system 
must be sought. 
  
 
Chapter Five - The Judiciary Constrained: Economics and the Law in Communism and Capitalism 
The Soviet Union was founded on an economic principle, and it was this 
principle that continued to drive the legal-political system until Communism’s 
fall in 1991. In the USSR, party policy and communist doctrine were at the 
heart of the legal system, and judges were required to work in light of this at all 
times.  
 
In the wake of the credit crisis and global recession, governments are turning to 
austerity in their economic policy, the harsh results of which are felt by 
ordinary people to their detriment, and to little overall gain. The question to be 
examined is, can it be constitutional to enact policy which has an outcome that 
is harmful to the population-at-large, and how will the judiciary react, if at all? 
As in communist states such as the USSR and China, economics is taking on 
greater and greater significance in the lives of both politicians and ordinary 
citizens in the United Kingdom, but how drastic are the effects of an economic 
technocracy, and what changes can we expect in the judiciary where money is 
involved? 
 
Introduction 
The differences between the legal systems of communist states like that of Soviet Russia and their 
western counterparts are stark, but are as much concerned with differing ideas of jurisprudence as 
they are with the dispensation of justice. After all, according to Schlesinger, “Law is no more than a 
social technique, with some advantages and disadvantages in comparison with other possible ways 
of regulating human behavior, but it is certainly not superior to what it should regulate.”192 Marxist 
ideology follows a differing view of the State to the ideas of the European enlightenment, which 
reached the height of its influence in the 18th century; an age of political upheaval that culminated 
in the American War of Independence and the French Revolution. As philosophers such as Paine, 
Locke Rousseau and Montesquieu disseminated their ideas of the state, power and the citizen’s 
relationship to the government, a revolutionary zeitgeist took hold which transformed the western 
world’s concept of justice, the law and the political. 
 
In the East however, Russia failed to adopt this revolutionary spirit, and maintained a hereditary 
autocracy until their own revolution in 1917. Unlike in the west, Russia was gripped by a revolution 
that had a new, Soviet identity, underpinned by the philosophies of Marx and Lenin. These new 
philosophers of the people, inspired by the socialist and unionist movements of the nineteenth 
century, advocated a system dominated by economic principle: a vast, all-controlling state that 
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became “the ultimate force behind the organs of justice ... and the ultimate rationale behind the 
direction taken by Soviet law has tended to be its relationship to Party policy.”193  
 
The Pre-Revolutionary Legal System 
The Russian attitude to the law, predating the Soviet revolution, has been at best ambivalent - the 
Czars from as early as Peter the Great began erecting a system of laws and government designed to 
protect the political and authoritarian centre, rather than protect those at most risk of abuse at the 
hands of the system. However, it was in the nineteenth century that perspectives regarding the 
Judiciary were beginning to change. The 1864 legal reforms introduced by Alexander II provided 
for an independent judiciary, trial by jury and a Bar Association (Advokatura).
194
 
 
This new judiciary, with its attention to defendants’ procedural and appeals rights, and their 
willingness to disregard executive administrative orders which they deemed illegal,
195
 could well 
have developed into a powerful and just judicial-administrative body, were it not for the constant 
interference by the government whenever it felt that the courts were threatening their authority. This 
philosophy of government was not restrained after the revolution, either. It is almost a given that 
justice as we know it in the West was denied to those under the iron thumb of the Soviet Party 
Secretaries, but for the judiciary, which had only recently begun to forge an independent identity 
under the Czars, the frustration caused by a sudden and dramatic change in perspective must have 
been staggering.  
 
Under the reign of successive autocrats the law in Russia had lurched through several attempts at 
codification and reform but none had been entirely successful. As a result, the Czar had taken to 
issuing Executive Orders where there was a gap in the law, or where the Judiciary was seen to 
threaten the supremacy of the regime. This mish-mash of statutes and orders was a quagmire for 
judges and advocates alike, who would in fact need knowledge of several legal systems operating 
alongside each other; the rigid and outdated soslovie system of Estates provided different rules for 
different classes, and as a result, the law governing the clergy was separate from that which 
governed the aristocracy or the peasantry. Not only that, but the changing social conditions in 
Russia created new classes of people for which the Estates system could find no place, for the 
intelligentsia, or the growing industrial class, for example. Soslovie in this case placed them in the 
somewhat ambiguous raznochintsy class, for those who no longer belonged to a traditional class.  
 
Moreover, the emancipation of the Serfs in 1861 led to a further division in the law. Until 
Stolypin’s sweeping agrarian reforms from 1906, the peasant class in Russia, who had only recently 
won their freedom, were not truly free. Instead, the crippling tax and land redemption payments that 
were agreed as part of the emancipation deal effectively trapped peasants in their communes (in 
Russian referred to as the Mir), where they were subject to customary, or popular laws (obychnoe 
                                                 
193 ibid pp210 
194 Ed. Beirne, P, Revolution in Law: Contributions to the Development of Soviet Legal Theory pp3 
195 ibid at pp5 
  
pravo and narodnoe pravo respectively). As a result, these legal reforms that provided a new and 
more robust judiciary did not become available to the peasant class until the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.  
 
Unfortunately, despite the wave of sweeping reforms enjoyed by the peasant and destitute classes in 
Russia at the turn of the twentieth century, any chance to see them pay off were stripped from them 
at the time of the Russian Revolution. In 1922, the Introductory Law of the Civil Code in Russia 
forbade “any interpretation of provisions of the Code on the ground of laws of the overthrown 
governments and the decisions of the pre-revolutionary courts," and ordered that “no court or other 
authority of the Republic shall take cognizance of disputes originating before November 7, 1917.” 
The use or reference to any pre-revolutionary law, proceeding, decision or statute, effectively 
cutting Communist Russia’s ties with the previous legal system and starting from scratch. Although 
for the new communist rulers this break made the task of forming a Party-obedient judiciary more 
simple, the developments made by the Czars might well have been further built upon to create a 
much fairer legal system, which could be relied upon to uphold the Rule of Law as is expected in 
other developed legal systems. 
 
It now is much easier to understand how the Russian legal system was able to be so perverted by the 
state in the years after the Revolution. A judiciary which had only recently before won it’s right to 
independence from government, yet had always been countermanded where the regime felt 
threatened, would have been much more receptive to an authoritarian regime, especially one as 
involving as the Soviet Party. The principal idea of government to the Soviet Union was an 
enormous and intrusive state, which was solely responsible for the rights of its citizens, and which 
could remove those rights as it saw fit. Childcare in the Soviet Union, for example, was a privilege 
granted by the state to Parents, and if it was felt by the party that a parent should not be responsible 
for raising his or her child, the child would be removed. This was the reality of life in Soviet Russia. 
 
The legal system fared no better, and individual rights were all but forgotten under the weight of 
responsibility to the party. However, this notion was not only because of a will by the government 
for absolute authority. In fact, the spirit of the Revolution had always been the Marx/Lenin 
Communist theory, which viewed crime differently to that of the West. In the Soviet state, crime 
was a matter of ignorance to communist ideals, and by educating criminals the idealist ‘Workers’ 
Paradise’ could be created. Of course, for many in the Soviet System this idea was an illusion, and 
although the Communist philosophy is seductive the reality it offers is less appealing. 
 
Perspectives on Law and the Constitution in the USSR 
This philosophy, where the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the individual, does not gel 
easily with the notion of human or individual rights, but nonetheless many states that adopted 
communism in the twentieth century also enacted grandly worded constitutions promising the 
people’s interests over those of the state. For example, Article 10 of the 1936 Constitution 
  
guarantees protection under law for individual property rights, however Article 12 goes on to say 
that, “In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in 
accordance with the principle: ‘He who does not work, neither shall he eat.’” As a result, the Soviet 
approach to the legal system seems to be one of contradiction. Not only that, but it places an 
unnecessary burden on the individual, since he owes his daily meals to the state in return for work 
that he hopes is satisfactory in the eyes of the government. 
 
The constitution itself in the Soviet Union was in effect an empty promise designed to convince 
observers of Communism’s democratic credentials. According to US Supreme Court Justice Scalia, 
 
 “The bill of rights of the former evil empire, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics was much better than ours... We guarantee freedom of speech and 
of the press, big deal! They guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press of 
street demonstrations and anyone who is caught trying to suppress criticism 
of the government will be called to account. Of course just words on paper - 
what our framers would have called a parchment guarantee.”195 
 
Just as Scalia asserted, “The Soviet Constitution [was] in no sense the supreme law of the land. It is, 
rather, a solemn declaration of general policies and a general approximate organizational and 
administrative scheme for government authorities. . . . A constitutional provision may be set aside 
by an administrative decree and the newly enacted rule incorporated into the Constitution only at a 
later date.”196 
 
Further evidence of the Soviet Union’s enforcement of Communist doctrine over the the rule of law 
was evidenced in their system of election, which by-and-large was nothing more than a show, 
where “no chance is given to the voters to make a choice of the candidates.”197 This was because 
under Soviet rule, and in order to protect the interests of the regime, “the right to nominate 
candidates [was] secured to Communist Party organizations and to other organizations controlled 
by the Communist Party ... In elections thus far held only one ticket had been placed on the ballot, 
that of the 'Communist block and those without party affiliations.'"
198
 
Like everything else in the government of the Soviet Union, the dispensation of justice was carried 
out under the auspices of Marxist principles. The first People’s Commissar of Justice, Nikolai 
Krylenko, commented that, “What we're up against here is a deep prejudice... a mistaken belief that 
people should be tried in accordance not with the Party's political guidelines but with considerations 
of ‘higher justice’.”199 Evidently, crime was viewed differently to how it is in the West; the 
objective of the law was to protect the Communist state from individuals perceived as threats, and 
                                                 
196 Scalia, A, Judiciary Committee Hearing SH-216, 09/02/2012 
197 Ed, Gsovski, V  Grzybowski, K. Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe New York: 
Frederick Praeger, Inc., 1959 pp24 
198 ibid pp25 
199 Radzinsky, E Stalin: The first In-Depth Biography Paw Prints (2008) pp258 
  
the criminal justice system was a constant means of enforcing the Marxist education of the people 
through public trials and constant judicial influence. The constitution of the USSR provided for the 
appointment to judicial office by the Supreme Soviet, which essentially meant that it was the 
General Secretary who would appoint senior judges in the Soviet Union.  
Not only did the communist system fail to gel with democratic principles, but problems arose 
because it was a state founded on the Marxist economic ideology, and it was this economic 
perspective that coloured the development of the Russian legal system.  
As is demonstrated particularly well in the example of the Corn Ear Law of the early Soviet Union, 
the Judiciary are loathe to dish out unnecessarily long, draconian sentences, the economics and 
politics of the time called upon the judiciary to punish harshly those who would steal and, in the 
eyes of the government, threaten the revolution itself. This was perhaps more true in the time of the 
New Economic Policy, when the Soviet Union faced the threats of starvation, insurrection and 
foreign interference, and as a result justice caved to the will of the regime.  
Economy and the Law in China 
China, which still operates under communist doctrine, is a curious case. The Communist principles 
advocated by Mao Tse Tung were somewhat different to those of Marx, Lenin and later Stalin. It 
was Mao’s belief that it was the agricultural peasant class, alongside the working class proletariate, 
that would drive the Communist revolution. This was part of Mao’s need to adapt Marxist 
principles to the conditions in China, where agriculture was still a dominant industry, and the old 
philosophies of Legalism and Confucianism were still held in high regard. As a result, it is possible 
to see the Communist revolution in China as a Utopian vision based on Confucian principles and 
brought about by Marxist revolutionary method. 
Of course, the manner in which the revolution was brought about changes little the effect it had 
upon the Chinese legal system or absence thereof. Until the revolution in 1949 China had followed 
confucian principles even in legal disputes, and the underused and underdeveloped legal system 
was all but ignored in favor of mediation.  
In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping began the process of Chinese economic reform (改革开放), Chinese 
politics and economics drastically deviated from their Russian counterparts. Xiaoping, whose ideas 
on socialist economic principles were at odds with Mao’s own political thought, took power after 
Mao’s death in 1976 and began his changes in two stages; the first stage saw decollectivisation of 
agriculture, inviting foreign investment and permitting entrepreneurs to open businesses; the second 
stage, begun in the 1980s and ending in the 1990s, involved the privatisation and outsourcing of 
much state-owned industry to the private sector and the lifting of price controls, protectionist 
policies and regulations, although state monopolies in sectors like banking and fuel remained. The 
private sector grew remarkably, accounting for as much as 70 percent of Chinese Gross Domestic 
Product by 2005, From 1978 to 2010, unprecedented growth occurred. With the economy 
increasing by 9.5% a year, China's became the second largest economy after the United States. 
  
Of course, the development of an economy is not always an indication of a developing legal or 
political system, and in many ways the developing legal and political landscape in China can be 
likened to a period of feudal rule. The reforms of 1978 marked the beginning of the end of 
communism in China. The twenty years that followed saw the constitution of China evolve to 
support both private enterprise and personal property rights; and these reforms forced the 
development of the chinese political system from being one of tight communist control and 
economic principles to a colossal yet profitable serf-state, more akin to Stolypin than Stalin.  
These reforms sparked the need for a new legal system to reassure foreign investors that they could 
expect the same legal protections in China as they could expect in any other nation. Despite the 
revolution and the push toward modernisation that culminated with the Great Leap Forward China 
still lacked a legitimate legal system to govern civil disputes between private corporations. As a 
result, China can be used to observe the development of a legal system from scratch. More 
importantly, China’s legal system will develop alongside a young but already successful economic 
system, based on modern economic principles and which is connected globally by highly developed 
digital communications technology. As a result, observers will be able to chart the development of 
judicial attitudes toward modern legal challenges such as the right to die, or the question of 
protecting the interests of big business, particularly on-line, without historical bias or an already 
existing but inappropriate framework.   
Of course at the present time China’s political and legal policies, particularly regarding the internet, 
are quite different from our own. China has been accused of being responsible for a number of 
digital attacks against foreign governments and private corporations. “In May 2009, President 
Obama labeled cyber-attacks ‘‘one of the most serious economic and national security challenges’’ 
that the country faces. Joel Brenner, former director of the Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive, has identified China as the origin point of extensive malicious cyber 
activities that target the United States. … A large body of both circumstantial and forensic evidence 
strongly indicates Chinese state involvement in such activities, whether through the direct actions of 
state entities or through the actions of third party groups sponsored by the state.”200  
Although the Chinese courts claim to “independently [exercise] the highest judicial right according 
to the law and without any interruption by administrative organs, social organizations or 
individuals,”201 the flagrant abuse of the Internet in China for piracy and cyber-terror attacks with 
very limited attention from the courts until only recently point to a judiciary with its eyes firmly 
closed to these kinds of crime, and being directed thus by the state government organs. According 
to a study by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) almost 100% of 
music downloaded from the Net in China is stolen.
202
 According to the Asia Director for the IFPI, 
Leong May See, “We have huge problems in China” when it comes to enforcing piracy legislation, 
not least of all because despite paying out an average of $13,000 per case the IFPI only recoups 
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some $130 for each successful law suit. The result of this is that there is no deterrence from the 
courts or government to prevent this kind of crime from occurring. It might be argued in this 
instance in fact that neither state organ is prepared to claim sovereign right to decide on this issue, 
since the Supreme Court lacks the scope or determination to begin producing leading cases, except 
for those which receive government approval and become so-called Guiding Cases. This inaction is, 
in part because“Judges are the judicial personnel who exercise the judicial authority of the State 
according to law”203 (emphasis added). Despite the State having control of decisions made by the 
judiciary, because the state has been supposedly instrumental in carrying out these kinds of 
aggressive cybercrimes, by keeping the law in China governing these crimes vague and unevenly 
applied, the State can continue to legitimise its activities. 
The Twin Serpents: the Constitution and the Economy  
 The digital age has given rise to copyright piracy on a scale not seen before, and the response from 
the industry has been to try and use the courts, whose “general use of the Internet is ‘very 
pedestrian’”204 to set an example, pressing for huge awards in damages against defendants. Recently 
Joel Tanenbaum, a student in the United States, was sued for copyright infringement on thirty 
songs, which he had downloaded and distributed via the Internet, and was ordered to pay damages 
of $675,000
205
. Excessive punishment like this while not deterring piracy
206
 harms the economy by 
removing real income from a consumer, and harms the rule of law. 
The creative arts industry has been slow to adapt to changing economic conditions in the past, and 
reacted similarly during the introduction of film with sound in the 1930s. It was the main concern of 
the music industry at the time that permitting soundtracks in film would destroy the music industry 
as it existed.
Mark
 More and more in the recent past however, there is increasing support by 
governments internationally for curtailing copyright violations with a series of bills that, it is 
argued, would seriously curtail rights to privacy and communications. These include the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 1998. 
This intertwining of economic and political-philosophical thinking is not unique to what might be 
described as peculiar or novel legal systems as compared to our own. In fact there has been a 
growing trend in the study of both economics and the law of the constitution to view political and 
legal systems as being fundamentally connected with the economic system of a state, which puts the 
ideals of a state constitution at risk.  
 
To elucidate; the object of a constitution is to safeguard the rights and responsibilities of both the 
state and the citizen as inviolable superior laws; to protect the means and manner in which a 
government can claim a mandate to rule, and afterwards the manner in which it is to rule. Deviation 
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from these rules is said to be unconstitutional and, as a superior law, carries with it greater penalties 
not just in law, but in the common understanding of the citizens. 
 
However, in times of great financial difficulty, the Chancellor of the Exchequer is able to enact 
policy that would lead directly to a worsening of socio-economic conditions viewed as real income, 
often dressed up in more acceptable terms such as ‘belt-tightening’ or balancing the budget. This is 
perhaps best expressed by the founder of the modern school of Constitutional Economics, Hector 
McNeill, who said,  
 
“It [is] evident that Keynesianism [is] associated with ... generating policy-
induced implications for segments of the economy causing them to suffer 
outcomes which were neither reasonable nor required. For example a 
common outcome of policy decisions has been corporate failures, 
unemployment and house repossessions. Governments and economists have 
tended to dismiss such perversity by wrapping it up in a parcel on which 
they write "medicine", "belt-tightening" or even "adjustment". However, in 
constitutional terms, when such events result directly from policy decisions 
they represent a form of arbitrary collateral damage.”207 
 
 These policies, especially in times of recession, often create economic ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ just as 
success in times of economic growth would create the same: those who succeed and those who do 
not. In a recession however, when these policies are enacted, it is not market forces that worsen 
social and financial problems for citizens, but the policies themselves that create public sector 
unemployment, slash interest rates and increase tax (especially point-of-sale tax schemes such as 
VAT and fuel duty). 
 
We presuppose that in the courtroom any conflict between industry and society must be a zero sum 
game; - that is, one side must win to the other’s detriment. In order for a factory, for example, to 
produce a good, it must also produce waste smoke, which spreads across a nearby residential 
area
208
. The residents object to the smoke, and bring a civil suit. As a result a judge might force the 
factory to pay for every ton of gas they produce, relative to the damage caused to the residents. This 
method forces the factory to reduce production of the smoke, and thus the product which they 
produce, which means the profitability of the factory will be damaged. If the judge is persuaded that 
the residents nearby are not affected then the factory can continue producing harmful emissions. In 
this circumstance there is no compromise, and it leads inevitably to a greater harm than good for 
society. Regardless of the outcome society is damaged in some way in this scenario, by focusing the 
court’s attention on choosing between public health or economic health. 
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With this in mind, the question to be asked is whether a money bill could be challenged in court on 
the grounds that it is unconstitutional. In this section it shall be shown that if a money bill such as a 
budget were to be challenged there could be a strong legal argument to permit ignorance of its rules, 
supported by the cases which have been explored so far in previous chapters. 
 
This argument should primarily focus on the rules governing Human Rights, especially those in the 
European Convention and the UN Declaration. These rules have made challenging the government 
on its decisions much easier, as they provide a codified framework of rules in which the 
government must operate. Not only that, because the operation of government extends so widely 
into people’s lives there exist countless variations of facts that could challenge a government’s 
action which have not been litigated upon already. In other words, there have not been enough 
instances of litigation in the European Court of Human Rights to properly define the limits of 
actions brought against governments for acts against the economic health of it’s citizens. We hear in 
times of economic woe of  government ‘belt-tightening’ policies, but although they may bear some 
significance to the improvement of the country economically, they lead to deliberate damage 
against those in work, who claim benefits of some description or another or otherwise rely upon the 
government to assist in some way
209
. For example, is it constitutional for a government to enforce a 
policy that charges an additional twenty per-cent value added tax against goods which are served 
hot but not meant to be consumed immediately, such as cornish pasties bought from a baker? This 
question may not at first appear to be a legal one, but such a tax would have particularly damaging 
implications to small businesses and consumers who, in times of economic crisis, would spent in 
greater amounts on products such as pasties and pies which are inexpensive and immediate.  
 
In the end, the comparison is not drawn against the tax itself, but against the manner in which the 
tax is brought about and the manner in which government imposes it. The Bill of Rights precludes 
arbitrary taxation by royal prerogative, but that is precisely the pattern that is appearing in British 
politics. Harsher and harsher regimes of taxation and austerity are pushed through Parliament first 
at the Commons stage, where a Budget bill will only be defeated as a sign of revolt against the 
government of the day (but can be debated upon), and from there is made into good law without any 
oversight by the Upper House. Although this process speeds up the timetable for the bill’s assent it 
provides much more limited protection  
 
Backdoor Privacy Laws: Buying Justice 
This section will lead on to comments about judge-made laws and how they are created and evolve. 
Judges create new laws (super-injunctions, for example) supported by the weight of litigation and 
availability of funds for appeal;, - one might think of it as ‘buying’ a new law from the courts. The 
courts would be abandoning their principles of justice and fair trial by allowing themselves to be 
manipulated by money, though the fact that a litigant has money does not mean that the courts will 
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support their claim. The fact that a party has more cash only means that it becomes easier 
financially to appeal (since litigation in an appellate court can be very expensive), where he may 
find a more favorable judgement. While this does not guarantee any certainty litigants with limited 
funds, even for a hearing at first instance, cannot persue a different ruling at the higher courts 
should they not achieve the outcome they want. The result of this inequality was the introduction of 
so-called ‘Super-Injunctions,’ which be explained in greater detail below.  
 
How did Super-Injunctions Come About?  
Super-injunctions began their lives effectively as gag-orders, preventing mention not only of what it 
is that the order concerns, but also preventing mention of the order itself. This development in the 
common law, although it highlighted neatly the authority of judges to make new laws, was also a 
cynical exploitation of the judiciary by the wealthy to protect their secrets. Not only did this stifle 
freedom of the press, but also the more fundamental right to freedom of expression. in the case of 
John Terry's super injunction, the order not only gagged the press but also the young woman with 
whom he was accused of having an extra-marital affair. This was clearly too far an extension of the 
authority of any injunction, and created a situation that would allow for a very serious breach of 
another persons rights. Such gagging orders give an unfair weighting to the right to privacy of the 
richest individual and as such could not have continued as good law.  
 
Although this super-injunction regime is largely thought of as a failure, it nonetheless proved that 
judges are still able to create rules where there is a gap in the statute law, or where judges deem it to 
be appropriate. The significant public and political backlash that accompanied the super-injunction 
decisions did serve to show that perhaps judges should bear in mind the public support for a privacy 
law created through the courts, and remember that even though the courts have the right to create 
new law, this is not necessarily a right that should be invoked without serious consideration for its 
wider impact. The relationship between parliament and the courts should therefore be one of 
symbiosis. Both the courts and Parliament have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law, and to 
protect the lives and rights of citizens in accordance with the constitution. To do this, Parliament 
and the courts should not see themselves as competitors or rivals, but as two separate but equal 
colleagues, who support each other and correct each other when it is appropriate, and not when it is 
convenient politically. As most people would no doubt argue, the law is too important for it to be 
used as a tool to garner support or to encourage derision. 
  
 
   Chapter Six - Judicial Revolution, Mission Creep? 
 
“The judge, by the way, was the King; and as he wore his crown 
over the wig, did not look at all comfortable, and it was 
certainly not becoming.”210 
Lewis Carroll 
 
In the previous chapters, we have seen the effect that an active Judiciary can have upon a common 
law system, especially where that system bears some similarity to our own. In the United States and 
New Zealand, the comparison is simple because their legal system is so similar to our own. In the 
following chapter, we shall expand on this exploration of foreign jurisdictions, however rather than 
using them to draw comparisons to the legal system as it currently stands, we shall be using the 
likes of Pakistan and Thailand to demonstrate the potential political fallout from such an increase in 
Judicial Activism in the United Kingdom. We shall use these jurisdictions as an allegory to what the 
future may hold should Judges take a more active role in policy. 
 
Is it Possible to Challenge the Sovereignty of Parliament? 
In 1702 Chief Justice Holt, influenced by Coke’s assertion that a statute could be declared void, 
judged in City of London v Wood
211
 that, “if an act of Parliament should ordain that the same person 
should be party and judge in his own cause, it would be a void Act of Parliament; for it is 
impossible that the same person should be Judge and party, for the judge is to determine between 
party and party; and if an act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that 
may look pretty odd; for it may discharge one from the allegiance to the government he lives under, 
and restore him to the state of nature; but it cannot make one that lives under a Government Judge 
and party.”212 
 
This judgement provides evidence of the Judiciary actively seeking to follow Coke in a way that is 
unprecedented. In Bonham’s Case as we have seen above, Coke sought to avoid a party being Judge 
in his own cause, and declared that a statute must be void if it reached this outcome, a serious blow 
to the idea that a Statute can only be repealed by the will of Parliament. Almost one hundred years 
later, Holt reached the same conclusion and demonstrated that same flaw in the currently held belief 
that Sovereignty lies with Parliament. Coke and Holt differ in one important respect, however. 
According to Baroness Hale’s interpretation of Coke’s judgement, his opposition to the absolute 
nature of a Statute was based purely on his distaste for the Sovereignty of the King. According to 
Baroness Hale
213
, after the Revolution we succeeded as a nation in establishing Parliament (in a 
closer form to the kind that we have today), and so Coke’s impassioned judgement against Statutes 
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that defy right or reason should be remembered not as an important precedent for overruling 
Parliament’s will, but as a footnote in the development of our modern legislature. Holt muddied the 
waters however, when he decided to follow Coke in his decision in Wood. Doing so has meant that 
Coke’s judgement is more firmly defined as good law, and standing precedent. In so doing, Holt has 
made Coke more significant than he could have imagined in the development of the concept of 
Judicial sovereignty.  
 
Naturally, Judges today would be extremely cautious to follow Coke, or Holt, in one of their own 
judgements. That doesn’t limit their ability to void statutes, however. There are still a host of 
decisions available to the Courts that would give them avenue to do so. Anisminic, one of the most 
principally important constitutional cases of the twentieth century, clarified that where a statute 
removed the Courts’ right to make judgements on points of law, the Court would ignore that section 
of the act entirely. Further attacks on the validity of statues, explored in the previous chapters 
above, serve equally well as means of excluding statute from the spectrum of law. Should a case 
like one of these be encountered over an issue of real significance to the operation of Parliament, 
such as that of expenses, or over an issue vital to the policy of the Government of the day, such as 
control orders, it is easy to imagine that there would be a very real constitutional crisis on hand.  
 
For example, in the wake of the political furore that erupted after the decision in the Supreme Court 
to allow appeals to the Sex Offenders Register in 2010, members of the Government openly 
criticised the decision of the justices as being irresponsible. On the 16th February 2011 during his 
weekly Question Time session in the House, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, described “how 
completely offensive it is, once again, to have a ruling by a court that flies in the face of common 
sense. Requiring serious sexual offenders to sign the register for life, as they now do, has broad 
support across this House and across the country. I am appalled by the Supreme Court ruling. ... I 
can also tell my hon. Friend [Philip Davies, Conservative MP for Shipley] that a commission will 
be established imminently to look at a British Bill of Rights, because it is about time we ensured 
that decisions are made in this Parliament rather than in the courts.”214 
 
Further attacks were made in a special statement to the House that day by Theresa May, the Home 
Secretary, who said that, “It is time to assert that it is Parliament that makes our laws, not the 
courts; that the rights of the public come before the rights of criminals; and, above all, that we have 
a legal framework that brings sanity to cases such as these.”215 
 
Of course, it is Parliament’s right and proper function to produce statutes, which have the benefit of 
being considered “real” law before they are subject to implementation. Their mere existence as 
statute should grant them an authority beyond that of ordinary common law decisions. For many 
statutes, this remains true for its entire operating life. For many Parliament-made rules, such as the 
                                                 
214  Hansard, 16 Feb 2011 : Column 955 
215  Ibid: at Column 959 
  
thousands of tax codes and statutory instruments in place in the United Kingdom today, there will 
be no judicial review of their implementation. However, for those that are questioned by the court, 
they must gain the assent of the judiciary before they can claim to be immutable. This leads us to 
the inevitable conclusion that all statutes are open to judicial review, and so all statutes could be 
overturned by the Judiciary. 
 
This is not an easy concept for the Judiciary to accept and follow, since the nature of their training 
inclines them toward sustaining the status quo with Parliament. Public opinion of the Courts often 
lists violently from endorsement to derision, depending on the nature of the judgement handed 
down. The Daily Mail, a British tabloid paper known for it’s extreme reaction to political scandal, 
said that David Cameron “declared war on unelected judges,” who have, the paper claims, “put the 
human rights of paedophiles and rapists before public safety.”216 
 
Equally, the Supreme Court suffered similar public consternation when it handed down a judgement 
vindicating bank charges for returned cheques and unauthorised overdrafts in 2005. Members of the 
public expressed their outcry against the decision, and their misunderstanding of the role of the 
Courts was obvious. One member of the public commented said that he believed, “The members of 
the Supreme Court are no doubt receiving backhanders from the banks, or perhaps they go to the 
same clubs with the executives of the banks.”217 Others were more vocal in their opposition to the 
judgement. Writing under the monicker ‘Chris,’ one reader from Liverpool said, “Isn't it strange 
that now the Government owns most of our banks, they suddenly decide that the 'unfair charges' are 
perfectly legal after all! Will Labour never stop finding ways to tax this population via ‘stealth 
taxes’?”218 A later attack by the Conservative Member Michael Howard was more direct. In a 
statement he made in 2005, he warned that “Parliament must be supreme. Aggressive judicial 
activism will not only undermine the public’s confidence in the impartiality of our judiciary. It 
could also put our security at risk - and with it the freedoms the judges seek to defend. That would 
be a price we cannot be expected to pay.”219 Mr Howard is correct, increased judicial activism 
would indeed demonstrate a degree of partiality by the judiciary, but it does not seek to favor one 
party over another.  
 
In the situation Mr Howard’s comments reflect, where the judiciary become increasingly political 
over the use of the Human Rights Act, the judiciary are actually siding with the rights of the British 
people. This is true, even in the case of indefinite detention, where the group the judgment directly 
effected is a minority or criminal. Though the group were branded “extremists” both by Mr Howard 
and by the press, the Courts recognised, and continue to recognise, that Human Rights should be 
applied without exception. Perhaps what Howard saw as the judiciary being “difficult” was in fact a 
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closer insight into how the courts should behave when faced with a decision that brings them into a 
confrontation with Government and policy. This is a view supported by at least a few politicians, 
such as Simon Hughes, the Liberal Democrats’ president, who said “British judges are the people’s 
best safeguard against misuse of power by ministers and failures to guarantee human rights by 
parliament.”220 This phrase is significant, because it places the Judiciary in a position of authority 
over ministers, to ensure that they use their position and powers properly. If this were so, then that 
would mean that the Judiciary have a greater role and significance in policy than otherwise 
believed. If the Judiciary have, or perhaps should have, the authority to stop ministers from abusing 
their power, then the Courts would adopt a role that actively seeks to change and affect policy in 
Parliament. 
 
It is still clear however- that there is a tremendous disconnect between the Courts’ role in political 
decisions and the public’s interpretation of that role. If there were a direct challenge to 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, these examples show that there is a public tendency toward mistrust of 
the Courts which is separate from their mistrust of politics and politicians, but also the obvious 
failure to appreciate the separation of powers that enables the Courts to operate independently from 
Parliamentary, and thus political, influence.  
 
Politicians’ complaints directed toward judgements from the Court seem to be more influential over 
public opinion, alongside the power of the press to turn the tide of public sentiment, than the 
Courts’ ability to persuade using their judgements. Seemingly, although willing to uphold the Rule 
of Law, the ideals of freedom, and our inalienable right to fair and open justice (as demonstrated in 
Wood, Bonham, Control Orders c), the unwillingness shown by Justices of the upper Courts to 
accept their prominent role in policy and the political also engenders a popular, if inaccurate, 
feeling of mistrust among what the public perceive as unelected judges pursuing matters of policy 
that should, by rights, be left to Parliament. 
 
So although we have decided here that there would be at least some public opposition to a more 
active judiciary in the political landscape, there have been examples in other jurisdictions, including 
some that follow our own Westminster model, that show the judiciary successfully overcoming the 
bonds of Parliamentary Sovereignty and establishing themselves in a new, central position in the 
political landscape. Two such examples can be found in Southeast Asia, where the influence of the 
courts on politics and on Schmitt’s ‘political’ has been much more significant this century than for 
their western counterparts. In jurisdictions like Thailand and Pakistan, “a wave of democratization 
hit the region ... and a majority of states there altered their constitutions to give more attention to 
rule of law, accountability, and rights issues. The effect was to empower the court.”221 In Pakistan, 
despite the civil unrest which continues to plague the political elite, the Courts have adopted a much 
more benign role amongst the population. 
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Judicial Activism in Southeast Asia: Successful Challenges? 
With the revolutions of Southeast Asia as a backdrop, I intend to demonstrate a thought experiment 
in which I shall present a challenge to Parliamentary Sovereignty. The impact of this challenge will 
be debated and the possible outcomes, based on previous cases and examples, will be put forward. 
We shall be focusing in this chapter on examples from other jurisdictions where the judiciary have 
taken an over-active political role, or one where the political authority of the state has been 
superseded by the judiciary themselves, taking on a direct role as the sovereign in both the legal and 
political senses of the word. We shall examine how this has affected the state’s political and social 
structure, how laws operate and how the people are able to express their wishes. 
 
In Southeast Asia, the Courts have developed a far greater prevalence in politics than in other areas 
of the world yet, in Thailand in particular, “current scholarship on Thailand has yet to draw much 
attention to this phenomenon”222. In Pakistan the courts have instigated near-revolution against the 
dictatorship that, prior to 2007, Judges and lawyers had sworn allegiance to simply as an 
“occupational hazard.” According to one observer, however, since the Chief Justice, Iftikhar 
Chaudhry, dared to challenge the constitutionality of an order by President Musharraf asserting a 
State of Emergency (Which places the Pakistani Constitution on hold). Chaudhry was immediately 
removed from office and placed under house arrest, and the next most senior Judge in the Pakistani 
Supreme Court was ordered to be his replacement. However, the Supreme Court ruled to overturn 
the dismissal, and he returned to work as Chief Justice once again.  
 
As a result of this judicial activism, “the average Pakistani distinguishes very clearly between the 
judiciary and the establishment [executive] … he now not only recognises the judiciary as a fully 
autonomous arm of the State but also looks to it to save him from the establishment as well as the 
legislature, the feudalocracy, his local SHO and everybody else in between.”223 Of course, it may 
well mean that rather than there being a greater trust between the population and the Judiciary, it is 
just as likely that this is a result of a greater understanding of the courts’ role in the political system, 
and so a broader awareness that the Judiciary’s role in a political system is to prevent the executive 
and the legislature from overstepping their legal bounds. 
 
With this in mind, we can see that should the political class challenge the rights and freedoms of the 
people in the United Kingdom; and the courts, as would be expected, defend those rights and 
freedoms against encroachment by the government, then the tide of public opinion will inevitably 
turn in the judiciary’s favor. More than this, that defence would give the courts a legitimacy to rule, 
a mandate from the public of the United Kingdom that no government could even hope to gain from 
an election, even one with a huge majority.  
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Unlike in the United Kingdom, where the role of the courts still appears to be somewhat 
misunderstood to the general public, in Southeast Asia the Courts are becoming an important 
influence on policy decisions. In the Philippines the Supreme Court had begun to regularly 
intervene in the country’s deadlocked politics, but as we have seen in Pakistan, this judicial 
activism is becoming more widespread across the region. After a spate of disputed elections the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court cleared the way constitutionally toward a more open democratic 
process through a number of controversial decisions in 2009, and the Malaysian High Court has 
also found itself entangled in political argument; theirs involving the use of the name Allah, a 
debate made more significant given the complex relationship faith groups have in Malaysia, 
alongside a second trial of Anwar Ibrahim, the Malay opposition leader.  
 
It is fairly clear that the courts would intervene in politics if the circumstances absolutely called for 
such an approach, and so the question is not whether the courts could ever hope to have such 
influence in political processes in this country, but which circumstances would drive our Judiciary 
to intervening so directly in this way. The circumstances do not require the courts to perform any 
constitutionally outlandish action, such as bringing proceedings against the Government itself, as 
Chaudhry’s Supreme Court did in Pakistan, but only require an unreasonable government to attempt 
to exclude basic premises of the constitution. This is a much simpler task for judiciaries in countries 
which have a written constitution. After all, it is easier to see which of your rights have been 
infringed by the government when they are neatly codified into a single document.  
 
 A further example of how the judiciary and the executive can be caught in conflict was  
demonstrated in Fiji, when the latest of a series of coups instigated by the military brought down the 
democratic civilian government in 2006. 
 
Qarase v Bainimarama
224
: When the Relationship Breaks Down 
Fiji is by no means a traditional example of a democratic nation. Since it’s independence from the 
United Kingdom in 1970 the Pacific island state has suffered a total of four coups from 1987 to 
2006. In the course of these coups and changes in government, the country has undergone a number 
of massive constitutional changes both positive and negative. These coups have also demonstrated 
the frailty of the relationship between the Courts and the government, and prove the assertion that 
ultimately the authority does indeed lay where the tanks are.  
 
Of course the political and constitutional differences between the United Kingdom and Fiji put 
some distance between the fates of the two nations, given that Fiji is currently under military rule 
and not a democratic political system. Not only that, but Fiji has a definite written Constitution 
which should help to safeguard the democratic process, the operation of government and the rights 
and responsibilities of citizens. In this situation, however, it seems that the Constitution has lost it’s 
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force, and proves to a certain extent that all constitutions are in the end simply paper promises, only 
as good as the word of the men we ask to keep them. 
 
The facts of the case are quite straightforward, but it is how this case has developed that has 
changed how the Constitution and courts are seen as a safeguard against government abuse. After 
an uprising in 2000, the government in Fiji was ruled by the SDL, the governing political party in 
Fiji, and led by the Prime Minister, Qarase. In 2006 the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) 
led by Commander Frank Bainimarama began what was called a “Truth Campaign”225 apparently 
because it was feared that SDL and Qarase intended to pursue racist policies that denied political 
involvement to the Indian Fijians settled on the islands, and unfairly forced ethnic Fijians to take up 
roles in politics that should be filled by Indian Fijians.  
 
Not long after this, Bainimarama demanded that the government submit to nine demands, or else 
resign. These demands focused generally around the same themes: the instigators of the 2000 coup 
being brought to justice; the withdrawal of certain Bills in Parliament which may worsen economic 
inequality based on racial grounds; denying intervention by foreign authority; dropping court 
proceedings against the military for statements made earlier in 2006 and formally addressing 
concerns about government spending and internal governance. 
 
Although Qarase did attempt to reach a compromise with Bainimarama during a meeting in New 
Zealand in November 2006, the military nonetheless began a coup d’etat on the 5th December 
2006. This led to the dissolution of Parliament and the dismissal of the cabinet. The President, Ratu 
Uluivuda, appointed Bainimarama the caretaker Prime Minister, and he subsequently appointed a 
military cabinet. It was also announced that Fiji would be placed under a state of emergency, 
placing more authority in the military, severely curtailing freedom of speech and of the press.  
 
In 2009 the Appeals Court of Fiji, the second highest court in the country, ruled that the coup had 
been illegal, as were the emergency powers that had been in place. It also declared that the interim 
government that had been in place since January 2007 was ‘invalid’. This decision effectively 
prompted the dissolution of the government and forced the resignation of Bainimarama from the 
position of Prime Minister, who returned to his position as commander of the military. Uluivuda 
was ordered by the court to set a date for democratic elections, and appoint a new Caretaker Prime 
Minister, who was to be a “distinguished person” and neither Bainimarama or Qarase.  
 
The next morning, Uluivuda announced news that elections would be held for a new government 
not later than 2014, and that Bainimarama was to be re-appointed as Prime Minister. It was also 
announced that all judicial appointments were to be dissolved, indicating that the regime was intent 
on ignoring the authority of the courts and the constitution. It is significant that the military 
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government
226
 felt that these actions were justified and leads to the question of how a proven, 
decorated and distinguished military leader
227
 could feel that his only choice in changing and 
improving his country’s system of government was through the abrogation of the constitution, a 
document considered in other jurisdictions (America, for example) and especially in a legal context 
to be almost sacred. It belies a philosophical exception to the rule of law, which grants a moral 
excuse where, as the adage goes, ‘an old man plants a tree under which he knows he will never sit’. 
In other words, Bainimarama is permitting himself to commit acts which are otherwise 
unacceptable (for example, establishing himself as a dictator and abrogating the constitution) in the 
hope that under his exclusive direction he can fix the problems he sees in Fiji in order to produce 
long-term stability. Although the constitution is considered to be the Sovereign, and if not the 
constitution then the President in Fiji, Bainimarama has completely ignored this sovereign authority 
and claimed it for himself, as well as ignoring the direction of the court that said the government 
must be re-appointed and elections held immediately in order for Fiji to be given a “clean slate”. 
Although he may not be the legitimate leader in Fiji he is now the de facto sovereign and this seems 
not to have caused many political or legal ripples, besides the challenge against him by his 
predecessor Qarase.  
 
Of course, the order of the court was to dissolve the government and declare new elections in order 
to give Fiji a “fresh start,” and this Bainimarama did to the very fullest he could. He demolished the 
legal system and rebuilt it, re-appointed his own cabinet after he was forced to declare its 
dissolution, and then set about drafting the People’s Charter for Change, Peace and Progress, 
which is an attempt to create a manifesto for change in Fiji and directed by Bainimarama himself 
without partisan interest from politicians, many of which he considered to have racist tendencies 
and an unwillingness to change. This is also true of the Constitutional Commission, set up to draft a 
new Sovereign document for Fiji. For Bainimarama, the most important thing  for the Commission 
is that “The commissioners should not be giving a running commentary on the proceedings, they 
should be completely independent … They should not give preferential treatment to certain 
segments or individuals in society who they meet privately and they should adhere to the laws in 
Fiji.”228 
 
For the Government of the United Kingdom, it is much more difficult to exclude rights from the 
population because there are so many different Statutes, common law decisions and international 
treaties governing our freedoms. Since we have never had a formal constitution, the rights we now 
consider to be fundamental bear no greater or lesser significance in fact than any other law. In order 
for the government to usurp our right to freedom of speech, for example, it would not simply be a 
case of repealing the affiliated section of the Human Rights Act. The Government would need to 
legislate in a way that would overturn the judicial decisions of every case of the Superior Courts of 
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Record that govern freedom of speech, privacy and general publication. Doing this would be a very 
grand exercise, and would not go unnoticed by the population, the judiciary and the international 
community. Without upsetting their constitutional status quo, the Judiciary would make decisions 
when required in much the same way as they do now when excluding statutes: they would simply 
claim that Parliament did not intend to exclude freedom of expression in this or that circumstance; 
or they would do as they did in the Control Orders case, and simply interpret the Act into something 
it did not start out as. Following this, any attempt to usurp the authority of the Courts by Parliament 
would be very dubiously entertained by the Judiciary, and would no doubt be widely condemned by 
the  legal and international communities.  
 
Of course, we must push this experiment further, and continue it to its next logical step, which is the 
reaction of the Judiciary to a serious constitutional crisis, set into motion by the Government.  
 
We have already seen in previous chapters that the relationship between the Judiciary and the 
Government is not always one of mutual agreement and camaraderie. However, despite the press 
continually reminding the people of the United Kingdom that the judiciary are unelected and 
undemocratic, international examples have shown that most Courts, where their members respect 
the Rule of Law, will look very harshly upon any attempt to exclude the democratic process, or 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens. As was the case in Pakistan, where the dictatorial 
president attempted to suspend the constitution and institute a state of emergency, the Courts are, in 
generally democratic states or states still developing the notion of democracy, quick to ensure that 
the right to proper representation of the people is not abused by those in charge. Given that the 
United Kingdom can be proud of the historical development of human rights and Constitutional 
freedoms that have been innovated and nurtured, in part thanks to its legal system, it would not be a 
terribly large leap to assume that the Supreme Court, along with the wider Judiciary, would be 
equally inclined to support this doctrine and take appropriate action against the Government in 
order to prevent a more catastrophic miscarriage of justice against the British people. We must 
distinguish first between the kinds of action available to the Judiciary, which are defined and 
constrained by certain principles of legal theory.  
 
As we have already seen, there is a distinction between seeing a rule as being intrinsically wrong, as 
Coke did in Bonham, and regarding a rule as morally questionable. For the latter position, we look 
to the Sovereign, or the author of the rule, to establish moral blameworthiness. 
 
We discussed in Chapter one that two schools of thought relating to this issue exist in law, and  are 
called Natural Law and Legal Positivism. Applying one or the other to this scenario is challenging, 
as attempting to reconcile the two theories is a complex business. For the most part, just like courts 
of Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, whose actions have demonstrated the same, 
the Judiciary in the legal system of the United Kingdom are concerned with the wellbeing of the 
citizens, and not the operation of the State. Although they may accept that it was the will of 
  
Parliament to author a Statute to begin with, and that in other circumstances the Statute might not 
cause an injustice, the Courts will still look  unfavorably and wholesale upon Statutes that 
deliberately seek to exclude judicial review, or curb the rights of citizens. This indicates that in fact 
Judges are Natural Lawyers, even if they don’t see themselves in those terms or even appreciate 
their meaning.  
 
For natural lawyers, rules draw their foundation from the distinction between Ordinary and Superior 
rules. Certain rules, such as constitutions, are more significant and are given greater worth in law 
than other statutes, and other laws must harmonise with them. The source of this superiority could 
be called sovereign, and in states with constitutions, that source can often   be found in the wording 
of the document itself, and is almost always assigned to the population. But  the problem with 
constitutions is that, as with all law, if the Government chooses not to uphold it, then it becomes 
meaningless. That is why the Judiciary are all the more significant in any legal system. All three of 
the Soviet constitutions, that of 1924, 1936 and 1977 all talk in one way or another about the so-
called “dictatorship of the Proletariat”229 and of Sovereign power belonging with the common 
people of the state; but the reality, as is commonly known, was much different. Far from having 
power, the people of the USSR were brutally repressed by a system of government that involved 
itself in a huge proportion of the population’s lives, and whose legal system worked more to help 
the government’s oppression than it did to guard against constitutional abuses, since the Justices of 
the Supreme Court were responsible to the body that elected them, the Supreme Soviet.
230
 As a 
result, we can see that too great an involvement in politics by the judiciary can lead to the Courts 
becoming nothing more than a part of Government involved principally with self-interest, thus 
depriving the population of justice and recourse against the State. The separation of the Judiciary 
and Government is of course a vital principle in the Rule of Law, and ensures that there is always 
an institution available to keep another from overstepping its authority and infringing the rights of 
citizens. This can apply equally of course to any branch of the establishment (these are the 
Judiciary, the Legislature and the Executive), who should in any government maintain necessary 
checks and balances on each other. 
 
Given then that in a democracy such as ours the courts would tend to decide in favour of defending 
the rights of the individual over the interests of Government, we can assume that if there was a 
significant challenge, most likely by implementing a statute against what we consider to be a 
fundamental right (i.e. Rights that we consider to be inalienable because of their age or the 
significance of the document that enshrines them, such as habeas corpus in Magna Carta), the 
Courts would exclude that challenge by failing to enforce the statute, or by interpreting it in a way 
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that perverts its meaning until it cannot operate as Parliament intended, such as was the case with 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of special advocates. 
 
The European Declaration on Human Rights, which was incorporated into the law of the United 
Kingdom through the Human Rights Act, lists the most important rights that have been recognised 
by the states of the European Union, and by the wider international community,
231
 specifying rights 
which are completely inalienable, as well as circumstances where a right can be constrained by a 
state’s government. Those that cannot be broken by a state regardless of the circumstances include 
the right against torture and against slavery, while those which are unacceptable in all save a few 
circumstances include the right to life, which can be constrained where the prescribed penalty in 
law is death; and the right to liberty, which can be constrained where a person is detained by the 
state for the commission of a crime.  
 
It is the Human Rights Act that has done so much to give power to the Judiciary since it was 
incorporated. The Act gives judges the authority to issue a declaration of incompatibility where they 
believe that an Act of Parliament does not work properly with the rights of the Declaration or with 
directly applicable European Union law, which means that judges can, legitimately, directly involve 
themselves in politics, not because they feel that it is their place to, or at least this is not a 
perspective that has been widely circulated; in fact, the justices involve themselves in politics 
because the law makes that action available.  
 
However, although a question governed by the Rights incorporated by the Declaration would 
provide the most scope for judicial activism, which may result in a law being overturned, as well as 
being a topic that would gain significant public attention, such a question would not provide enough 
scope for the Judiciary to properly challenge the authority of Parliament as sovereign.  It is not 
enough for statutes to be rendered incompatible; constitutionally, the most significant challenges to 
Parliament have come about when the Judiciary have attempted to limit the authority of Parliament 
to govern and police itself and its members. More controversy still has come about from Parliament 
attempting to limit the jurisdiction of the courts into it’s business. As a result of these observations, 
it becomes clear that the only real constitutional challenge that could come about with any real 
impact would be one similar to that of the Sheriff of Middlesex’s Case. This case, which has already 
been explored in greater detail in chapter two, was concerned with the jurisdiction of Parliament in 
matters of breach of Parliamentary procedure.  
 
Were a similar case to arise today, though it would need to be one that challenges Parliament’s 
procedure much more significantly than Middlesex, the results could be phenomenal. Parliament 
could become limited even in the scope of disciplining it’s MPs, or regulating it’s finances. Of 
course, the most significant challenge would be to assert that a Bill passed by Parliament and which 
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has received Royal Assent is not automatically valid until it has been reviewed by the Judiciary 
beforehand, but this would require the most unique and limiting of circumstances for it to become 
good case law.  
 
Theoretical Challenges to Parliamentary Sovereignty 
We shall look therefore to Judicial Review to provide us with an opportunity to challenge 
Parliament more directly. In this case, as we are focusing on the application of Judicial Review to 
challenge Parliament’s Sovereignty, we are limited in scope to challenging Parliament on three 
points of political pressure. The courts could use any one of these three avenues to bring about the 
required challenge to Parliament, which should result in a change in their relationship in favour of 
the courts. The First method would be a challenge to the Courts’ jurisdiction by Parliament. Any 
attempt to exclude the Courts from examining a case on a point of law has been avoided by the 
judiciary. For specific examples we need only look to Anisminic, as well as the more recent terror 
cases,  as well as Woolas. In these circumstances, the court can do nothing but follow the decisions 
from these earlier cases. After all, what purpose would a court hold if Parliament excluded its right 
to examine questions of law? Of course, the courts could follow the methodology of their decisions 
in the Belmarsh cases. In these circumstances, as we have already explored, the courts were able to 
reinterpret the statute in a way that allowed for operation of transparent judicial procedure by 
excluding the use of closed evidence and special advocates. In similar circumstances, we can be 
confident that this is the course the Judiciary will take again.  
 
The second challenge would be on the grounds of Parliamentary procedure. Of course, it isn’t 
possible for the courts to simply challenge the way in which Parliament goes about its business, and 
there must be an instigating action. In the case of MPs’ expenses, it was criminal proceedings 
brought about by a Metropolitan Police investigation. As a result of this investigation, the courts 
were able to examine in detail the way in which Parliament records its expenses records, and the 
justification Parliamentary members offered up for its inclusion in the convention of Parliamentary 
Privilege. Put simply: because the question of the expense records was brought before a court, it 
thus brought the question of their being privileged squarely into their proper jurisdiction. A similar 
challenge that brought into question the right of Parliamentary parties to accrue funds from specific 
sources, for example, or the question of a judicially imposed cap upon donations, would hurl the 
Courts into a maelstrom of Political wrangling, as public opinion would likely not permit the 
government to create legislation to make the donations process less transparent, and more unfairly 
weighted toward big donors, trade unions and industry leaders; such a public reaction would seem 
especially likely in the wake of the Phone Hacking scandal, that raised the profile of the political 
dangers involved with interacting with high-level members of the press. 
 
The third and final challenge that the Judiciary could make use of is that of its involvement,  and 
specifically it’s current a lack thereof, in International politics. It is often considered by the 
judiciary to be a “forbidden area” to discuss questions of international diplomatic policy in court, 
  
since the Courts lack the jurisdiction to call into question the policy of foreign governments; 
however, should the Judiciary challenge the policy of our government in their interaction with a 
foreign power, such as America for example, would the government consider itself bound by the 
decision, or would it go ignored? And if it were to be bound by that decision, it may well mean that 
the Government must accept that the courts have a much more significant role defined for them in 
general politics and international relations.  
 
It seems likely, given that in the majority of challenges against policy that the Government have 
suffered in recent years, that the Executive would in fact capitulate, and accept a court decision in 
international relations. Of course, the problem with this scenario is that so far the courts have 
respected this “forbidden” question of international policy, as Lord Neuberger explained in 
Rahmatullah.
232
 According to him, “it would be very doubtful whether a domestic court should start 
dictating to the FCO or the MoD as to how to communicate with a foreign government, and in 
particular how a letter relating to a potentially sensitive diplomatic issue should be expressed. 
Doing so would risk trespassing into the forbidden areas.”233 
 
Importantly, this statement does not rule out altogether the courts questioning the interpretation of 
diplomatic communication, or how a branch of the government should communicate with a foreign 
power. Naturally, as Lord Neuberger has said, it is “very doubtful,” and would only be in the most 
severe of circumstances that such action would be permissible, but it would not be impossible. 
 
Therefore, our last circumstance seems like the most likely candidate for a successful challenge to 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. If the Judiciary challenge the interpretation of a diplomatic 
communication, and successfully interpret it to support a claim against the government and its 
international relations, then it could be a significant milestone in redefining the role of the courts in 
the political system not just in Britain but internationally. A ruling in the United Kingdom giving 
domestic courts the right to question international relations could feasibly spread to other Common 
law states, and the balance of power would inevitably shift from State Parliaments to national courts 
as the principal actors on the international stage.  
 
In some senses, this has already happened in the United Kingdom. The Human Rights Act, 
alongside Britain’s involvement with the European Union, makes it necessary to involve the courts 
to some degree. The Courts are at present responsible for ensuring that the Government carries out 
its responsibilities to the European Union, and that it ensures the Government is made to account 
for it’s actions where they infringe upon the rights of citizens. In the same case, Lord Neuberger 
said that,  
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“This case is an illustration of the court performing perhaps its most vital 
role, namely to ensure that the executive complies, as far as it can, with its 
legal duties to individuals, in particular when they are detained; and the 
limits of the powers of the court, as a domestic tribunal, in that its reach 
cannot go beyond its jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction does not extend to the 
US military authorities in Afghanistan.” 
 
It seems fairly plain that the Courts in the United Kingdom would lack jurisdiction over the 
American armed forces in Afghanistan, but could they claim that they had an authority over the 
interpretation of diplomatic communications after all? Of course, in this case the testimony of 
diplomats had to be sufficient for the court, as it was felt that it would be inappropriate for a lawyer 
to interpret a diplomatic document. This is also understandable, since it is well known that 
diplomats speak in “the thicket of diplomatic language,” and “for this Court to take issue with Mr 
Drew or to go behind his interpretation of the diplomatic language and communications would take 
us into the forbidden area.” 
 
However, the courts must step at least a short way into the forbidden area if there is to be a 
successful challenge to Parliamentary sovereignty. It seems that Rahmatullah does, in fact, provide 
a useful starting point in mounting a successful challenge to Parliament. The key difference in this 
case and our preferred challenge, however, would be if the detainee were a British national and not 
a national of Pakistan, as is the case in Rahmatullah. Just as it was in this case, were the courts to 
issue a writ of Habeas Corpus to the United States following a period of imprisonment governed by 
a so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the United Kingdom would have no choice but 
to force the United States to grant a request for the prisoner to be returned. Whether this would be 
done by the government or the courts is yet to be seen, but it is doubtful that a judgement by the 
domestic judiciary would have any impact on policy in the United States. Alternatively, a direction 
by the courts may force the Government in the United Kingdom to address the issue more 
forcefully through the proper diplomatic channels.  
 
Whatever the outcome, should the courts deliberately challenge the diplomatic or government 
interpretation of a communication made in the course of international relations, the courts will have 
redefined their position in international politics from passive to active players in international 
relations. But the vital question governing this challenge is yet to be faced: how far would the 
Courts be willing to tread into the “forbidden area,” and how drastically would their role change 
were they to do so? Rahmatullah has provided for the courts the thin end of the wedge simply by 
granting the writ of habeas corpus. However as Lord Neuberger points out it is the courts’ 
responsibility to ensure that “the executive complies, as far as it can, with its legal duties to 
individuals”234 and this has been an enduring theme in our exploration of the role of the Judiciary as 
Sovereign, and of its relationship with Parliament itself.  
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Should the courts defy the will of Parliament and policy so dramatically by undertaking to influence 
diplomatic relations, or reinterpret diplomatic communications, or however the judiciary may 
choose to effectively force itself into the world of the political, the consequences may be quite 
dramatic. A political landscape that places the judiciary in a more central position would alter the 
constitutional model for the United Kingdom dramatically. Adjudicating under the principles of the 
Rule of Law, the Courts would be able to vet policy for constitutional issues, or even to simply 
ensure that no statute is “contrary to right or reason” in the style of Natural lawyers. However, 
serious questions of legitimacy are raised when the courts begin interfering with Parliamentary 
prerogative. For example, it is the sole responsibility of Parliament to decide on acts of hostility 
against foreign powers. If, for example, the judiciary had been involved in the political process 
undertaken shortly before the invasion of Iraq, for example, the outcome for both Britain and Iraq 
may have been quite different, and the rules governing the invasion may have taken on a feeling of 
greater empathy for Natural law and human rights. This is simply because the current constitutional 
framework, created as a result of a deeper integration with Europe as well as the greater 
significance of the Human Rights Act in the early years of the twenty-first century, favors the 
implementation of human rights in law. Should the Judiciary adopt a greater political role law and 
policy become synonymous, and as a result politics will be forced into a perspective that favors 
Natural law and the idea of “aught-ness” in law.  
 
The judgement in Rahmatullah has, for now, effectively closed the book on the Courts’ 
interpretation of diplomatic communication just as much as on Rahmatullah’s hopes of returning to 
Britain; but should a situation such as the one suggested above arise in the course of the United 
Kingdom’s relationship with the United States, it seems all the more likely that the judgement 
handed down by the court will be much more significant. If the courts do attempt to force the 
Government into acting against the United States, or indeed any foreign power who is holding a 
British citizen, it will primarily show a determination by the courts to uphold the values of the rule 
of law, by ensuring that the notion of habeas corpus is not an empty one to either the judiciary or 
the government. In fact, were there to be a question of habeas corpus concerning a British citizen 
held by the United States in Bagram, without the interference of a third nation (in this case 
Pakistan) also vying for the prisoner’s release, the pressure upon the judiciary by centuries of 
Judicial respect for the Rule of Law would, it is hoped, be sufficient to inspire drastic actions by the 
Judiciary.  
 
Much like some of the historical challenges to Parliamentary sovereignty that were explored in 
chapter two, when the courts try their hand at judicial activism the stakes will always be high. Even 
in Rahmatullah’s case, and in our theoretical challenge, it is not just the future of the prisoner that 
the court holds in it’s hands. If the judiciary is careless or rushed in it’s judgement, and words their 
response too strongly, it is possible that, like in Pakistan and Thailand, the judiciary could end up 
deciding on the fate of governments and elections. Although this would demonstrate their 
  
Sovereign authority absolutely, it would also bring the electoral system in the United Kingdom into 
a state of disarray and uncertainty. Like the common law itself, the role of the judiciary is ever-
evolving, and it requires time and carefully considered judgements to properly define it’s place. 
This has always been the way in the United Kingdom, however.  
 
As with our constitution, which has no fixed point of origin and no determinate end,
235
 the 
Judiciary’s role will continue to expand; or perhaps more fittingly, through their judgements the 
courts are pulling the cloth away, slowly revealing the true extent of their authority by pressing, 
gently but often, against the edges of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
The story of the Judiciary’s relationship with Parliament is a complex narrative which continues to 
change as much as new developments in law allow. Documents such as Magna Carta gave the 
Judiciary an opportunity to challenge the King on notions of fairness and the rights of man; the Bill 
of Rights gave the people a means of redress against the Sovereign and fundamentally changed the 
balance between Parliament, the King and the Judiciary; and the Human Rights Act, possibly the 
most influential of all, gave the Courts the ability to directly challenge the legality of a statute using 
International law. Though it is not true yet that Parliament must tread softly to avoid the attentions 
of a more powerful judiciary, Parliament must be cautious. The Courts have already demonstrated 
their willingness to enter the fray on questions of elections, expenses, jurisdiction and Parliamentary 
procedure,
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 and their willingness to continue to press against Parliament’s authority extends as far 
as they are willing to defend the rights of citizens against the abuses of their government. This is not 
to say that Judges are becoming or are willing to become the new political authority in the United 
Kingdom. As Lord Bingham wrote, “The British people have not repelled the extraneous power of 
the papacy in spiritual matters, and the pretensions of royal power in temporal, in order to subject 
themselves to unchallengeable rulings by unelected judges.”237 A former Law Lord himself, this 
testimony reflects the attitudes of many in the Judiciary. Although wary of expanding their 
authority, and cautious of the damage too forceful a grab for power would cause, the courts tread 
carefully to balance their duty to the rights of man with the responsibility to allow Parliament to 
operate as a democratic institution. To reiterate Lord Bingham’s statement above, judges have no 
desire to subject the people to their unelected, despotic will; but it must be acknowledged that the 
courts have a duty to uphold the rights of the citizen against the state, and this is a responsibility 
that they will exercise to the very limit of their jurisdiction. The only difficult part of that task is 
discovering how far their jurisdiction extends. Rahmatullah has shown us that it cannot extend to 
American servicemen overseas, but the next challenge to British diplomatic method by the courts, 
in only slightly different circumstances, may yield very different results. We shall further explore 
this conclusion in the next and final chapter.
                                                 
235 That is, where it is possible to say that the Constitution is ‘finished’ and in need of no more refinement. 
236 Woolas, R v Chaytor  Others, Rahmatullah, Anisminic, and Stockdale v Hansard. All these cases were explored in depth in 
chapters two and three.  
237 Bingham, T, The Rule of Law, Penguin 2010, pp55 
  
 
   Chapter Seven - The Continued Survival of Parliamentary Sovereignty? 
 
“The whole structure of the common law . . . stands as a 
monument slowly raised, like a coral reef, from the minute 
accretions of past individuals of whom each built upon the relics 
which his predecessors left and in turn left a foundation upon 
which his successors might work” 
-  Judge Learned Hand, 1922 
Introduction 
 
In the following chapter we shall explore the impact that both historical and modern cases and 
theory has had upon the theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty, and how perspectives on this theory 
are beginning to change. This final chapter’s title ends with a question, inviting consideration that 
this topic is yet to be explored completely. The puzzle of Parliamentary Sovereignty is it’s own 
contradictory nature. In order to resolve constitutional conflicts, such as the conflict in Jackson, we 
turn to the courts for an answer. However, simply by informing us, through their judgements, that 
Parliament is still Sovereign, we delimit the power of Parliament into what the Courts say it is. As a 
result, we have to question the continuation of Parliamentary Sovereignty. This is because the more 
cases that are brought before the courts which invite debate on the subject of Sovereignty, the more 
Parliament’s authority is curtailed simply by defining it. Once we define how Parliament is able to 
properly legislate we are provided with a better understanding of how Parliament might be unable 
to do the same.  
 
As has been explored in previous chapters, no constitution can claim to be fixed and immutable. 
Judicial review and constitutional interpretation provide means for a constitution to update and 
evolve with changing attitudes. Given that amendments to constitutions normally require much 
stricter assent by the legislature, judicial review provides a faster and more accessible method, 
without the need to engage the legislature in arduous consultation and debate. Since the United 
Kingdom lacks a written constitution, codified in a single document, the constitutional principles 
that the Courts in the United Kingdom uphold are much more fluid, and can be more easily 
defended by judges tasked with constitutionally difficult or contentious questions. There are a 
collection of historical documents that have taken on a significance unlike any ‘normal’ statute, but 
whether or not this amounts to a constitution in the same way as we see, for example, in the United 
States, is a topic of much debate. The Constitution of the United Kingdom, unlike its written 
counterparts from other jurisdictions, “contains no statement of fundamental rights” and this can be 
both limiting and liberating for the courts. Unlike in the United States, where the Supreme Court 
has a constitutional authority to review statutes, in the United Kingdom the courts have no 
constitutionally defined mandate to interfere in politics, but that does not exclude them from doing 
  
so. If anything, it is this lack of definition that has lead to a “judicialization [sic] of politics” which 
is “likely to become a more important feature of the [political] system…”238 
 
For the United States, who benefit from the certainty of a written constitution and centuries of 
precedent provided by Marbury v Madison amongst others, the position of their judges has been 
made absolute. Unlike the French Conseil Constitutionel
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 for example, who are given the 
opportunity to review Bills before they become law, the US Supreme Court is only called upon to 
decide the constitutionality of Statutes when a dispute is raised; but for the United Kingdom, the 
procedure is much less clear. Courts in the United Kingdom have for centuries appeared to follow 
the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, and Judges themselves at least seem to accept this 
notion; and yet Judges even today are reshaping the relationship between the courts and Parliament, 
using new tools unavailable to eminent Judges from history such as Coke. In the time of Bonham 
there was no European Convention on Human Rights, and many of the rights recognised in that 
Treaty were absent from statute in England and Wales. With no other means of reaching the same 
judgement, Coke established (in somewhat controversial terms) the principle of excluding 
Government from acting as Judge in its own cause, and in so doing found that Acts of Parliament 
are not unquestionable and can be made void. 
 
Judges are much maligned in our society
240
. They are not Government officials, and neither are they 
snake-oil lawyers. As Stephen Sedley asserts, there are “sections of the media which are out to get 
Judges.”241 Their responsibility is to justice and the constitution. Of course, sometimes they do 
make errors, as all judges will inevitably do in the course of their long careers, but the gift of a 
common-law system means that an appeal can overturn such a decision, potentially changing not 
just one person's life, but the entire law under which their judgement was passed down.  
 
Judges can only make decisions based on the evidence before them and the testimony of those 
brought before the court. Where the evidence is flawed, inevitably so too will be the judgement. But 
Judges don't work for the benefit of Government, and they certainly shouldn't favor one argument 
over another without impartiality before evaluating all the evidence. Their allegiance lies with the 
Rule of Law, which is a principle that lies beyond government policy or public opinion. It is the 
principle that lies at the heart of all jurisdictions, and is a constant for  all countries that respect that 
Justice comes from an impartial and independent Judiciary, that creates and influences the law over 
time and by evolution to improve and develop it for the modern world.  
According to Natural lawyers a law cannot be a law if it is, as Coke LJ said in Bonham's Case, 
"against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed,” if it were, then 
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“the common law will control it, and adjudge such an Act to be void.” The Courts apply the law in 
a way that reflects a belief in fundamental human rights, an awareness of the Rule of Law and a 
desire to maintain the very most basic of freedoms granted to us by Magna Carta and which have 
been present in one form or another for hundreds of years. In other words, they will defend the 
notion that Coke laid out so neatly in Bonham. The courts will tend to uphold and preserve our right 
as citizens to a free and fair trial, so that none of us are sold or denied justice. Given, as we have 
seen above, that it was Parliament that wrote and approved a number of Bills throughout the 
twenty-first century that attempted to deny us those rights, and which have been challenged 
successfully by the Courts, it seems that our basic freedoms would be better secured with more 
judicial activism, not less; a viewpoint that can only be reinforced by the examples we have seen in 
the Southeast Asian jurisdictions we have observed here.  
 
Judges should not be discouraged from changing the rules, as the common law permits them to do. 
To lawyers, and so to judges, rules and laws are very different, but judges effect change in both. 
They are deeply involved in changing policy by altering and affecting the interpretation of statute, 
but they also affect procedural rules, such as those in Parliament that govern expenses, or the extent 
of the authority of individual government ministers. By doing this, the courts carve for themselves 
an important place in the constitutional and governmental framework of the United Kingdom. As 
judges have already made clear, through their judgements if not directly, they are deeply involved 
in policy-making, and cannot refuse to acknowledge their place in the law-making process no 
matter how involved their role might be. Their decisions form part of a foundation that inevitably 
leads to the evolution of the law as a whole. 
 
The End of Legalism 
 
It is no longer possible to consider laws as static and without involvement in morality. If  one is 
handed a law that is obviously unjust, or morally reprehensible, it must be the responsibility of 
those in a position to correct it to do so. For judges, the means of this correction is statutory 
interpretation. Where the only means of correcting the injustice the law creates, the only means of 
redress is to render the statute void. This was illustrated best in Somersett’s Case, where  It is 
inconclusive to say that no statute has any superior place above any other kind of law, when it is the 
courts alone who are charged with interpreting statutes based on what 'aught' to be
242
. Parliament 
legislates according to necessity, and creates positivist Acts, laws whose existence and role cannot 
be questioned, but it is the common law that decides whether it is a law that should exist as it is, and 
creates a Natural Law framework to constrain parliament's whim. In our legal system, therefore, we 
actually reconcile the two theories by allowing them to operate side-by-side, and provide checks 
and balances for each other.  
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In order for us to reconcile the clear ability of the Courts to overturn statute and create policy,  
demonstrated by the cases we have explored in the previous chapters, we must accept that statutes 
are only law once they have been validated by the Judiciary. Although a law is permitted to operate 
as-is until it is reviewed in court, once the question of its validity has been raised, and the rule is 
interpreted in different ways depending on the circumstance of the complaint, the law certainly 
faces the choice either to change or die. If we consider the popular view of the Enlightenment, as 
the US Declaration of Independence does, that “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed,”243 we find it impossible to reconcile our 
obedience with our sovereignty.  
 
There can be only one sovereign, and in the United Kingdom the title has to rest not with 
Parliament but with the Rule of Law. It is a lofty concept, that we could give such a title to a notion 
that lacks even a clear definition, but it is the most satisfactory means of reconciling the equally 
valid methods available to the separated offices of power in a government (the Executive, the 
Legislature and the Judiciary) of reversing rules created by those opposing and equal offices. Even 
the population, if they are so inclined to do so, can petition for a law to be unmade, or in cases of 
demonstration, can engage in civil disobedience to render a law inoperable. Parliament is able to 
overturn common law decisions using statute, and the Judiciary are able to overturn legislation 
through careful interpretation. All these methods of recourse are available thanks to the Rule of 
Law, whose will is interpreted and carried out by the Judiciary. In this regard one could say, to 
paraphrase George Orwell, that each of the organs of Government are equal, but some are more 
equal than others. 
 
Naturally, Parliament will and often does baulk against the Courts exercising any degree of judicial 
activism, especially on matters that directly affect policy or are populist issues that attract attention. 
Michael Portillo, an experienced politician, voiced his concern on the Sex Offenders’ Register issue 
when he told This Week, 
 
“Judicial activism is a tautology... It’s a bit like talking about political 
politicians... All judges are active and in this case [the right of appeal for 
people who appear on the sex offenders’ register] they have made the right 
decision. People are placed on this list for life without any redress or appeal 
process... They ought to have an appeal – as those on other lists compiled by 
the government do. That’s as close to a human right as I can imagine... 
What you have here is parliament grandstanding on a populist issue.”244 
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It is clear to see that the Courts have a legitimate claim to Sovereign power in the United Kingdom, 
since they do so much that changes, creates and strikes down law, be it a judicial decision or a 
statute and Judges have a great many means available to them in order to exercise this power. In the 
wake of the European Convention on Human Rights as we have already said, the Human Rights Act 
gives the judiciary the ability to declare statutes incompatible. Bonham gives the Courts the option 
to follow Coke, especially where the rule to be examined is one so opposed to right and reason. 
Finally, the Courts could exercise the authority put to use by Lord Mansfield in Somersett’s Case,245 
who said 
 
“The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being 
introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only positive law, which 
preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from 
whence it was created, is erased from memory: it’s so odious, that nothing 
can be suffered to support it, but positive law. Whatever inconveniences, 
therefore, may follow from a decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or 
approved by the law of England; and therefore the black must be 
discharged.” 
 
Clearly here we see Lord Mansfield declaring that when a statute so odious as slavery has lost its 
reason and occasion, yet the statute still remains, the judge has a duty to implement the common 
law, and render the statute to be invalid. It is the only way that the rules of Parliaments of the past, 
rendered now inoperable in all save a few circumstances, can be swept away so as to preserve the 
rights and freedoms of the contemporary state and its people. Were the common law not to exercise 
this house-keeping, then it may be that many laws odious to our society would still be on the statute 
books. Although it is true that such laws may need never be implemented, it is a matter of pride that 
statutes which control and permit the trade of slaves, for example, should be utterly removed from 
being allowed to operate in our jurisdiction. 
 
No matter whether the statute is one or one hundred years old when the courts control it and 
adjudge it to be void, its position as statute should grant it immunity from being invalidated by the 
courts, but this is not true. The very fact that a statute can be overturned in the manner undertaken 
by Lord Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice Coke or the Supreme Court of today proves that the concept 
of a superior statute is fallacy. This makes it much more clear to see how the role of the Judiciary 
has changed since the earliest days of the Common Law. Justice Michael Kirby   explains that, “It 
was inherent in the role of the Royal judges from the reign of Henry II to enforce the law 
throughout the Kingdom. This was an attribute of their function as Royal servants. Servants state 
and apply the law. Making the law is the province of sovereigns.”246  
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Now of course we see that this simply is no longer the case. The Judiciary has been granted it’s own 
slice of Sovereign power, and this gives it the authority to strike down and control statutes, 
sometimes stating directly the intent to make a law void, and sometimes interpreting the wording of 
the statute so obliquely that it becomes unenforcible or remotely different from the meaning it had 
when first given Royal Assent. Kirby goes on to tell us that, in the  common law jurisdictions of the 
United States, and elsewhere in the Commonwealth, jurists were challenging the declaratory theory 
of English positivism, and in doing so discovered that, “Judicial creativity lay deeply embedded in 
the very nature of the common law as they practiced it.”247 
 
Clearly, the declaratory concept of judicial theory is beyond help. “The legal Reformation … 
gained urgency as the twentieth century drew to its close” and Judicial activism as the dominant 
theory behind the law-making and un-making processes in the common law became more prevalent 
among academics and practicing judges alike.
248
 
 
But as the authority of Judges grows, so the authority of statute, and so parliament, must wane, if 
only by short distances. We began our annotation of so-called ‘activist’ judgements with Bonham,  
one of the most significant cases supporting the development of greater judicial authority. Bonham, 
of course, attempted to give the courts the authority to strike down statute where, as has been 
explained, the law is anathema, or contrary to public right or reason, or where it cannot be 
performed. Lord Chief Justice Coke aimed to give the Courts a means of redress against positive 
law, which would otherwise claim to be inviolable. After this judgement, that position was less 
clear, and justices became emboldened. Somersett’s Case is another excellent example of this 
expansion of Judicial power. In this case, where the law of slavery was called into question in 
British Courts, it was a judge who decided that the practice of slavery was so abhorrent to the 
society of the time that the law was to be ignored completely. 
 
Moving further toward the modern-era, cases such as Liversidge v Anderson demonstrate a 
willingness by the courts to defend principles felt to be more vital than simple obedience to 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. This is a trend that continued into the twenty-first century as we have 
seen in cases such as Ahmed v The Treasury and the Belmarsh cases. Moreover, this trend has not 
limited itself just to the rights of man. Anisminic, which has been mentioned countless times, 
demonstrates ideally that Parliament can never constrain the right of the judiciary to examine cases 
on points of law. This case is the best example of the courts asserting their constitutional place, and 
defying the will of Parliament in order to preserve that place.  
 
It is unusual to see that, far from becoming prevalent in the United Kingdom, there is still a 
reluctance to embrace further Judicial authority over Parliament, especially where that same attitude 
has already been met with relative popularity in other jurisdictions, including in Australasia and 
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America. At more-or-less the same time, but on different sides of the world, countries united by 
their shared use of the historic common law brought to them by the British Empire were finding 
more and more that the Judiciary was moving further and further from the “unrealistic ... dogma of 
‘strict and complete legalism.’”249 
 
This paradigm shift need not be unwelcome in the legal system of the United Kingdom. Its 
occurrence is an inevitability, but it comes with many more benefits than were afforded under the 
previous system of legalism. A commentary article in The Guardian reflected the shift in popular 
opinion regarding Judicial activism, claiming that,  
 
“Partly through the common law, partly through treaty and partly through 
statute, modern Britain is slowly moving, over time, from being a country in 
which rights were conceded to those deemed worthy, often based on 
property or gender, to becoming a country where rights are deemed inherent 
to the individual and can be enforced in independent courts.”250 
 
Were it not for this fundamental change in the attitudes of judges, such a defence of modern human 
rights might not be possible, especially in a system where judges are expected to simply interpret 
the law based on what had come before, and what Parliament had already decided. Now that judges 
accept that their judgements form a part of the rule-making process, and the options created by 
European integration provide them with even further authority to keep statute from having the full 
effect of law, they are better able to accept that the courts are able to stake a claim to certain 
sovereign authority, on at least an equal footing with that of Parliament. It could be seen that, as 
with the comment in the Guardian above, statute, treaty and common law can be seen as three 
equally applicable rule-types, that can each cancel out the other should the need arise. As a result, 
each of the organs of power adopt certain shared attributes of the Sovereign.  
 
One could interpret this as being the Sovereign itself; that it is not a title given to one group or 
individual, but is divided amongst the organs of power who operate together as the sovereign. 
Otherwise, the Sovereign may better be identified, as has been seen above, to be the Rule of Law 
itself, that regulates each of these organs, controlling and checking their power through the 
authority of the courts themselves. It could be argued that when the courts rule a statute to be 
invalid, they are in fact invoking the will of the rule of law to give their decision the requisite 
authority. It has been proven in the course of this thesis however, that it is impossible for legal 
Sovereignty to rest solely with Parliament.  
 
There have been too many successful challenges to the absolute authority of Parliament for the 
claim to hold water, and the majority of these challenges, as we have seen, have come from the 
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language of the court. It becomes ever more plain that Parliament not only shares sovereign 
authority with judges, but is also bound by the decisions of the courts. A unifying aspect of the 
Sovereign regardless of the theory that you investigate is that he is unlimited by any other 
instrument, organ, group or individual. If the Sovereign can be limited in scope then he cannot 
claim the title. Where the courts challenge the authority of Parliament, with every success 
Parliament loses yet more authority as Sovereign, and this authority is transferred to the courts.  
 
Judicial Activism and Austin’s Decline 
 
Chapter one of this thesis opened with the statement, “There does not appear to be any room for 
absolute power in modern law and politics.”251 This is still very much the case, and the courts 
continue to confirm this belief whenever a question of constitutionality is raised. Although the 
courts make no claim to absolute authority, they nonetheless continue to ensure that other organs of 
power cannot claim the same. The twin tools of Judicial Review and Declarations of 
Incompatibility provide the courts with legitimate means of challenging Parliament when it chooses 
to exercise its unchecked will upon the population. In time, these tools will inevitably evolve, and 
grant even greater powers to the court to check the continued expansion of the government. The 
ever-increasing role that international law plays in the legal and political systems not just of our 
country but in every country can only serve to widen the role the courts must play in enforcing and 
upholding the Rule of Law. “The ICC’s [International Criminal Court’s] biggest achievement … is 
the fact that most of the world (111 countries and rising) is committed to the idea that certain crimes 
should never go unpunished.”252The authority of statute internationally is only granted so long as 
the states that are signatory to them respect and enforce them. As problems such as these become 
more prevalent in legal systems across the globe, a more active and imaginative judiciary will begin 
to play a much more vital role in international law and politics. Truly, the age of international law 
will be the age of modern international judicial activism.  
 
Without the courts, and their exercise of this function, it would be impossible for our society to 
operate properly and with the necessary safeguards to ensure that the population is protected and 
allowed to flourish. As with Bentham and Austin
253
, it is prudent to regard government as being in a 
position to effect both positive and negative social change; as a result, the need for an impartial 
judiciary, properly equipped and able to amend and, if necessary, strike down Acts of Parliament, is 
a fundamental tool for democracy.  
 
Although it is true that Austin has been used as little more than a straw-man argument on behalf of 
Classical legal theorists (though there are few classical lawyers who remain loyal to Austin
254
) to be 
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swept aside before moving on to more modern theories
255
 to be defeated, his is still nonetheless a 
widely taught and respected theory that attempts to capture a comprehensive roadmap of the law 
and aspects of politics. The downfall that Austin suffered was making his definition of the 
Sovereign too rigid, too certain. In so doing, Austin in fact made his theory all the more susceptible 
to criticism. As a result, Hart developed Austin’s theory of sovereignty into his rule of recognition. 
This hardly helps either because, rather than personalising the origin of law, as Austin did with his 
human Sovereign, Hart places the validity of a rule inside an impersonal system of validation. In 
effect, Hart reduces Austin’s sovereign into a box-ticking exercise rather than a person or body of 
persons who can be easily identified, can be demonstrated enforcing his will, and can be held to 
account for his actions. Hart’s theory does not account for this, but holds more to the spirit of the 
idea of the Rule of Law as being Sovereign. 
 
Austin failed to provide an appropriate definition for the Sovereign, and it is in trying, in the course 
of this work, to find a person or body of persons to fill the Sovereign’s seat that we realise that the 
Sovereign is the Rule of Law, which allows statutory rules to be validated
256
 using the rule of 
recognition, and so the laws of England and Wales are continually reassessed and evaluated by the 
Judiciary. We have seen in both our own jurisdiction and in others internationally that Judges have 
the authority, the will and the means to make, change and strike down statutes, which gives them a 
position of unrivaled constitutional authority. The Sovereignty of the courts provides a new 
constitutional model that radically affects the way Parliament can do business. If the courts were 
involved in policy-making and implementation, then not only would the system be drastically 
slower, as the judiciary evaluates government decisions for constitutionality, it must lead to an 
inevitable stand-off with Parliament, as each vies for absolute authority for law-making in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Although Austin may be outdated he nonetheless provides a pivotal starting point in accurately 
identifying where Sovereignty might lie. However, since Austin’s lectures in jurisprudence were 
first published in 1832, the legal landscape has changed drastically. As a result our understanding of 
the Sovereign must change as well. Instead of a King, Parliament or deity, the Sovereign has 
become something more intangible, and more universal, and yet something that is easier understood 
than trying to force inappropriate definitions upon the existing machine of government. After an 
international post-war shift from Positivism to Natural law in the years after World War Two, the 
Rule of Law, a principle acknowledged in cultures across the world, may now claim Sovereignty in 
the United Kingdom with certainty and legitimacy. Of course, Baroness Hale was right to point out 
in Chapter One that it is indeed a matter of where the tanks are, but when the International Criminal 
Court takes up jurisdiction over the controversial crime of aggression in 2013, the notion of 
legitimacy to rule may mean more than simply a monopoly on violence and coercion by force. 
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Hart’s Influence in the Sovereignty Debate 
 
According to Hart, “to say that a given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests 
provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the system. We can indeed simply say that 
the statement that a particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all the criteria provided by the rule 
of recognition.”257 to Hart, a rule is a rule if the procedure that created it is the accepted means of 
creating law, and that the procedure was followed fully and properly. This effectively concurs with 
the idea that the Rule of Law is sovereign, in much the same way as a Constitution enjoys sovereign 
authority in a society, the Rule of Recognition, theoretically, should be the most superior form of 
law, since it determines how all other laws can be manufactured. However, there arises the question 
of where the rule comes from, and furthermore, whether or not the rule of recognition can be 
changed. 
 
One serious pitfall with the rule of recognition is the question of alteration. If the rule of recognition 
can be altered, then who can alter it, and does that deprive it of its authority? The Parliament Acts 
of 1911 and 1949 both served to change the rule of recognition for statutes in the United Kingdom. 
Rather than receiving assent from both Houses of Parliament and the Monarch, the Act granted the 
House of Commons the authority to pass a statute to the Monarch for Royal Assent without the 
scrutiny of the Upper House. If the definition of a statute is a bill which has received assent from 
Parliament and the Crown, is an act passed without all of these requirements a ‘real’ act of 
Parliament? The Jackson ruling plainly demonstrated that the Courts were willing to cosider Acts 
passed in this way as bona fide Acts of Parliament, with the same authority as any other, but the 
question was addressed that by altering the framework of Statutory creation, Parliament had 
inadvertently caused one constitutional crisis by authoring an act designed to solve another. 
 
Without judicial review the Courts are little more than dispute resolution centres, but given the 
authority to challenge statute the Judiciary in the United Kingdom has an opportunity to redefine 
it’s role in the British Constitutional Model, and to adopt, as closely as possible, the mantle of 
Sovereign in the legal sense. The passionate defence of the rights of the individual by the court, 
expressed by Baroness Hale in Jackson, means that “the courts will treat with particular suspicion 
(and might even reject) any attempt to subvert the rule of law by removing governmental action 
affecting the rights of the individual from all judicial scrutiny.”258 Given that the courts may 
“reject” such an attempt by Parliament, we can see that the Courts accept that their authority 
extends to striking down statute, no matter how reluctant they might be to vocalise this authority. 
However, as Lord Carswell pointed out, the courts will always be cautious of attacking the theory 
of Parliamentary Sovereignty, in order to preserve the “tradition of mutual respect”259 between 
Parliament and the Judiciary. Given however that this thesis has demonstrated that the Sovereign is 
the Rule of Law, no one body in the United Kingdom could claim Sovereignty. However the Courts 
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are the arbiters of the Rule of Law and, in a similar fashion to the divine right of Kings, are solely 
charged with revealing and defining the law through  reported decisions. 
  
 
Conclusion  
 
“Parliamentary Sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute.”260 
-Lord Hope in Jackson 
 
Of course Parliament plays a significant role of its own in the rule-making process. It’s ability to 
create anticipatory rules, and to make laws when required and not when the question is brought 
before a judge in court, provides the legal system with greater certainty and flexibility. But it is still 
possible for the Courts to control statutes and even change their meaning, sometimes drastically.  
 
It is in the interpretation of statutes and judgements that the real advantage of the common law can 
be seen, and that is it’s flexibility. Every judgement sets in stone the law, to a degree of certainty, 
for the next litigants to use or refute. But these words are open to interpretation, and the difficulty is 
persuading a judge that your perspective is the correct one. This becomes even more difficult as 
cases become older, and their circumstances become all the more alien and historical. Statutes and 
decisions alike can still claim historical origin. Even familiar cases like Donoghue v Stephenson
261
 
are becoming more historical and less understandable from a social perspective; drying up into 
opaque legal terminology and rule frameworks with only a little context left to which people can 
relate, be them lay person or professional. 
 
As a result, and with reference to the cases we have discussed above, it becomes obvious that 
Parliament must submit to the will of the Courts, and as a result must renounce it’s claim to legal 
Sovereignty in the United Kingdom. For the Legal System in the United Kingdom, there are now a 
host of precedents to be examined when considering the question mark that now hangs over 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. Jackson v Attorney General is now the most significant of the cases to 
have directly challenged the notion of Parliamentary Sovereignty, since rather than challenging the 
validity of a statute based on European Union law,
262
 the case challenges the very means by which 
Parliament enacts statutes. Although the position of Statute as law is not under question, the issue at 
hand both for practicing professionals and legal philosophers is whether the court can, thanks to this 
judgement, declare an act to be invalid through interpretation if the process by which it was 
authored was not appropriate or correct, and based on the research carried out in this paper, I am 
forced to accept that this is the reality. In the words of Lord Nicholls, “Statutes create law. The 
proper interpretation of a statute is a matter for the courts, not Parliament. This principle is as 
fundamental in this country’s constitution as the principle that Parliament has exclusive cognisance 
over its own affairs.”263 
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Early statutes, however, served a similar purpose to the courts of today. These rules were seen not 
as a change in the law, or the creation of laws anew, but an agreed restatement by the government 
of what the law was. By way of example, the 1351 Treason Act sought to explain that the rule on 
treason did not extend to crimes of servants against their masters, so called ‘petty treason’. In the 
early years of the development of the common law as we know it today, the lines between the 
institutions of power were less defined. The High Court of Parliament as it was then known brings 
into question the separation of the legislature and the judiciary, and goes some way to explain why 
it is that the system in the United Kingdom works as it does. 
 
 Like the common law itself, the relationship between the Courts and Parliament has evolved over 
time, and the roles of the institutions have changed. Parliament has shifted from a body with 
legislative and judicial authority to one which can only claim a legislative role. This was further 
cemented in the Sheriff of Middlesex’s Case which made clear that it was the role of the Courts to 
decide on matters of law, and not Parliament. For the Judiciary, the process has been slower, and 
marked with greater controversy, especially in the twentieth century amid the rise of popular 
democracy. It is important to remember that in any society no system is static, and neither is any 
system perfect. All need to adapt to changing circumstances and different cultural norms. If the 
relationship between the courts and Parliament were never to change, it would be very dangerous 
for justice and the Rule of Law, as there would be no body with the jurisdiction to challenge the 
will of Parliament even if it is one that runs counter to the Rule of Law.  
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